Gabriele De Anna

How can the discoveries made in the biological sciences play a role in a discussion on the foundation of ethics? This book responds to this question by examining how evolutionism can explain and justify the existence of ethical normativity and the emergence of particular moral systems. Written by a team of philosophers and scientists, the essays collected in this volume deal with the limits of evolutionary explanations, the justifications of ethics, and methodological issues concerning evolutionary accounts of ethics, among other topics. They offer deep insights into the origin and purpose of human moral capacities and of moral systems.

“How should authority relate to common sense, in making the judgements that its functioning requires?” This essay tries to address this question. Firstly, it attempts at clarifying three key concepts which are deployed in the question: the concepts of authority, common sense, and judgement. Subsequently, it claims that the elucidation of those concepts suggests that we need to settle two preliminary issues, to begin with: a. given what authority is, what roles should formal logic and other sciences have in the rational procedures which authority uses to make its judgements? b. In what sense can a suitable notion of common sense be common? Finally, the essay suggests, as an answer to the initial question, the view that common sense is a common ground of experiences and beliefs that all human beings can share, and that authority, in order to maintain its role, can make judgements based on scientific theories which are inaccessible to people subject to that authority, only to the extent that those theories are consistent with common sense.

In this paper, the ontological, terminological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of omission are considered in a coherent and balanced framework, based on the idea that there are omissions which are actions and omissions which are non-actions. In particular, we suggest that the approach to causation which best deals with omission is Mackie's INUS conditional proposal. We argue that omissions are determined partly by the ontological conditional structure of reality, and partly by the interests, beliefs, and values of observers. The final upshot is that moral judgments involved in cases of omissions cannot be grounded on, but are the ground for judgments about what INUS conditions count as omissions.

This essay deals with the problem of the status of colours, traditionally considered as the paradigmatic case of secondary qualities: do colours exist only as aspects of experience or are they real properties of objects, existing independently of human and animal perception? Recently, John Campbell has argued in favour of the simple view of colours, according to which colours are real properties of objects. I discuss the place of Campbell's position in a debated which was started by John Mackie and continued by John McDowell, and defend it from a criticism due to Michael Smith. I conclude that the simple view is a philosophically credible position. Subsequently, I consider an alleged contradiction between the simple view and semantic externalism pointed out by Jim Edwards. I suggest that a supporter of the simple view may consistently maintain semantic externalism, if she also accepts epistemological externalism about the canonical warrant of perceptual judgements.