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Brent Kious

University of Utah
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    35
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  News and Updates
    32

 More details
  • University of Utah
    Post-doctoral fellow
University of California, Los Angeles
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2009
Salt Lake City, Utah, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Applied Ethics
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
  • All publications (35)
  •  94
    Internal Control and Inappropriate Desires
    American Journal of Bioethics 11 (8): 21-22. 2011.
    The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 8, Page 21-22, August 2011
    Biomedical EthicsMedical Ethics
  •  352
    Philosophy on steroids: Why the anti-doping position could use a little enhancement
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29 (4): 213-234. 2008.
    There is currently much concern over the use of pharmaceuticals and other biomedical techniques to enhance athletic performance—a practice we might refer to as doping. Many justifications of anti-doping efforts claim that doping involves a serious moral transgression. In this article, I review a number of arguments in support of that claim, but show that they are not conclusive, suggesting that we do not have good reasons for thinking that doping is wrong.
    Philosophy of SportNeuroethics
  •  104
    Autonomy and Values: Why the Conventional Theory of Autonomy is Not Value-Neutral
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (1): 1-12. 2015.
    One of the most widely accepted views in bioethics is that paternalistic interference in others’ self-regarding decisions is justified only if those decisions are not autonomous. Typically, a decision is autonomous if and only if it satisfies certain psychological criteria. Namely, it must be competent and also voluntary. This latter criterion means, roughly, that the agent herself decided without being controlled or unduly influenced by other persons or impersonal forces, in light her own value…Read more
    One of the most widely accepted views in bioethics is that paternalistic interference in others’ self-regarding decisions is justified only if those decisions are not autonomous. Typically, a decision is autonomous if and only if it satisfies certain psychological criteria. Namely, it must be competent and also voluntary. This latter criterion means, roughly, that the agent herself decided without being controlled or unduly influenced by other persons or impersonal forces, in light her own values.The modern locus classicus of this idea is undoubtedly Beauchamp and Childress ; they claim we have a duty to respect autonomous agents.
    Autonomy in Applied EthicsPsychiatric TaxonomyPhilosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, MiscMent…Read more
    Autonomy in Applied EthicsPsychiatric TaxonomyPhilosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, MiscMental Illness
  •  101
    Response to MacGregor and McNamee: Risks, relativity, and wrongness
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32 (3): 209-210. 2011.
    Biomedical Ethics
  •  107
    Autonomy, Judgment, and Theories of the Good
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (1): 21-24. 2015.
    I am grateful for the insightful comments that have been furnished by Drs. Gala, Moseley, and Perring following their reading of my paper. Happily, I find myself in the position of being able to accept many of their criticisms, which identify many of the limitations of my argument as I see them. In only a few cases do I feel that their remarks are misplaced.The first concern raised by Moseley and Gala is that the paper gives the regrettable impression that persons with anorexia nervosa generally…Read more
    I am grateful for the insightful comments that have been furnished by Drs. Gala, Moseley, and Perring following their reading of my paper. Happily, I find myself in the position of being able to accept many of their criticisms, which identify many of the limitations of my argument as I see them. In only a few cases do I feel that their remarks are misplaced.The first concern raised by Moseley and Gala is that the paper gives the regrettable impression that persons with anorexia nervosa generally have few cognitive deficits and primarily experience problems in valuing. But as is widely known, this is false: many persons with AN reason poorly and suffer perceptual distortions. I did not.
    Autonomy in Political TheoriesAutonomy, MiscPhilosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, MiscMental…Read more
    Autonomy in Political TheoriesAutonomy, MiscPhilosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, MiscMental IllnessPsychopathology, Misc
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