• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Alex Blum

New York University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    79
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Recommended
    27
  •  News and Updates
    53

 More details
New York University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1968
Homepage
Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv District, Israel
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  • All publications (79)
  •  515
    The Hidden Future
    Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (1): 9-10. 2018.
    We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable.
  •  28
    The Hidden Future
    Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences. forthcoming.
    Alex Blum ABSTRACT: We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable. Download PDF.
  •  55
    On Disjunction
    Acta Philosophica 24 (2): 383-384. 2015.
  •  1080
    Can It Be that Tully=Cicero?
    Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2): 149-150. 2017.
    We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid designators.
  •  42
    Can It Be that Tully=Cicero?
    Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences. forthcoming.
    Alex Blum ABSTRACT: We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid designators. Download PDF.
  • Substitutivity
    Logique Et Analyse 40 249-253. 1997.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologySubstitutivity in Attitude Ascriptions
  •  276
    The Kantian versus Frankfurt
    Analysis 60 (3): 287-288. 2000.
    Alternative Possibilities
  •  2
    The Expression of Truth
    Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 10. 1999.
  •  273
    N
    Analysis 60 (3): 284-286. 2000.
    IncompatibilismThe Consequence Argument
  •  28
    Discussion: Tractatus 2.063
    Philosophical Investigations 12 (4): 325-326. 2008.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  • Simple and compound statements
    Logique Et Analyse 20 (77): 165. 1977.
  • On epistemic opacity
    Logique Et Analyse 16 (63): 379. 1973.
    Metaphysics and Epistemology
  •  90
    On Changing the Past
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (3): 377-378. 2013.
    Aspects of TimeTime Travel
  •  146
    Bayne on Kripke
    Philosophia 19 (4): 455-456. 1989.
    Kripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism
  •  68
    An introduction to logic
    Philosophia 18 (2-3): 303-308. 1988.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogics
  •  65
    A note on natural deduction
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15 (2): 349-350. 1974.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicProof Theory
  • Wittgenstein su linguaggio privato E seguire Una regola
    Epistemologia 21 131-142. 1998.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  43
    Stanley Malinovich, 1933-2004
    with Sidney Gendin
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78 (5): 177. 2005.
  •  114
    Errata: Analyticity and truth in all possible worlds
    Noûs 17 (4): 730. 1983.
    Analyticity, Misc
  •  30
    A Purported Theorem of Epistemic Logic
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (1): 105-106. 1996.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogics
  •  199
    An Anomaly in the D–N Model of Explanation
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3): 365-367. 1989.
    It is argued that the constraints placed on the non-law premisses of a D–N explanation are irrelevant to their function and will not salvage the deductive requirement from triviality.
    Deductive-Nomological Explanation
  •  139
    The Force of Truth
    Philosophical Investigations 34 (4): 393-395. 2011.
    The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded…Read more
    The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded his argument on this implication rather than on what we call the force of truth.
    Aristotle: Logic and Philosophy of Language
  •  1248
    Foreknowledge and Free Will
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1): 55-57. 2012.
    We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant.
    Free Will and Foreknowledge20th Century Analytic Philosophy, Misc
  •  151
    Correction
    Analysis 61 (1): 90-90. 2001.
  • A Look at «Tractatus» 6.54
    Logique Et Analyse 31 (123-124): 219-221. 1988.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  55
    Discussion: Tractatus 2.063
    Philosophical Investigations 12 (4): 325-326. 1989.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  • When is a statement not a statement? when it'sa liar
    with L. Goldstein
    The Reasoner 2 (2): 4-6. 2008.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyTruth
  •  103
    Sentence, necessity, and meaning
    Philosophia 27 (3-4): 521-522. 1999.
    Meaning
  •  83
    Isomorphism Between C1 and C2
    Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 18 (13-15): 237-240. 1972.
    Model Theory
  •  60
    A Version of the Frege ‐ Quine Argument
    Dialectica 42 (4): 307-312. 1988.
    Frege: Philosophy of Language, Misc
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback