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10A correction in Copi's account of Boolean normal formsNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14 (2): 288-288. 1973.
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187The core of the consequence argumentDialectica 57 (4): 423-429. 2003.We suggest that the classical version of the consequence argument contending that freedom and determinism are incompatible subtly misstates the core intuition, which is that if a true conditional and a true antecedent are jointly beyond our control, then so is the consequent. We show however that the improved version no less than the classical implies fatalism.Interestingly, the reasoning, that yields fatalism, undermines a direct argument for the soundness of the improved version. But if fatali…Read more
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43On Changing the PastOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (3): 377-378. 2013.
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13Stanley Malinovich, 1933-2004Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78 (5). 2005.
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30Isomorphism Between C1 and C2Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 18 (13-15): 237-240. 1972.
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58Arithmetic and Logic Incompleteness: the LinkThe Reasoner 2 (3): 6. 2008.We show how second order logic incompleteness follows from incompleteness of arithmetic, as proved by Gödel
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51The Force of TruthPhilosophical Investigations 34 (4): 393-395. 2011.The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded…Read more
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736Foreknowledge and Free WillOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1): 55-57. 2012.We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant
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34A note on theological fatalism1Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (2): 143-147. 2007.We contend that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We suggest that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two. We end by rounding out, hope-fully, some left over corners of serious concern to the theist
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28Two Observations About S5Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 23 (36): 485-486. 1977.
Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv District, Israel
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |