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515The Hidden FutureSymposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (1): 9-10. 2018.We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable.
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28The Hidden FutureSymposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences. forthcoming.Alex Blum ABSTRACT: We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable. Download PDF.
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1080Can It Be that Tully=Cicero?Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2): 149-150. 2017.We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid designators.
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42Can It Be that Tully=Cicero?Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences. forthcoming.Alex Blum ABSTRACT: We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid designators. Download PDF.
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2The Expression of TruthSkepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 10. 1999.
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139The Force of TruthPhilosophical Investigations 34 (4): 393-395. 2011.The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded…Read more
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1248Foreknowledge and Free WillOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1): 55-57. 2012.We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant.
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83Isomorphism Between C1 and C2Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 18 (13-15): 237-240. 1972.
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43A correction in Copi's account of Boolean normal formsNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14 (2): 288-288. 1973.
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75On the cannot of infallibilitySophia 44 (1): 125-127. 2005.We content that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We end by suggesting that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two.
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93Arithmetic and Logic Incompleteness: the LinkThe Reasoner 2 (3): 6. 2008.We show how second order logic incompleteness follows from incompleteness of arithmetic, as proved by Gödel
Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv District, Israel
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
| Logic and Philosophy of Logic |