•  152
    Alcoholism, Disease, and Insanity
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (4): 297-315. 2013.
    It is argued that alcoholism, and substance addiction generally, is a disease. It is not of its nature chronic or progressive, although it is in serious cases. It is better viewed as a psychological disease than a neurological one. It is argued that each time an alcoholic takes a drink, this is the result of choice; however, in cases of serious affliction, such choices are compulsive and may be called 'involuntary' in that they are made against the subject's will, motivated by an overwhelmingly …Read more
  • The Segal Discussion
    with Donald Davidson
    Philosophy International. 1997.
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    Representing representations
    In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes, Cambridge University Press. pp. 146--161. 1998.
  •  21
    Ignorance of meaning
    In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language, Oxford University Press. 2003.
    Article
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    Common Sense, Science, and ‘Spirituality’
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (4): 325-328. 2013.
  •  23
    Book Reviews (review)
    Mind 100 (399): 408-410. 1991.
  •  40
    Truth and sense
    In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference one Hundred Years later, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 15--24. 1995.
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    Knowledge of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Theory
    with Richard K. Larson
    MIT Press. 1995.
    Current textbooks in formal semantics are all versions of, or introductions to, the same paradigm in semantic theory: Montague Grammar. Knowledge of Meaning is based on different assumptions and a different history. It provides the only introduction to truth- theoretic semantics for natural languages, fully integrating semantic theory into the modern Chomskyan program in linguistic theory and connecting linguistic semantics to research elsewhere in cognitive psychology and philosophy. As such, i…Read more
  •  124
    This paper is principally devoted to comparing and contrasting poverty of stimulus arguments for innate cognitive apparatus in relation to language and in relation to folk psychology. These days one is no longer allowed to use the term ‘innate’ without saying what one means by it. So I will begin by saying what I mean by ‘innate’. Sections 2 and 3 will discuss language and theory of mind, respectively. Along the way, I will also briefly discuss other arguments for innate cognitive apparatus in t…Read more