Daniel Cohen

This contribution resumes the main conclusions of a common work of philosophical comparatism between the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Proclus, which is based on the examination of their respective reception of the traditional metaphysical use of anciant myths. This article consists in the examination of two important “definitions” of myth collected in the Enneads of Plotinus and Proclus’ Commentary on the Republic. On the basis of these analyses, it is possible to assert that, for Plotinus as for Proclus, the muthos appears as being a simple particular case of logos, and even that the logos itself is only a particular case of muthos.

This contribution resumes the main conclusions of a common work of philosophical comparatism between the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Proclus, which is based on the examination of their respective reception of the traditional metaphysical use of anciant myths. This article consists in the examination of two important “definitions” of myth collected in the Enneads of Plotinus and Proclus’ Commentary on the Republic. On the basis of these analyses, it is possible to assert that, for Plotinus as for Proclus, the muthos appears as being a simple particular case of logos, and even that the logos itself is only a particular case of muthos.

Calling an argument “merely academic” impugns its seriousness, belittles its substance, dis-misses its importance, and deflates hope of resolution, while ruling out negotiation and compromise. How-ever, “purely academic” argumentation, as an idealized limit case, is a valuable analytical tool for argumen-tation theorists because while the telos of academic argumentation may be cognitive, it is cognitive in the service of a community, which, in turn, is a community in the service of the cognitive.

With the possible exception of completely formal exercises in logic, philosophy is thoroughly metaphorical and largely conditional. Moreover, the purposes served by metaphors and conditionals in it are similar. Metaphors ask us to imagine the world in a new way, while conditionals may ask to imagine a new world. Yet some conditionals and metaphors are incompatible. There are limits to how metaphors can occur in conditionals, and how conditionals can themselves be metaphors. Specifically, only certain kinds of metaphors can be accommodated in the antecedents of conditionals, and even then only within a restricted class of conditionals. This paper focuses on the linguistic tension between metaphors and conditionals. I argue that this echoes a tension at the heart of philosophy between two modes of philosophizing: a speculative-revisionary mode that is metaphorical and an analytic-explanatory mode that is conditional. The tasks are generally complementary so that the difference can be ignored with impunity. However, if we do not respect that difference, we may find ourselves analyzing metaphors and seeing logical analyses as metaphorical, and thus missing the point on both fronts.

It has been suggested that to say something of the form 'if P, then Q' is less an affirmation of a conditional than a conditional affirmation of the consequent, Q. If the condition of assertion, P, is true, then Q has been asserted. If the condition of assertion turns out to have been false, it is as if there had been no assertion. Such conditionals have come to be called "conditional assertions." This dissertation is a study of the logic conditionals, focusing on the logic of conditional assertions and the significance of that locution for accounts of language. ;Conditional assertions differ from assertions of conditionals in two important respects. First, a conditional assertion only succeeds in asserting when the condition of assertion is met. Second, what a conditional assertion asserts, when it does, is just its consequent. A logic of conditional assertions has to account for both the occasional contextual equivalence of a conditional and its consequent and the occasional nonassertiveness of some conditionals. ;It is pragmatic considerations that ground the proposed taxonomy of conditionals and so distinguish conditional assertions from other kinds of conditionals. Pragmatic concerns also provide desiderata for constructing a logic of conditional assertions. A logic is presented and proved sound and complete that meets these goals. The logic of conditional assertions is further developed along two main branches. The logic is first extended to a first-order theory, a theory with quantification. It is also combined with the Relevance Logic, R, so that an implication connective is incorporated. The result of the latter is a "multiconditional logic," a logic accommodating more than one kind of conditional. Soundness and completeness proofs are provided for these systems. Finally, the philosophical impact of a multiconditional logic with nonassertive elements on accounts of language is measured