•  16
    A logic of belief
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 17 (3): 344-348. 1976.
  •  732
    Foreknowledge and Free Will
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1): 55-57. 2012.
    We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant
  •  33
    A note on theological fatalism1
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (2): 143-147. 2007.
    We contend that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We suggest that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two. We end by rounding out, hope-fully, some left over corners of serious concern to the theist
  •  28
    Two Observations About S5
    Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 23 (36): 485-486. 1977.
  •  19
    Quine on an alleged non sequitur
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (3): 249-250. 1981.
  •  42
    Sentence, necessity, and meaning
    Philosophia 27 (3-4): 521-522. 1999.
  •  23
    ‘N’
    Analysis 60 (3). 2000.
  •  7
    Belief in the Tractatus
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1): 259-260. 1996.
  •  22
    An introduction to logic
    Philosophia 18 (2-3): 303-308. 1988.
  •  14
    The Force of Truth 1
    Philosophical Investigations 34 (4): 393-395. 2011.
    The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded…Read more
  •  33
    A note on natural deduction
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15 (2): 349-350. 1974.