Gabriele De Anna

This essay deals with the problem of the status of colours, traditionally considered as the paradigmatic case of secondary qualities: do colours exist only as aspects of experience or are they real properties of objects, existing independently of human and animal perception? Recently, John Campbell has argued in favour of the simple view of colours, according to which colours are real properties of objects. I discuss the place of Campbell's position in a debated which was started by John Mackie and continued by John McDowell, and defend it from a criticism due to Michael Smith. I conclude that the simple view is a philosophically credible position. Subsequently, I consider an alleged contradiction between the simple view and semantic externalism pointed out by Jim Edwards. I suggest that a supporter of the simple view may consistently maintain semantic externalism, if she also accepts epistemological externalism about the canonical warrant of perceptual judgements.

Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have been arguing for what they named libertarian paternalism (henceforth LP). Their proposal generated extensive debate as to how and whether LP might lead down a full-blown paternalistic slippery slope. LP has the indubitable merit of having hardwired the best of the empirical psychological and sociological evidence into public and private policy making. It is unclear, though, to what extent the implementation of policies so constructed could enhance the capability for the exercise of an autonomous citizenship. Sunstein and Thaler submit it that in most of the cases in which one is confronted with a set of choices, some default option must be picked out. In those cases whoever devises the features of the set of options ought to rank them according to the moral principle of non-maleficence and possibly to that of beneficence. In this paper we argue that LP can be better implemented if there is a preliminary deliberative debate among the stakeholders that elicits their preferences, and makes it possible to rationally defend them

Resumo Recentemente o Hilemorfismo – a visão tradicional, segundo a qual, as substâncias são constituídas pela combinação de forma e matéria – tem sido alvo de renovado interesse. Este artigo centra-se na substância material e sugere que, neste caso, a constituição hilemórfica exige uma noção de forma que deve ser alargada ao conceito de energia, ou ao exercício de uma força. Neste artigo também se defende o gradualismo substancial: se a forma for assim entendida, a substancialidade possui graus, ou seja, as coisas podem ser substâncias em maior ou menor grau. O gradualismo substancial pode iluminar os actuais debates relativos à identificação das partes das substâncias e à compatibilidade entre o hilemorfismo e o categorialismo. Palavras-chave : forma, gradualismo substancial, hilemorfismo, matéria, substânciaHylomorphism, the old traditional view according to which substances are constituted by the combination of form and matter, has recently undergone a renaissance. This essay focuses on material substance, and suggests that in this case the hylomorphic constitution calls for a notion of form which should be understood also as energy, or the exercise of a force. It further argues for substantial gradualism: when form is thus understood, substantiality comes in degrees, i.e. things can be substances to a greater or lesser degree. Substantial gradualism sheds new light on current discussions concerning the identification of the parts of substances and the compatibility between hylomorphism and sortalism. Keywords : form, hylomorphism, matter, substance, substantial gradualism.

Science increasingly deals with human behavior: biology, neuroscience, genetics, psychology, evolutionary theory, and ethology all bring new insights into our actions and uncover new facts about our agency. However, what is the philosophical significance of their findings? The answer to this question varies according to one's background philosophical views. On the one hand, the dominant empiricist view contends that the sciences can in principle tell us everything there is to know about human agency. On the other hand, there are other non-empiricist views - such as Kantian or Aristotelian perspectives - which hold that although science can contribute to our understanding of agency, agency itself cannot be reduced to mere scientific facts. This collection of original essays brings together a number of experts from different philosophical fields (history of philosophy, philosophy of action, ethics, and philosophy of science) to discuss how recent scientific developments about human behavior may be interpreted by, and may be relevant for, non-empiricist conceptions of agency. Contributors share the project of reconciling the scientific and the manifest images of the world in order to reach a stereoscopic vision of reality, with the conviction that philosophy is an attempt to establish coherence among our beliefs, while taking, at least prima facie, all the aspects of our experience at face value.