•  26
    The Unity of the Kind Artwork
    Rivista di Estetica 23 (43): 3-31. 2002.
    A defence of a meta-representational theory of artworks, accounting for the unity of the kind. Artworks are surmised to be artefacts that are produced with the intention of being recognised as having been produced with the intention of eliciting a conversation.
  •  255
  •  31
    Some varieties of spatial hearing
    In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. 2012.
    We provide some meta-theoretical constraints for the evaluation of a-spatial theories of sounds and auditory perception. We point out some forms of spatial content auditory experience can have. If auditory experience does not necessarily have a rich egocentric spatial content, it must have some spatial content for the relevant mode of perception to be recognizably auditory. An auditory experience devoid of any spatial content, if the notion makes sense at all, would be very different from the au…Read more
  •  41
    La struttura di uno strumento di scrittura collaborativa per la democrazia partecipata
    with Gino Roncaglia
    Rivista di Estetica 36 (3): 59-79. 2007.
    Premessa Questo intervento si propone di presentare, in maniera sintetica ma—speriamo — ragionevolmente completa, un’idea in fondo abbastanza semplice: utilizzare alcuni strumenti di lavoro collaborativo in rete per la redazione di bozze o progetti di testi normativi (e in particolare di progetti di legge). Le potenzialità degli strumenti di rete nel favorire non solo una maggiore trasparenza nelle varie fasi di elaborazione dei testi normativi e una loro migliore reperibilità e accessibilità...
  •  11
    Understanding of elementary topological equivalencies is impaired by preconceptions about the topological structure of ordinary objects, so that the equivalencies turn out to be counterintuitive. Here I will discuss some of these preconceptions, namely the dominance of gestalt properties of the visual display of the configuration, the neglect of holistic properties, the dominance of transformations the preserve metric properties over those that preserve topological properties only, the assumptio…Read more
  •  253
    Parts and places: The structures of spatial representation
    Philosophical Review 110 (3): 479-481. 2001.
    The purpose of Parts and Places, say Casati and Varzi in their introduction, is to construct “a theory of our spatial competence,” a theory that will lay bare how we conceive of space and the things that lie within it. Its purpose, then, is psychological, not metaphysical. Its object of study is not space. It is not the things that lie within it. Rather its object of study is us. In this regard, Parts and Places is at best a mixed success.
  • De «re» et «de corpore»
    Revue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 124 (3): 271-289. 1992.
  •  89
    Trust, secrecy and accuracy in voting systems: the case for transparency (review)
    Mind and Society 9 (1): 19-23. 2010.
    If voting systems are to be trusted, they not only need to preserve both secrecy (if requested) and accuracy, but the mechanisms that preserve these features should be transparent, in the sense of being both cognitively understandable and accessible. Electronic voting systems, much as they promise accuracy in counting, and on top of being criticized for their insufficient protection of secrecy, violate the transparency requirement.
  •  5
    I defend a cognitive theory of pictures, according to which the central paradigm of our concept of a picture is the representational picture, i.e., the one which induces recognitional abilities in the perceiver. I show how to classify different pictorial styles in terms of their distance from the paradigm, and I criticize alternative accounts.
  •  442
    False beliefs and naive beliefs: They can be good for you
    with Marco Bertamini
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6): 512-513. 2009.
    Naive physics beliefs can be systematically mistaken. They provide a useful test-bed because they are common, and also because their existence must rely on some adaptive advantage, within a given context. In the second part of the commentary we also ask questions about when a whole family of misbeliefs should be considered together as a single phenomenon.