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13SearleworldHistory and Theory 51 (1): 123-142. 2012.ABSTRACTJohn Searle's most recent effort to account for human social institutions claims to provide a synthesis of the explanatory and the normative while simultaneously dismissing as confused and wrongheaded theorists who held otherwise. Searle, although doubtless alert to the usual considerations for separating the normative and the explanatory projects, announces at the outset that he conceives of matters quite differently. Searle's reason for reconceiving the field rests on his claim that bo…Read more
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20Three Dogmas of ExplanationHistory and Theory 47 (1): 57-68. 2008.What ought to count as an explanation? Such normative questions—what “ought to be” the case?—typically mark the domain that those with a type of philosophical aspiration call their own. Debates in the philosophy of history have for too long been marred by bad advice from just such aspirants. The recurrent suggestion has been that historians have a particular need for a theory of explanation since they seem to have none of their own. But neither the study of the natural sciences nor the study of …Read more
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12Review of Paul Andrew Roth: Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences: A Case for Methodological Pluralism (review)Ethics 99 (2): 434-435. 1989.
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63Narrative Explanations: The Case of HistoryHistory and Theory 27 (1): 1-13. 1988.The very idea of narrative explanation invites two objections: a methodological objection, stating that narrative structure is too far from the form of a scientific explanation to count as an explanation, and a metaphysical objection, stating that narrative structure situates historical practice too close to the writing of fiction. Both of these objections, however, are illfounded. The methodological objection and the dispute regarding the status of historical explanation can be disposed of by r…Read more
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65Chaos, Clio, and Scientistic Illusions of UnderstandingHistory and Theory 34 (1): 30-44. 1995.A number of authors have recently argued that the mathematical insights of "chaos theory" offer a promising formal model or significant analogy for understanding at least some historical events. We examine a representative claim of each kind regarding the application of chaos theory to problems of historical explanation. We identify two lines of argument. One we term the Causal Thesis, which states that chaos theory may be used to plausibly model, and so explain, historical events. The other we …Read more
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65Politics and epistemology: Rorty, MacIntyre, and the ends of philosophyHistory of the Human Sciences 2 (2): 171-191. 1989.In this paper, I examine how a manifest disagreement between Richard Rorty and Alasdair MacIntyre concerning the history of philosophy is but one of a series of deep and interrelated disagreements concerning, in addition, the history of science, the good life for human beings, and, ultimately, the character of and prospects for humankind as well. I shall argue that at the heart of this series of disagreements rests a dispute with regard to the nature of rationality. And this disagreement concern…Read more
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39Logic and translation: A reply to Alan BergerJournal of Philosophy 79 (3): 154-163. 1982.The article argues, "contra" berger, that quine's advocacy alleged of classical logic is not based on any alleged "fit" between classical logic and some empirical account of language learning. roth begins by examining berger's claim that quine has changed his position on the acceptability of alternative logics. in berger's account, quine now accepts alternative logics because he could not defend his commitment to classical logic alone based on empirical evidence (e.g., verdict tables). roth argu…Read more
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29New Philosophy of Social Science: Problems of IndeterminacyMetaphilosophy 26 (4): 440-448. 1995.This article defends methodological and theoretical pluralism in the social sciences. While pluralistic, such a philosophy of social science is both pragmatic and normative. Only by facing the problems of such pluralism, including how to resolve the potential conflicts between various methods and theories, is it possible to discover appropriate criteria of adequacy for social scientific explanations and interpretations. So conceived, the social sciences do not give us fixed and universal feature…Read more
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39Review of Hilary Kornblith, Knowledge and its Place in Nature (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (12). 2003.
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6Book Reviews : Objectivity, Empiricism and Truth. By R. H. Newell. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. Pp. 124. $24.95 (cloth (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 19 (2): 244-247. 1989.
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634The silence of the norms: The missing historiography of The Structure of Scientific RevolutionsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4): 545-552. 2013.History has been disparaged since the late 19th century for not conforming to norms of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, as a matter of fact a work of history upends the regnant philosophical conception of science in the second part of the 20th century. Yet despite its impact, Kuhn’s Structure has failed to motivate philosophers to ponder why works of history should be capable of exerting rational influence on an understanding of philosophy of science. But all this constitutes a great irony a…Read more
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13MURRAY G. MURPHEY, "Philosophical Foundations of Historical Knowledge" (review)History and Theory 34 (3): 231. 1995.
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86The epistemology of "epistemology naturalized"Dialectica 53 (2). 1999.Quine's “Epistemology Naturalized” has become part of the canon in epistemology and excited a widespread revival of interest in naturalism. Yet the status accorded the essay is ironic, since both friends and foes of philosophical naturalism deny that Quine makes a plausible case that the methods of naturalism can accommodate the problems of epistemology
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144Hayden White and the Aesthetics of HistoriographyHistory of the Human Sciences 5 (1): 17-35. 1992.
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74A Rationalist Methodology for the Social SciencesPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 19 (1): 104-108. 1989.
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35Review Symposium: S. Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our TimesHistory of the Human Sciences 14 (2): 87-97. 2001.
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233Ways of pastmakingHistory of the Human Sciences 15 (4): 125-143. 2002.Riddles of induction – old or new, Hume’s or Goodman’s – pose unanswered challenges to assumptions that experiences logically legitimate expectations or classifications. The challenges apply both to folk beliefs and to scientific ones. In particular, Goodman’s ‘new riddle’ famously confounds efforts to specify how additional experiences confirm the rightness of currently preferred ways of organizing objects, i.e. our favored theories of what kinds there are.1 His riddle serves to emphasize that nei…Read more
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34Microfoundations Without Foundations: Comments on LittleSouthern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1): 57-64. 1996.
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48Truth in interpretation: The case of psychoanalysisPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (2): 175-195. 1991.This article explores and attempts to resolve some issues that arise when psychoanalytic explanations are construed as a type of historical or narrative explanation. The chief problem is this: If one rejects the claim of narratives to verisimilitude, this appears to divorce the notion of explanation from that of truth. The author examines, in particular, Donald Spence's attempt to deal with the relation of narrative explanations and truth. In his critique of Spence's distinction between narrativ…Read more
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44Editor’s Introduction:“What Does History Matter to...?”Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (3): 301-307. 2011.
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94The bureaucratic turn: Weber contra Hempel in Fuller's social epistemologyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (3-4). 1991.Like the positivists, Fuller is concerned to demarcate and systematically evaluate scientific claims and practices. Fuller corrects and reforms the positivist enterprise in light of his sociological naturalism. What Fuller's analysis brings to the fore is how the naturalization of epistemology makes the power?knowledge relation into an epistemological issue. Yet, in his writings. Fuller is radically divided with respect to how to react to this fact. Specifically, Fuller vacillates between, on th…Read more
Santa Cruz, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Social Science |
20th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Physical Science |