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Alex Blum

New York University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    79
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Recommended
    27
  •  News and Updates
    53

 More details
New York University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1968
Homepage
Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv District, Israel
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  • All publications (79)
  •  139
    The Force of Truth
    Philosophical Investigations 34 (4): 393-395. 2011.
    The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded…Read more
    The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded his argument on this implication rather than on what we call the force of truth.
    Aristotle: Logic and Philosophy of Language
  •  1248
    Foreknowledge and Free Will
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1): 55-57. 2012.
    We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant.
    Free Will and Foreknowledge20th Century Analytic Philosophy, Misc
  •  151
    Correction
    Analysis 61 (1): 90-90. 2001.
  • A Look at «Tractatus» 6.54
    Logique Et Analyse 31 (123-124): 219-221. 1988.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  55
    Discussion: Tractatus 2.063
    Philosophical Investigations 12 (4): 325-326. 1989.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  • When is a statement not a statement? when it'sa liar
    with L. Goldstein
    The Reasoner 2 (2): 4-6. 2008.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyTruth
  •  103
    Sentence, necessity, and meaning
    Philosophia 27 (3-4): 521-522. 1999.
    Meaning
  •  83
    Isomorphism Between C1 and C2
    Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 18 (13-15): 237-240. 1972.
    Model Theory
  •  60
    A Version of the Frege ‐ Quine Argument
    Dialectica 42 (4): 307-312. 1988.
    Frege: Philosophy of Language, Misc
  •  136
    Analyticity and truth in all possible worlds
    Noûs 17 (2): 281-289. 1983.
    Analyticity, Misc
  •  43
    A correction in Copi's account of Boolean normal forms
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14 (2): 288-288. 1973.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicNonclassical Logics
  •  43
    Two Observations About S5
    Mathematical Logic Quarterly 23 (36): 485-486. 1976.
  •  75
    On the cannot of infallibility
    Sophia 44 (1): 125-127. 2005.
    We content that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We end by suggesting that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two.
    Philosophy of ReligionDivine Omniscience
  • Cidd: 168 impossible premises and correct argument
    Manuscrito 20. 1997.
  •  108
    A note on pleasure
    Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (4): 367-70. 1991.
    Pleasure, MiscTheories of Value
  •  103
    Nozick on indeterministic free will
    with Stanley Malinovich
    Journal of Chinese Philosophy 13 (4): 471-473. 1986.
    Libertarianism about Free WillChinese Philosophy
  •  93
    Arithmetic and Logic Incompleteness: the Link
    with Laureano Luna
    The Reasoner 2 (3): 6. 2008.
    We show how second order logic incompleteness follows from incompleteness of arithmetic, as proved by Gödel
    Model TheoryMetaphysics and EpistemologyMathematical Proof
  •  125
    The agony of pain
    Philosophical Inquiry 18 (3-4): 117-120. 1996.
    Pleasure and Pain
  •  51
    Notes and Discussions Notes et Discussions — Notizen und Diskussionen Convention T And Natural Languages
    Dialectica 32 (1): 77-80. 1978.
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