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33A note on theological fatalism1Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (2): 143-147. 2007.We contend that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We suggest that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two. We end by rounding out, hope-fully, some left over corners of serious concern to the theist
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28Two Observations About S5Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 23 (36): 485-486. 1977.
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14The Force of Truth 1Philosophical Investigations 34 (4): 393-395. 2011.The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded…Read more
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35On the cannot of infallibilitySophia 44 (1): 125-127. 2005.We content that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We end by suggesting that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two.
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23Comment on Yehuda Gellman's “the intelligibility of God's simplicity in rational theology”Philosophia 4 (4): 560-560. 1974.
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30A Purported Theorem of Epistemic LogicTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (1): 105-106. 1996.
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77An Anomaly in the D–N Model of ExplanationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3): 365-367. 1989.It is argued that the constraints placed on the non-law premisses of a D–N explanation are irrelevant to their function and will not salvage the deductive requirement from triviality.
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12Notes and Discussions Notes et Discussions — Notizen und Diskussionen Convention T And Natural LanguagesDialectica 32 (1): 77-80. 1978.
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10A correction in Copi's account of Boolean normal formsNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14 (2): 288-288. 1973.
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187The core of the consequence argumentDialectica 57 (4): 423-429. 2003.We suggest that the classical version of the consequence argument contending that freedom and determinism are incompatible subtly misstates the core intuition, which is that if a true conditional and a true antecedent are jointly beyond our control, then so is the consequent. We show however that the improved version no less than the classical implies fatalism.Interestingly, the reasoning, that yields fatalism, undermines a direct argument for the soundness of the improved version. But if fatali…Read more
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43On Changing the PastOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (3): 377-378. 2013.
Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv District, Israel
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |