Lorenzo Greco

If one looks for the notion of conscience in Hume, there appears to be a contrast between the loose use of it that can be found in his History of England, and the stricter use of it Hume makes in his philosophical works. It is my belief that, notwithstanding the problems Hume’s philosophy raises for a notion such as conscience, it is possible to frame a positive Humean explanation of it. I want to suggest that, far from corresponding to a mental power or to a faculty of some sort, conscience for Hume can be understood as a reflective form of self-surveying. This becomes apparent if the discussion about conscience as presented in A Treatise of Human Nature is integrated with other notions Hume introduces in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals when discussing the case of the ‘sensible knave’, such as those of inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, and reflection on one’s own conduct. To further explicate my line of argument, I shall also contrast Hume’s conclusions with some arguments presented by other authors in this regard, such as Bernard Mandeville and Joseph Butler.

In this paper, I present some reasons in favour of an interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy as a brand new form of "virtue ethics." By discussing some specific issues within the secondary literature in favour and against this kind of reading, I argue that Hume offers better philosophical tools to redefine the basic notion of virtue ethics than the neo-Aristotelian alternative. In particular, I maintain that the strength of Hume’s proposal lies in its pointing toward the unity of character instead of the unity of the virtues. This allows Hume to develop a nonfinalistic, secular and pluralistic morality in which the individuality of people is seen as a central value to be promoted.