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32The Causal Inefficacy of ContentMind and Language 24 (1): 80-102. 2009.The paper begins with the assumption that psychological event tokens are identical to or constituted from physical events. It then articulates a familiar apparent problem concerning the causal role of psychological properties. If they do not reduce to physical properties, then either they must be epiphenomenal or any effects they cause must also be caused by physical properties, and hence be overdetermined. It then argues that both epiphenomenalism and over‐determinationism are prima facie perfe…Read more
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28Addiction and Choice: Rethinking the Relationship (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2016.Views on addiction are often polarised - either addiction is a matter of choice, or addicts simply can't help themselves. But perhaps addiction falls between the two? This book contains views from philosophy, neuroscience, psychiatry, psychology, and the law exploring this middle ground between free choice and no choice.
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28Four arguments for the indeterminacy of translationIn A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine, Kluwer Academic Print On Demand. pp. 131--139. 2000.
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27Consciousness, by W. G. Lycan (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1): 240-243. 1991.
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24Commentary on Hanna Pickard, “The Purpose in Chronic Addiction”American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (2): 63-64. 2012.
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22Interpreting Davidson (edited book)Center for the Study of Language and Inf. 2001.Donald Davidson is, arguably, the most important philosopher of mind and language in recent decades. His articulation of the position he called "anomalous monism" and his ideas for unifying the general theory of linguistic meaning with semantics for natural language both set new agendas in the field. _Interpreting Davidson_ collects original essays on his work by some of his leading contemporaries, with Davidson himself contributing a reply to each and an original paper of his own
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20A Slim Book on Narrow ContentMIT Press. 1999.A good understanding of the nature of a property requires knowing whether that property is relational or intrinsic. Gabriel Segal's concern is whether certain psychological properties—specifically, those that make up what might be called the "cognitive content" of psychological states—are relational or intrinsic. He claims that content supervenes on microstructure, that is, if two beings are identical with respect to their microstructural properties, then they must be identical with respect to t…Read more
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20Ignorance of meaningIn Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language, Oxford University Press. 2003.Article
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18Consciousness, by W. G. Lycan (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1): 240-243. 1991.
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17Verdad y significadoIdeas Y Valores 53 (125): 49-79. 2004.The paper provides a sketch of the place of the work of Donald Davidsonin the study of formal semantics for natural languages. It discusses someimportant relations between Davidsons work and ideas due to Frege,Tarski, Quine and Chomsky. A criticism of Davidsons behaviouristicmethodology is offered..
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15Truth and senseIn Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 15--24. 1995.
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14Representing representationsIn P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes, Cambridge University Press. pp. 146--161. 1998.
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10Review of Robert A. Wilson: Cartesian psychology and physical minds: Iindividualism and the sciences of mind (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1): 151--156. 1997.
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7Five Flies in the Ointment: Some Challenges for Traditional Semantic TheoryIn Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 287-308. 2012.
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The philosophy of psychologyIn Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject, Oxford University Press. 1998.
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Please allow me to recapitulate some territory that will be familiar to most readers. Here is how the problem of mental causation has typically been set up since shortly after the onset of non-reductive physicalism. It is now widely assumed that the realm of the physical is causally closed. This means that the probability of any event’s occurring is fully determined by physical causes, and physical causes alone. There is no space in the physical causal nexus for any non-physical event to exert a…Read more
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Truth andIn Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 189. 2006.
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O jednorodnej analizie semantycznej deskrypcji określonych i nieokreślonych (tłum. Filip Kawczyński)Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 75. 2010.
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Narrow ContentIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.