-
13SearleworldHistory and Theory 51 (1): 123-142. 2012.ABSTRACTJohn Searle's most recent effort to account for human social institutions claims to provide a synthesis of the explanatory and the normative while simultaneously dismissing as confused and wrongheaded theorists who held otherwise. Searle, although doubtless alert to the usual considerations for separating the normative and the explanatory projects, announces at the outset that he conceives of matters quite differently. Searle's reason for reconceiving the field rests on his claim that bo…Read more
-
20Three Dogmas of ExplanationHistory and Theory 47 (1): 57-68. 2008.What ought to count as an explanation? Such normative questions—what “ought to be” the case?—typically mark the domain that those with a type of philosophical aspiration call their own. Debates in the philosophy of history have for too long been marred by bad advice from just such aspirants. The recurrent suggestion has been that historians have a particular need for a theory of explanation since they seem to have none of their own. But neither the study of the natural sciences nor the study of …Read more
-
12Review of Paul Andrew Roth: Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences: A Case for Methodological Pluralism (review)Ethics 99 (2): 434-435. 1989.
-
64Narrative Explanations: The Case of HistoryHistory and Theory 27 (1): 1-13. 1988.The very idea of narrative explanation invites two objections: a methodological objection, stating that narrative structure is too far from the form of a scientific explanation to count as an explanation, and a metaphysical objection, stating that narrative structure situates historical practice too close to the writing of fiction. Both of these objections, however, are illfounded. The methodological objection and the dispute regarding the status of historical explanation can be disposed of by r…Read more
-
65Chaos, Clio, and Scientistic Illusions of UnderstandingHistory and Theory 34 (1): 30-44. 1995.A number of authors have recently argued that the mathematical insights of "chaos theory" offer a promising formal model or significant analogy for understanding at least some historical events. We examine a representative claim of each kind regarding the application of chaos theory to problems of historical explanation. We identify two lines of argument. One we term the Causal Thesis, which states that chaos theory may be used to plausibly model, and so explain, historical events. The other we …Read more
-
65Politics and epistemology: Rorty, MacIntyre, and the ends of philosophyHistory of the Human Sciences 2 (2): 171-191. 1989.In this paper, I examine how a manifest disagreement between Richard Rorty and Alasdair MacIntyre concerning the history of philosophy is but one of a series of deep and interrelated disagreements concerning, in addition, the history of science, the good life for human beings, and, ultimately, the character of and prospects for humankind as well. I shall argue that at the heart of this series of disagreements rests a dispute with regard to the nature of rationality. And this disagreement concern…Read more
-
41Logic and translation: A reply to Alan BergerJournal of Philosophy 79 (3): 154-163. 1982.The article argues, "contra" berger, that quine's advocacy alleged of classical logic is not based on any alleged "fit" between classical logic and some empirical account of language learning. roth begins by examining berger's claim that quine has changed his position on the acceptability of alternative logics. in berger's account, quine now accepts alternative logics because he could not defend his commitment to classical logic alone based on empirical evidence (e.g., verdict tables). roth argu…Read more
-
24The epistemology of science after QuineIn Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, Routledge. pp. 3. 2005.
-
15Hayden White in Philosophical Perspective: Review Essay of Herman Paul’s Hayden White: The Historical Imagination (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (1): 102-111. 2014.For almost half a century, the person most responsible for fomenting brouhahas regarding degrees of plasticity in the writing of histories has been Hayden White. Yet, despite the voluminous responses provoked by White’s work, almost no effort has been made to treat White’s writings in a systematic yet sympathetic way as a philosophy of history. Herman Paul’s book begins to remedy that lack and does so in a carefully considered and extremely scholarly fashion. In his relatively brief six chapters…Read more
-
St. Louis Roundtable on Philosophy of the Social SciencePhilosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1): 3-91. 2002.
-
3A Rationalist Methodology for the Social Sciences (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 19 (1): 104-108. 1989.
-
9Raymond Martin, "the past within us: An empirical approach to philosophy of history" (review)History and Theory 31 (2): 200. 1992.
-
17Book Reviews : Objectivity, Empiricism and Truth. By R. H. Newell. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. Pp. 124. $24.95 (cloth (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 19 (2): 244-247. 1989.
-
399MistakesSynthese 136 (3): 389-408. 2003.A suggestion famously made by Peter Winch and carried through to present discussions holds that what constitutes the social as a kind consists of something shared – rules or practices commonly learned, internalized, or otherwise acquired by all members belonging to a society. This essays argues against the explanatory efficacy of appeals to this shared something as constitutive of a social kind by examining a violation of social norms or rules, viz., mistakes. I argue that an asymmetric relation…Read more
-
694. three dogmas (more or less) of explanationHistory and Theory 47 (1). 2008.What ought to count as an explanation? Such normative questions—what “ought to be” the case?—typically mark the domain that those with a type of philosophical aspiration call their own. Debates in the philosophy of history have for too long been marred by bad advice from just such aspirants. The recurrent suggestion has been that historians have a particular need for a theory of explanation since they seem to have none of their own. But neither the study of the natural sciences nor the study of …Read more
-
4Review of Robert Piercey, The Uses of the Past From Heidegger to Rorty: Doing Philosophy Historically (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (10). 2009.
-
46To claim that Hayden White has yet to be read seriously as a philosopher of history might seem false on the face of it. But do tropes and the rest provide any epistemic rationale for differing representations of historical events found in histories? As an explanation of White’s influence on philosophy of history, such a proffered emphasis only generates a puzzle with regard to taking White seriously, and not an answer to the question of why his efforts should be worthy of any philosophical atten…Read more
-
834The PastsHistory and Theory 51 (3): 313-339. 2012.ABSTRACTThis essay offers a reconfiguration of the possibility‐space of positions regarding the metaphysics and epistemology associated with historical knowledge. A tradition within analytic philosophy from Danto to Dummett attempts to answer questions about the reality of the past on the basis of two shared assumptions. The first takes individual statements as the relevant unit of semantic and philosophical analysis. The second presumes that variants of realism and antirealism about the past ex…Read more
-
Michael Krausz, ed., Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (review)Philosophy in Review 10 66-70. 1990.
-
145What does the sociology of scientific knowledge explain?: or, when epistemological chickens come home to roostHistory of the Human Sciences 7 (1): 95-108. 1994.
Santa Cruz, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Social Science |
20th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Physical Science |