David Ellerman

Double-entry bookkeeping (DEB) implicitly uses a specific mathematical construction, the group of differences using pairs of unsigned numbers ("T-accounts"). That construction was only formulated abstractly in mathematics in the 19th century—even though DEB had been used in the business world for over five centuries. Yet the connection between DEB and the group of differences (here called the "Pacioli group") is still largely unknown both in mathematics and accounting. The precise mathematical treatment of DEB allows clarity on certain conceptual questions and it immediately yields the generalization of the double-entry method to multi-dimensional vectors typically representing the different types of property involved in an enterprise or household.

Liberal-contractarian philosophies of justice see the unjust systems of slavery and autocracy in the past as being based on coercion—whereas the social order in modern democratic market societies is based on consent and contract. However, the ‘best’ case for slavery and autocracy in the past were consent-based contractarian arguments. Hence, our first task is to recover those ‘forgotten’ apologia for slavery and autocracy. To counter those consent-based arguments, the historical anti-slavery and democratic movements developed a theory of inalienable rights. Our second task is to recover that theory and to consider several other applications of the theory. Finally, the liberal theories of justice expounded by John Rawls and by Robert Nozick are briefly examined from this perspective.

Classical logic is usually interpreted as the logic of propositions. But from Boole's original development up to modern categorical logic, there has always been the alternative interpretation of classical logic as the logic of subsets of any given (nonempty) universe set. Partitions on a universe set are dual to subsets of a universe set in the sense of the reverse-the-arrows category-theoretic duality--which is reflected in the duality between quotient objects and subobjects throughout algebra. Hence the idea arises of a dual logic of partitions. That dual logic is described here. Partition logic is at the same mathematical level as subset logic since models for both are constructed from (partitions on or subsets of) arbitrary unstructured sets with no ordering relations, compatibility or accessibility relations, or topologies on the sets. Just as Boole developed logical finite probability theory as a quantitative treatment of subset logic, applying the analogous mathematical steps to partition logic yields a logical notion of entropy so that information theory can be refounded on partition logic. But the biggest application is that when partition logic and the accompanying logical information theory are "lifted" to complex vector spaces, then the mathematical framework of quantum mechanics is obtained. Partition logic models indefiniteness (i.e., numerical attributes on a set become more definite as the inverse-image partition becomes more refined) while subset logic models the definiteness of classical physics (an entity either definitely has a property or definitely does not). Hence partition logic provides the backstory so the old idea of "objective indefiniteness" in QM can be fleshed out to a full interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Saunders Mac Lane famously remarked that "Bourbaki just missed" formulating adjoints in a 1948 appendix (written no doubt by Pierre Samuel) to an early draft of Algebre--which then had to wait until Daniel Kan's 1958 paper on adjoint functors. But Mac Lane was using the orthodox treatment of adjoints that only contemplates the object-to-object morphisms within a category, i.e., homomorphisms. When Samuel's treatment is reconsidered in view of the treatment of adjoints using heteromorphisms or hets (object-to-object morphisms between objects in different categories), then he, in effect, isolated the concept of a left representation solving a universal mapping problem. When dualized to obtain the concept of a right representation, the two halves only need to be united to obtain an adjunction. Thus Samuel was only a now-simple dualization away for formulating adjoints in 1948. Apparently, Bodo Pareigis' 1970 text was the first and perhaps only text to give the heterodox "new characterization" (i.e., heteromorphic treatment) of adjoints. Orthodox category theory uses various relatively artificial devices to avoid formally recognizing hets--even though hets are routinely used by the working mathematician. Finally we consider a "philosophical" question as to whether the most important concept in category theory is the notion of an adjunction or the notion of a representation giving a universal mapping property (where adjunctions arise as the special case of a bi-representation of dual universal mapping problems).

A theory of property needs to give an account of the whole life-cycle of a property right: how it is initiated, transferred, and terminated. Economics has focused on the transfers in the market and has almost completely neglected the question of the initiation and termination of property in normal production and consumption. Yet the market also provides a laissez-faire mechanism: when the legal authorities do not intervene, then the initial right is, in effect, assigned to the first seller and the terminal liability to the last buyer. But does this mechanism satisfy the juridical principle of responsibility: assign de jure responsibility in accordance with de facto responsibility? The fundamental theorem states that if all transfers are covered by voluntary contracts and all contracts are fulfilled, then the laissez-faire mechanism satisfies the responsibility principle.Une théorie de la propriété se doit d’expliquer entièrement le cycle de vie du droit de propriété: les conditions de son émergence, de son transfert et de sa résiliation. La théorie économique s’est focalisée sur les mécanismes de transferts sur le marché et a presque totalement négligé la question de l’émergence et de la réalisation de la propriété dans les phénomènes de production et de consommation. Pourtant, le marché fournit également un mécanisme de laissez-faire: lorsque les autorités légales s’abstiennent d’intervenir, le droit initial est affecté au premier vendeur et la responsabilité terminale au dernier acheteur. Néanmoins, ce mécanisme satisfait-il le principe juridique de responsabilité? A savoir, assigner une responsabilité de jure en accord avec le principe de responsabilité de facto? En effet, le théorème fondamental exprime qui si tous les transferts s’effectuent par des contrats volontaires, et que tous les contrats sont remplis, alors le principe du laissez-faire satisfait le principe de responsabilité.

Evolutionary economics often focuses on the comparison between economic competition and the process of natural selection to select the fitter members of a given population. But that neglects the other "half" of an evolutionary process, the mechanism for the generation of new possibilities that is key to dynamic efficiency. My topic is the process of parallel experimentation which I take to be a process of multiple experiments running concurrently with some form of common goal, with some semi-isolation between the experiments, with benchmarking comparisons made between the experiments, and with the "migration" of discoveries between experiments wherever possible to ratchet up the performance of the group. The thesis is that parallel experimentation is a fundamental dynamic efficiency scheme to enhance and accelerate variation, innovation, and learning in contexts of genuine uncertainty or known ignorance. Within evolutionary biology, this type of parallel experimentation scheme was developed in Sewall Wright's shifting balance theory of evolution. It addressed the rather neglected topic of how a population on a low fitness peak might eventually be able to go "downhill" against selective pressures, traverse a valley of low fitness, and then ascend a higher fitness peak. The theme of parallel experimentation is used to recast and pull together dynamic and pluralistic theories in economics, political theory, philosophy of science, and social learning.

This paper is part of a larger project to better understand the limitations of the economic theory of agency and incentives.1 The economic approach focuses on extrinsic incentives whereas a better understanding of human organization requires an understanding of intrinsic motivation and the complementary or substitutive relationships with extrinsic motivation. I will focus on different treatments of informational or “panoptic” questions regarding transparency or non-transparency in the management of firms or other human organizations. This context will give the questions definiteness but the ideas might also be applied in a broader social context. As a conceptual framework, I will use the seminal work of Douglas McGregor. The economic approach to agency and incentives theory is based essentially on what McGregor called the “Theory X” worldview, and the alternative explored here is essentially what he called the “Theory Y” view of individuals in organizations.

Two aspects of the fine Flecha-Cruz paper can be usefully elaborated. The Mondragon cooperatives differ not only from capitalist firms but also from most other cooperatives in the doctrine of the 'priority of labor over capital' which means that the people working in any sort of cooperative will be members and will not be rented as employees. Also the Mondragon system of internal capital accounts solves the equity-structure problem that has plagued many modern cooperatives structured as non-profits or traditional worker cooperatives with 'membership shares'.

From a pre-publication review by the late Austrian economist, Don Lavoie, of George Mason University: "The book's radical re-interpretation of property and contract is, I think, among the most powerful critiques of mainstream economics ever developed. It undermines the neoclassical way of thinking about property by articulating a theory of inalienable rights, and constructs out of this perspective a "labor theory of property" which is as different from Marx's labor theory of value as it is from neoclassicism. It traces roots of such ideas in some fascinating and largely forgotten strands of the history of economics. It draws attention to the question of "responsibility" which neoclassicism has utterly lost sight of. It is startlingly fresh in its overall approach, and unusually well written in its presentation. ... It constitutes a better case for its economic democracy viewpoint than anything else in the literature."

When this book was first published in 1990, there were massive economic changes in the East and significant economic challenges to the West. This critical analysis of democratic theory discusses the principles and forces that push both socialist and capitalist economies toward a common ground of workplace democratization. This book is a comprehensive approach to the theory and practice of the "Democratic firm" – from philosophical first principles to legal theory and finally to some of the details of financial structure. The argument for economic democracy supports private property, free markets and entrepreneurship for instance, but fundamentally it replaces the employer/employee relationship with democratic membership in the firm. For students, teachers, policy makers and others interested in the application of democracy to the workplace, this book will serve as a manifesto and a standard reference on the topic.

A theory of property needs to give an account of the whole life-cycle of a property right: how it is initiated, transferred, and terminated. Economics has focused on the transfers in the market and has almost completely neglected the question of the initiation and termination of property in normal production and consumption (not in some original state or in the transition from common to private property). The institutional mechanism for the normal initiation and termination of property is an invisible-hand function of the market, the market mechanism of appropriation. Does this mechanism satisfy an appropriate normative principle? The standard normative juridical principle is to assign or impute legal responsibility according to de facto responsibility. It is given a historical tag of being "Lockean" but the basis is contemporary jurisprudence, not historical exegesis. Then the fundamental theorem of the property mechanism is proven which shows that if "Hume's conditions" (no transfers without consent and all contracts fulfilled) are satisfied, then the market automatically satisfies the Lockean responsibility principle, i.e., "Hume implies Locke." As a major application, the results in their contrapositive form, "Not Locke implies Not Hume," are applied to a market economy based on the employment contract. It is shown the production based on the employment contract violates the Lockean principle (all who work in an employment enterprise are de facto responsible for the positive and negative results) and thus Hume's conditions must also be violated in the marketplace (de facto responsible human action cannot be transferred from one person to another—as is readily recognized when and employer and employee together commit a crime).

The logical basis for information theory is the newly developed logic of partitions that is dual to the usual Boolean logic of subsets. The key concept is a "distinction" of a partition, an ordered pair of elements in distinct blocks of the partition. The logical concept of entropy based on partition logic is the normalized counting measure of the set of distinctions of a partition on a finite set--just as the usual logical notion of probability based on the Boolean logic of subsets is the normalized counting measure of the subsets (events). Thus logical entropy is a measure on the set of ordered pairs, and all the compound notions of entropy (join entropy, conditional entropy, and mutual information) arise in the usual way from the measure (e.g., the inclusion-exclusion principle)--just like the corresponding notions of probability. The usual Shannon entropy of a partition is developed by replacing the normalized count of distinctions (dits) by the average number of binary partitions (bits) necessary to make all the distinctions of the partition.

There is some consensus among orthodox category theorists that the concept of adjoint functors is the most important concept contributed to mathematics by category theory. We give a heterodox treatment of adjoints using heteromorphisms that parses an adjunction into two separate parts. Then these separate parts can be recombined in a new way to define a cognate concept, the brain functor, to abstractly model the functions of perception and action of a brain. The treatment uses relatively simple category theory and is focused on the interpretation and application of the mathematical concepts

Early democratic theorists such as Kant considered the effects of being a servant or, in modern terms, an employee to be so negative that such dependent people should be denied the vote. John Stuart Mill and John Dewey also noted the negative effects of the employment relation on the development of democratic habits and civic virtues but rather than deny the franchise to employees, they pushed for workplace democracy where workers would be a member of their company rather than an employee. In spite of the continuing prevalence of the employment relation and the lack of workplace democracy, this topic now seems to be something of a "third rail" in deliberative democratic theory