Mark Coeckelbergh

Like other teletechnological practices, drone fighting as remote fighting gives rise to a paradox with regard to the relation between ethics and distance: on the one hand, it bridges physical distance in the sense that it enables spying on people and killing people in other parts of the world. On the other hand, it seems to increase moral distance: if you are far away from your target, it becomes easier to kill. However, based on interviews with drone crew as published in the media, I show that the current surveillance tech­nologies used in drone fighting might mitigate this effect since they allow the viewer to build up a kind of in­timacy with targets. Then I argue that this moral proximity is only possible if we assume!hat in­terpretation and the construction of narrative play a key role in the·epistemology of surveillance. I compare military surveillance to surveillance in public spaces to elaborate this point and explore the relation be­tween automated surveillance, distance, and interpretation. I also argue that given the lack of shared soci­ality and communication, moral distance in surveillance and drone fighting can only partly be bridged by technology-mediated interpretation and narration. I conclude that we need more reflection on how technol­ogies could create the conditions under which moral metamorphosis and interpretative freedom is not only possible but also probable.

ABSTRACT: This paper raises questions regarding the societal, cultural and ethical significance of finance, mathematics, and financial-mathematical technologies, discussing in particular the phenomenon of quantification as mediated by contemporary electronic information and communication technologies (ICTS). It first relates the history of mathematics to the history of financial technologies, and argues, inspired by Simmel and Marcuse, that from ancient times to now there seems to be an evolution towards increasing quantification not only in finance, accounting etc., but in modern society in general. It shows that scientific and technological changes have social and ethical consequences, as quantification creates more distance between people. The paper then analyzes and discusses current shifts of financial agency that exemplify what seems to be a moment of hyper-quantification through the use of ICTs: experiences of “the market” as an independent agent and money machines as artificial agents in high frequency trading—perhaps the only agents still able to cope with the data-loaded and hyper-quantified world we live in. Under these conditions it becomes more difficult to exercise responsibility. The paper concludes that while we must acknowledge the human character of finance and mathematics, there are real human and social consequences of quantification, in ancient times and today, for society and responsibility. It is therefore misleading to assume that financial technologies and mathematics are ethically neutral; more analysis of ethical and societal aspects is needed, also from an “outside” perspective.

What does it mean to introduce the notion of imagination in the discussion about global justice? What is gained by studying the role of imagination in thinking about global justice? Does a focus on imagination imply that we must replace existing influential principle-centred approaches such as that of John Rawls and his critics? We can distinguish between two approaches to global justice. One approach is Rawlsian and Kantian in inspiration. Discussions within this tradition typically focus on the question whether Rawls's theory of justice (1971), designed for the national level, can or should be applied to the global level. Can and should Rawls's Difference Principle be globalized, as Thomas Pogge argues? Is this proposal superior to Rawls's Law of Peoples (1999)? Another approach to global justice has been developed by Martha Nussbaum in Cultivating Humanity (1997), Poetic Justice (1995), and other work. I will construct her view and critically examine it by looking at her arguments about the relation between empathy, literature, and global justice. At first sight, these two approaches seem to be opposed. The former puts an emphasis on principles, universal reason, and the moral aspects of institutions and their policies, whereas the latter is rather concerned with the relation between imagination and justice, with the particular, and with the individual moral development. But is this necessarily so? I will show that both approaches could benefit from each other's insights to strengthen their own position. Moreover, I will argue for middle way between, or an integration of the two approaches that combines principles and imagination. In this way, we can move towards a more comprehensive account of global justice.