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Alex Blum

New York University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    79
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Recommended
    27
  •  News and Updates
    53

 More details
New York University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1968
Homepage
Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv District, Israel
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  • All publications (79)
  •  515
    The Hidden Future
    Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (1): 9-10. 2018.
    We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable.
  •  28
    The Hidden Future
    Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences. forthcoming.
    Alex Blum ABSTRACT: We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable. Download PDF.
  •  55
    On Disjunction
    Acta Philosophica 24 (2): 383-384. 2015.
  •  1080
    Can It Be that Tully=Cicero?
    Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2): 149-150. 2017.
    We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid designators.
  •  42
    Can It Be that Tully=Cicero?
    Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences. forthcoming.
    Alex Blum ABSTRACT: We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid designators. Download PDF.
  • Substitutivity
    Logique Et Analyse 40 249-253. 1997.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologySubstitutivity in Attitude Ascriptions
  •  276
    The Kantian versus Frankfurt
    Analysis 60 (3): 287-288. 2000.
    Alternative Possibilities
  •  28
    Discussion: Tractatus 2.063
    Philosophical Investigations 12 (4): 325-326. 2008.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  • Simple and compound statements
    Logique Et Analyse 20 (77): 165. 1977.
  • On epistemic opacity
    Logique Et Analyse 16 (63): 379. 1973.
    Metaphysics and Epistemology
  •  2
    The Expression of Truth
    Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 10. 1999.
  •  273
    N
    Analysis 60 (3): 284-286. 2000.
    IncompatibilismThe Consequence Argument
  •  151
    Correction
    Analysis 61 (1): 90-90. 2001.
  • A Look at «Tractatus» 6.54
    Logique Et Analyse 31 (123-124): 219-221. 1988.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  55
    Discussion: Tractatus 2.063
    Philosophical Investigations 12 (4): 325-326. 1989.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  • When is a statement not a statement? when it'sa liar
    with L. Goldstein
    The Reasoner 2 (2): 4-6. 2008.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyTruth
  •  103
    Sentence, necessity, and meaning
    Philosophia 27 (3-4): 521-522. 1999.
    Meaning
  •  83
    Isomorphism Between C1 and C2
    Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 18 (13-15): 237-240. 1972.
    Model Theory
  •  61
    A Version of the Frege ‐ Quine Argument
    Dialectica 42 (4): 307-312. 1988.
    Frege: Philosophy of Language, Misc
  •  136
    Analyticity and truth in all possible worlds
    Noûs 17 (2): 281-289. 1983.
    Analyticity, Misc
  •  43
    A correction in Copi's account of Boolean normal forms
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14 (2): 288-288. 1973.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicNonclassical Logics
  •  43
    Two Observations About S5
    Mathematical Logic Quarterly 23 (36): 485-486. 1976.
  •  75
    On the cannot of infallibility
    Sophia 44 (1): 125-127. 2005.
    We content that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We end by suggesting that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two.
    Philosophy of ReligionDivine Omniscience
  • Cidd: 168 impossible premises and correct argument
    Manuscrito 20. 1997.
  •  108
    A note on pleasure
    Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (4): 367-70. 1991.
    Pleasure, MiscTheories of Value
  •  103
    Nozick on indeterministic free will
    with Stanley Malinovich
    Journal of Chinese Philosophy 13 (4): 471-473. 1986.
    Libertarianism about Free WillChinese Philosophy
  •  93
    Arithmetic and Logic Incompleteness: the Link
    with Laureano Luna
    The Reasoner 2 (3): 6. 2008.
    We show how second order logic incompleteness follows from incompleteness of arithmetic, as proved by Gödel
    Model TheoryMetaphysics and EpistemologyMathematical Proof
  •  125
    The agony of pain
    Philosophical Inquiry 18 (3-4): 117-120. 1996.
    Pleasure and Pain
  •  51
    Notes and Discussions Notes et Discussions — Notizen und Diskussionen Convention T And Natural Languages
    Dialectica 32 (1): 77-80. 1978.
  •  107
    Belief in the Tractatus
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1): 259-260. 1996.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
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