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73Quantification and Leibniz's lawPhilosophical Review 96 (4): 555-578. 1987.The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVI, No. 4 (October 1987). Categorically proves that Leibniz's Law (the principle that any instance of _for any x and y, if x=y, then if ...x..., then ..y..._ is true) is not a principle of which is true of natural language objectual quantification.
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Indeterminacy and Truth Value GapsIn Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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61Defective Contexts, Accommodation, and NormalizationCanadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4). 1995.Propositional Attitudes defends an account of ‘believes’ on which the verb is contextually sensitive. x believes that S says that x has a belief which is ‘well rendered’ or acceptably translated by S; since contextually variable information about what makes for a good translation helps determine the extension of ‘believes,’ the verb is contextually sensitive. Sider and Soames criticize this account. They say it has unacceptable consequences in cases in which we make multiple ascriptions of belie…Read more
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50Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the MindPhilosophical Review 106 (4): 614. 1997.When I started the book, I thought that if there are beliefs, then they are brain states. I still believe that. I express three caveats about the book.
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47XIV*—Attitude Ascriptions, Semantic Theory, and Pragmatic EvidenceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (1): 243-262. 1987.Mark Richard; XIV*—Attitude Ascriptions, Semantic Theory, and Pragmatic Evidence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Page.
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114Meaning (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2003._ Meaning_ brings together some of the most significant philosophical work on linguistic representation and understanding, presenting canonical essays on core questions in the philosophy of language. Brings together essential readings which define and advance the literature on linguistic representation and understanding. Examines key topics in philosophy of language, including analyticity; translational indeterminacy; theories of reference; meaning as use; the nature of linguistic competence; tr…Read more
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165Direct reference and ascriptions of beliefJournal of Philosophical Logic 12 (4): 425--52. 1983.
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21Taking the Fregean seriouslyIn D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 219--239. 1988.
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39Reply to Lynch, Miščević, and StojanovićCroatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2): 197-208. 2011.This paper responds to discussions of my book When Truth Gives Out by Michael Lynch, Nenad Miščević, and Isidora Stojanović. Among the topics discussed are: whether relativism is incoherent (because it requires one to think that certain of one’s views are and are not epistemically superior to views one denies); whether and when sentences in which one slurs an individual or group are truth valued; whether relativism about matters of taste gives an account of “faultless disagreement” superior to c…Read more
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205Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe ThemCambridge University Press. 1990.This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defence of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is 'psychologically real'. The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along…Read more
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42Context and the Attitudes: Meaning in Context, Volume 1Oxford University Press. 2013.Thirteen seminal essays by Mark Richard develop a nuanced account of semantics and propositional attitudes. The collection addresses a range of topics in philosophical semantics and philosophy of mind, and is accompanied by a new Introduction which discusses attitudes realized by dispositions and other non-linguistic cognitive structures.
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65Semantic theory and indirect speechMind and Language 13 (4). 1998.Cappelen and Lepore argue against the principle P: A semantic theory ought to assign p to S if uttering S is saying p. An upshot of P’s falsity, they allege, is that some objections to Davidson’s programme (such as Foster’s) turn out to be without force. This essay formulates and defends a qualified version of P against Cappelen and Lepore’s objections. It distinguishes P from the more fundamental Q: A semantic theory ought to assign p to S iff literal utterance of S literally says p. Without so…Read more
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23Reference and Competence: Moravcsik's Thought and LanguageDialogue 32 (3): 555-. 1993.The book under review consists of a “Problems” section, with chapters entitled “Ontology,” “Thought” and “Language”; and a “Proposals” section, with like-titled chapters. The first section is a survey; as might be expected of one of 126 pages, compression is the watchword. The reviewer felt that it did not live up to dust jacket copy, heralding a book “easily accessible to undergraduates.”
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Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |