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51If P, Then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning. David H. Sanford (review)Philosophy of Science 59 (2): 331-332. 1992.
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26How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virtue, and yet objectivity is itself a bias? In this paper, we argue that objectivity is indeed a kind of bias but is still an argumentative virtue. In common with many biases – and many virtues – its effects are neither uniformly negative nor uniformly positive. Consequences alone are not enough to determine which character traits are argumentative virtues. Context matters. The opening section addresse…Read more
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26There is more to mathematics than proofs; there are also arguments, which means that mathematicians are human arguers complete with their biases. Among those biases is a preference for beauty, It is a bias insofar as it is a deaprture from objectivity, but it is benign, accounting for the popularity of Cantor's "Paradise" of non-denumerable infinities as a travel destination for mathematicians and the relatively little interest in Robinson's infinitesimals.
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21Although Michael Yong-Set's proposal to approach argumentation theory from a ludological perspective is not yet sufficiently developed to warrant adopting it, there is enough to warrant exploring it further – which is all the reception it needs at this point.
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30For all its problems, there is still much to be gleaned from the argument-is-war paradigm. Much of the conceptual vocabulary that we use to talk about wars is commonly applied to arguments. Other concepts in the war-cluster can also be readily adapted to arguments. Some parts, of course, do not seem to apply so easily, if at all. Of most interest here are those war-concepts that have not been deployed in thinking about arguments but really should be because of the light they can shed on argum…Read more
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The Logic of Conditional AssertionsDissertation, Indiana University. 1983.It has been suggested that to say something of the form 'if P, then Q' is less an affirmation of a conditional than a conditional affirmation of the consequent, Q. If the condition of assertion, P, is true, then Q has been asserted. If the condition of assertion turns out to have been false, it is as if there had been no assertion. Such conditionals have come to be called "conditional assertions." This dissertation is a study of the logic conditionals, focusing on the logic of conditional assert…Read more
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24On What Cannot BeIn J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 123--132. 1990.
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7Review: Anthony Appiah, Assertion and Conditionals (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (4): 1051-1052. 1987.
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19The rhetoric of logic reveals, we claim, that arguments are about force, ending only when one side submits. Rhetoricians, it is countered, are content to persuade, settling for agreement when truth is wanted—and all is fair in pursuit of consent. The choice between conceptual rape and seduction is a false choice. It is time to cut against the grain. We are distracted by the rhetoric of logic and gloss the logic of rhetoric. Rhetorical models for pluralistic discourses are vital, but fail as regu…Read more
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8Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal by Robert Fogelin (review)Informal Logic 23 (1). 2003.
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38Arguments and Metaphors in PhilosophyUniversity Press of America. 2004.In this book, Daniel Cohen explores the connections between arguments and metaphors, most pronounced in philosophy because philosophical discourse is both thoroughly metaphorical and replete with argumentation. Cohen covers the nature of arguments, their modes and structures, and the principles of their evaluation, and addresses the nature of metaphors, their place in language and thought, and their connections to arguments, identifying and reconciling arguments' and metaphors' respective roles …Read more
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24Finocchiaro, Maurice., Meta-argumentation: An Approach to Logic and Argumentation Theory (review)Review of Metaphysics 67 (2): 428-430. 2013.
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52A new axiomatization of Belnap's conditional assertionNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (1): 124-132. 1986.
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21A complex network of reciprocal relations connect arguments and stories. Arguments can occur in stories and stories can be parts of arguments. Further, stories can themselves be arguments. Whether a text or exchange serves as an argument partly depe nds on how we read it, i.e., on the story we tell about it and how well we argue for that story, but the circle is not as vicious as it appears. Or at least, that is the story we present and the argument we tell in this dialogue revisiting the ancien…Read more
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33Commentary on: Katharina von Radziewsky's "The virtuous arguer: One person, four characters"In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewinski (eds.), Virtues of argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013, Ossa. 2014.N/A.
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1Review: Robert K. Meyer, Georg Dorn, P. Weingartner, A Farewell to Entailment (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (1): 352-353. 1990.
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28Fogelin's Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal by Robert FogelinInformal Logic 23 (1). 2003.
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51Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a great deal, perhaps even most, of our reasoning turns out to be rationalizing. The reasons we give for our positions are seldom either the real reasons or the effective causes of why we have those positions. We are not as rational as we like to think. A second, no less disheartening observation is that while we may be very effective when it comes to giving reasons, we are not that good at getting reasons. We are not as reasons-responsive as w…Read more
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17Schoolhouses, Jailhouses and the House of Being: The Tragedy of Philosophy’s MetaphorsMetaphilosophy 29 (1‐2): 6-19. 1998.As a rule, there is nothing in the words themselves to mark off metaphors from literal language. If a boundary could somehow be drawn, it would be in constant need of re‐adjustment as metaphors become entrenched, idiomatic, and finally literal, and literal phrases are put to figurative or hyperbolic, and then metaphorical uses. Further, there is no algorithmic recovery of the intended meaning of a metaphor from the meanings of its components, no function that takes literal meanings as its argume…Read more
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156Argument is War... And War is Hell: Philosophy, Education, and Metaphors for ArgumentationInformal Logic 17 (2): 177-188. 1995.The claim that argumentation has no proper role in either philosophy or education, and especially not in philosophical education, flies in the face of both conventional wisdom and traditional pedagogy. There is, however, something to be said for it because it is really only provocative against a certain philosophical backdrop. Our understanding of the concept "argument" is both reflected by and molded by the specific metaphor that argument-is-war, something with winners and losers, offensive and…Read more
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50Paul Boghossian - Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and ConstructivismInformal Logic 27 (2): 229-232. 2007.Paul Boghossian’s recent book, Fear of Knowledge offers an extended argument against some forms of contemporary anti-realism and, by implication, an argument for realism. The intended audience is philosophers with metaphysical and epistemological interests, argumentation theorists might be most engaged by it because while the book is flawed as an argument, it makes a positive contribution when read as a discourse about argument. The main flaw is the uncharitable readings of Kuhn, Rorty, and Lat…Read more
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Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Philosophy, Misc |
Areas of Interest
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Philosophy of Language |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Philosophy, Misc |