•  98
    Response to MacGregor and McNamee: Risks, relativity, and wrongness
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32 (3): 209-210. 2011.
  •  104
    Autonomy, Judgment, and Theories of the Good
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (1): 21-24. 2015.
    I am grateful for the insightful comments that have been furnished by Drs. Gala, Moseley, and Perring following their reading of my paper. Happily, I find myself in the position of being able to accept many of their criticisms, which identify many of the limitations of my argument as I see them. In only a few cases do I feel that their remarks are misplaced.The first concern raised by Moseley and Gala is that the paper gives the regrettable impression that persons with anorexia nervosa generally…Read more
  •  1482
    Diseases, patients and the epistemology of practice: mapping the borders of health, medicine and care
    with Michael Loughlin, Robyn Bluhm, Jonathan Fuller, Stephen Buetow, and Benjamin R. Lewis
    Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (3): 357-364. 2015.
    Last year saw the 20th anniversary edition of JECP, and in the introduction to the philosophy section of that landmark edition, we posed the question: apart from ethics, what is the role of philosophy ‘at the bedside’? The purpose of this question was not to downplay the significance of ethics to clinical practice. Rather, we raised it as part of a broader argument to the effect that ethical questions – about what we should do in any given situation – are embedded within whole understandings of …Read more
  •  88
    Internal Control and Inappropriate Desires
    American Journal of Bioethics 11 (8): 21-22. 2011.
    The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 8, Page 21-22, August 2011
  •  349
    Philosophy on steroids: Why the anti-doping position could use a little enhancement
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29 (4): 213-234. 2008.
    There is currently much concern over the use of pharmaceuticals and other biomedical techniques to enhance athletic performance—a practice we might refer to as doping. Many justifications of anti-doping efforts claim that doping involves a serious moral transgression. In this article, I review a number of arguments in support of that claim, but show that they are not conclusive, suggesting that we do not have good reasons for thinking that doping is wrong.