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57The moral status of post-personsJournal of Medical Ethics 39 (2): 76-77. 2013.Nicholas Agar argues that it is possible, and even likely, that radically enhanced human beings will turn out to be ‘post-persons’, that is, beings with a moral status higher than that of mere persons such as us.1 This would mean that they will be morally justified in sacrificing our lives and well-being not merely in cases of emergency, but also in cases of ‘supreme opportunities’ , that is, whenever such a sacrifice leads to ‘significant benefits for post-persons’. For this reason, Agar believ…Read more
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115Believing in the Dignity of Human EmbryosHuman Reproduction and Genetic Ethics 17 (1): 53-65. 2011.After showing that despite being inherently flawed the concept of dignity cannot be replaced without loss by ethical principles such as “respect for persons,” it is argued that, if dignity be not understood as dignitas, but as bonitas, which emphasizes connectedness rather than excellence and to which the proper response is not respect, but awe, there is no reason not to ascribe it to the human embryo. The question whether or not human embryos have dignity can then be answered in the affirmative…Read more
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149. Schopenhauers LeidensethikIn Matthias Koßler & Oliver Hallich (eds.), Arthur Schopenhauer: Die Welt Als Wille Und Vorstellung, Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. pp. 137-152. 2014.
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197No Philosophy for Swine: John Stuart Mill on the Quality of PleasuresUtilitas 23 (4): 428-446. 2011.I argue that Mill introduced the distinction between quality and quantity of pleasures in order to fend off the then common charge that utilitarianism is ‘a philosophy for swine’ and to accommodate the (still) widespread intuition that the life of a human is better, in the sense of being intrinsically more valuable, than the life of an animal. I argue that in this he fails because in order to do successfully he would have to show not only that the life of a human is preferable to that of an anim…Read more
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Können nicht-sprachliche Handlungen Argumente sein?Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 28 (2): 125-146. 2003.
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64Telos: The revival of an aristotelian concept in present day ethicsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 48 (1): 62-75. 2005.Genetic engineering is often looked upon with disfavour on the grounds that it involves "tampering with nature". Most philosophers do not take this notion seriously. However, some do. Those who do tend to understand nature in an Aristotelian sense, as the essence or form which is the final end or telos for the sake of which individual organisms live, and which also explains why they are as they are. But is this really a tenable idea? In order to secure its usage in present day ethics, I will fir…Read more
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Durch Leiden lernen. Schopenhauer zwischen Mitleid und WeltüberwindungSchopenhauer Jahrbuch 84 75-90. 2003.
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The Invention of Autonomy. A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 53 (2). 1999.
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Anthropologie und Ethik des Enhancements (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (2). 2011.
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70Review of Nicholas Agar, Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (11). 2005.
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2125Human Enhancement and the Giftedness of LifePhilosophical Papers 40 (1): 55-79. 2011.Michael Sandel's opposition to the project of human enhancement is based on an argument that centres on the notion of giftedness. Sandel claims that by trying to ?make better people? we fall prey to, and encourage, an attitude of mastery and thus lose, or diminish, our appreciation of the giftedness of life. Sandel's position and the underlying argument have been much criticised. In this paper I will try to make sense of Sandel's reasoning and give an account of giftedness that defends its relev…Read more
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The Ontological Ethics of Hans JonasIn Darian Meacham (ed.), Medicine and Society, New Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, Springer Verlag. 2015.
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12Being Queasy about Reconstructing AnimalsAustralian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 7 (1). 2005.
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32The Art of Misunderstanding CriticsCambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25 (1): 153-161. 2016.
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56Nietzsche, the Overhuman and PosthumanJournal of Evolution and Technology 21 (1): 1. 2010.Sorgner (2009, 29) has argued that Bostrom (2005, 4) was wrong to maintain that there are only surface-level similarities between Nietzsche’s vision of the overman, or overhuman, and the transhumanist conception of the posthuman. Rather, he claims, the similarities are “significant” and can be found “on a fundamental level”. However, I think that Bostrom was in fact quite right to dismiss Nietzsche as a major inspiration for transhumanism. There may be some common ground, but there are also esse…Read more
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9Erkenntnis und Wahrnehmung in Platons Dialog TheaitetosAllgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 23 (2): 167-180. 1998.
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7Abschied vom unbewegten Beweger. Eine Begegnung mit Rudolf zur LippeAllgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 27 (3): 257-264. 2002.