Antonio Calcagno

This paper explores the question of the meaning of life, not only from the perspective of its temporal unfolding from birth to death but also from the perspective of its own particular meaning and its final cause, to use Aristotelian categories. In order to discuss this argument I refer myself to Edith Stein to show how crucial moments of her own life give rise to important and de????ining philosophical positions that touch upon questions of personal identity, social and communal relations, and a relationship with God.

Engaging contemporary notions of metaphor and drawing on his past work on the subject, Josef Stern presents a theory of metaphor which is based both on context and semantics. Over the past two decades philosophers of language, linguists, and cognitive scientists have generally believed that metaphor is external to the general conceptions of semantics and grammar. Moreover, metaphor is understood in its pragmatic sense, that is, as having its nature defined by its employment and various uses in language as opposed to the content and character present in the meaning of metaphor. Stern sets as his goal a challenge of such readings of metaphor. Dialoguing with and challenging eminent thinkers on the subject of metaphor, including Donald Davidson and David Kaplan, Stern competently sketches his vision of metaphorical meaning which underlies a speaker-hearer’s capacity to interpret a metaphor by “drawing on a deep analogy between demonstratives, indexicals and metaphors.” His engaging views raise interesting questions and give much food for thought. Issues addressed include: the literal paraphrasability of metaphors vis-à-vis cognition, the roles of exemplification and similarity in metaphorical interpretation, dead metaphors, the pictorial character of metaphors, and the relation between metaphors and the literal.

_John Dewey and Continental Philosophy_ provides a rich sampling of exchanges that could have taken place long ago between the traditions of American pragmatism and continental philosophy had the lines of communication been more open between Dewey and his European contemporaries. Since they were not, Paul Fairfield and thirteen of his colleagues seek to remedy the situation by bringing the philosophy of Dewey into conversation with several currents in continental philosophical thought, from post-Kantian idealism and the work of Friedrich Nietzsche to twentieth-century phenomenology, hermeneutics, and poststructuralism. This unique volume includes discussions comparing and contrasting Dewey with the German philosophers G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer on such topics as phenomenology, naturalism, organicism, contextualism, and poetry. Others investigate a series of connections between Dewey and contemporary French philosophy, including the notions of subjectivity, education, and the critique of modernity in Michel Foucault; language and politics in Jacques Derrida; and the concept of experience in Gilles Deleuze. Also discussed is the question of whether we can identify traces of _Bildung_ in Dewey’s writings on education, and pragmatism’s complex relation to twentieth-century phenomenology and hermeneutics, including the problematic question of whether Heidegger was a pragmatist in any meaningful sense. Presented in intriguing pairings, these thirteen essays offer different approaches to the material that will leave readers with much to deliberate. _ John Dewey and Continental Philosophy_ demonstrates some of the many connections and opportunities for cross-traditional thinking that have long existed between Dewey and continental thought, but have been under-explored. The intersection presented here between Dewey’s pragmatism and the European traditions makes a significant contribution to continental and American philosophy and will spur new and important developments in the American philosophical debate

Engaging contemporary notions of metaphor and drawing on his past work on the subject, Josef Stern presents a theory of metaphor which is based both on context and semantics. Over the past two decades philosophers of language, linguists, and cognitive scientists have generally believed that metaphor is external to the general conceptions of semantics and grammar. Moreover, metaphor is understood in its pragmatic sense, that is, as having its nature defined by its employment and various uses in language as opposed to the content and character present in the meaning of metaphor. Stern sets as his goal a challenge of such readings of metaphor. Dialoguing with and challenging eminent thinkers on the subject of metaphor, including Donald Davidson and David Kaplan, Stern competently sketches his vision of metaphorical meaning which underlies a speaker-hearer’s capacity to interpret a metaphor by “drawing on a deep analogy between demonstratives, indexicals and metaphors.” His engaging views raise interesting questions and give much food for thought. Issues addressed include: the literal paraphrasability of metaphors vis-à-vis cognition, the roles of exemplification and similarity in metaphorical interpretation, dead metaphors, the pictorial character of metaphors, and the relation between metaphors and the literal.

What is “human being”? In this book, Thomas Langan draws on a lifetime of study to offer a new understanding of this central question of our existence, turning to phenomenology and philosophical anthropology to help us better understand who we are as individuals and communities and what makes us act the way we do. While recognizing the human being as an individual with a particular genetic makeup and history, Langan also probes the real essence of human being that philosophers have tended to ignore. He argues that human being is the result of the experiences of humans throughout time—an ontological reality that not only incorporates our collective memories, institutions, habits, ethical practices, and religious faiths but also unfolds in time with its own history to inform individuals in the present. He provides tools and descriptions for accessing this broader historical and present-day reality, investigating deeper structures of human being to show how those historical roots can be appropriated and made meaningful. Building on Langan’s earlier works, _Human Being_ is also readily accessible on its own. Langan shows how the larger issues discussed in those books, ranging from the Catholic tradition to high technology, relate to being human while he brings to light new philosophical insights and ideas. Because human beings continue to evolve, informing our everyday understanding of the world, Langan shows how vital it is for us to think through the sense of human being and how great a challenge that is in today’s society. His work offers insight into human being that invites readers to think and live more deeply in their humanity—and to face the challenges of a rapidly changing world by reawakening perennial quests for love and the divine, and the very search for meaning itself

This article seeks to advance a way of being in the world of the hu-man person that encompasses both the truest sense of freedom of choice and its result, namely, happiness. Starting from the proposal of a relational ethics in Stein I intend to show how, in the authentic relationship through Einfühlung, it is possible to arrive at the “revelation” of what is deeper in ourselves, i.e., the personal core that characterizes us as unique and unrepeatable entities. The growth and development of our personalities occurs coherently with who we are. But the “choice” to adhere to the authenticity of a deep self is a choice of freedom that also leads one to harmony, to the acceptance of one’s finitude and weaknesses, and thus to living well with who one “really” is. This result coincides with being happy.

Jean-Luc Marion claims that God must no longer be thought of in terms of the traditional metaphysical category of Being, for that reduces God to an all too human concept which he calls "Dieu." God must be conceived outside of the ontological difference and outside of the question of Being itself. Marion urges us to think of God as love. We wish to challenge Marion’s claim of the necessity to move au-delà de l’être by arguing that Marion presents a very limited understanding of Being: he interprets the Being of God as causa sui. The thought of Edith Stein will be employed in order to bring out a fuller sense of the metaphysical notion of the Being of God. Stein offers us a rich backdrop against which we can interpret more traditional readings of God as Being, thereby challenging Marion’s claim of the caducity of Being.

This book explores the philosophical writings of Gerda Walther. It features essays that recover large parts of Walther’s oeuvre in order to show her contribution to phenomenology and philosophy. In addition, the volume contains English translations of her key work. The essays consider the interdisciplinary implications of Gerda Walther’s ideas for sociology, political science, psychology, women’s and gender studies, and religious studies. A student of Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and Alexander Pfänder, she wrote foundational studies on the ego, community, mysticism and religion, and consciousness. Walther’s discussion of empathy, identification, the ego and ego-consciousness, alterity, God, mysticism, sensation, intentionality, sociality, politics, and woman is relevant not only to phenomenology and philosophy but also to scholars of religion, sociology, political science, and psychology. Gerda Walther was one of the important figures of the early phenomenological movement. However, as a woman, she could not habilitate at a German University and was, therefore, denied a position. Her complete works have yet to be published. This ground-breaking volume not only helps readers discover a vital voice. It also demonstrates the significant contribution of women to the early phenomenological movement.

Gerda Walther[aut] Walther, Gerda has no developed account of empathyEmpathy; rather, she draws from the writings of early phenomenologists and psychologists on empathy. Generally, for Walther[aut]Walther, Gerda, empathy is an act of mind that permits the understanding of another’s consciousnessConsciousness and experienceExperience. Edith Stein[aut]Edith Stein, in many respects, lays the ground for a phenomenological account of empathy. Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s treatment of intersubjectivityIntersubjectivity and the nature of intersubjective acts such as empathy draws greatly from Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund. There exist three primary sources for Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s analysis of empathy, all of which were written while Stein[aut]Stein, Edith was still in direct contact with Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund either as his student, assistant or as a private researcher attempting to habilitate. The primary and better known source is Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s doctoral dissertation published originally in 1917, titled On the Problem of Empathy\”On the Problem of Empathy”, by Stein, Edith. The text, which is the only extant portion of her doctoral dissertation, sets the stage for Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s later work on the subject. Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund was pleased by Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s selection of the topic, but he wanted her to give more of a historical overview, with special reference to Lipps[aut]Lipps, Hans’ work. Hence, the text is replete with discussions of notable philosophers like Scheler[aut]Scheler, Max, Dilthey[aut]Dilthey, Wilhelm, and Lipps[aut]Lipps, Hans. The second major work that addresses empathy is to be found in Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities\”Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities”, by Stein, Edith. This work was published in Volume V of Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund’s Jahrbuch and consists of two principal texts: PsychicCausalityCausalityPsychic and Individual and Community. This text comes from Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s period during and after her assistantship with Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund. The text is largely, but not exclusively, based on her work on Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund’s Ideen II. The last source is Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s research manuscript titled, Einführung in die Philosophie.

Gerda Walther identifies the possibility of we-communities that are non-intentional and have no intentional object. What is expressed, shared, communicated, and understood between lovers need not necessarily manifest itself in an objective, social, or communal form, as is the case, for example, in a political party. I argue that this non-intentional we can be experienced at the level of habit or affect, a level that is lived but which is not fully grasped in terms of the consciousness of meaning and the relation between meaning fulfillment and meaning intention.

Edith Stein came to phenomenology after beginning her university studies in psychology. She struggled with the inability of psychology to justify and delineate its founding principles. She found in Edmund Husserl, though his sustained criticisms of psychologism, the possibility of a phenomenological ground for psychology. This article demonstrates how Stein, drawing from but also distancing herself from Husserl, justifies the possibility of a phenomenological psychology framed within a personalist structure of subjectivity and sociality.

Stein describes the peculiar mental life of the community as a Gemeinschaftserlebnis or lived experience of the community. Such an experience is marked by a certain form of consciousness insofar as one knows that one is dwelling with and for the other (miteinander und füreinander) at varying degrees of intensity.Furthermore, one experiences solidarity as one dwells within the experience of the other and vice versa. Two central problems arise with this phenomenologicaldescription. First, one wonders whether the doctrine of empathy itself can account for these higher social mental states without necessarily arguing for a specific form of consciousness that is particular to community. Second, the question arises as to why community is described as being accompanied by a peculiar mental state, whereas other social structures like the mass, society, and the state are not described in this way. This article has as its focus these two questions.

The phenomenologist Gerda Walther posits the possibility of a new social act, which she terms telepathy. It is marked by an intimate in-terpersonal union in which ego and alter ego become capable of sharing in the identical lived experience, though distant from one another. Here, there is no fusion or collective identi????ication; rather, in-dividuals, though they live the experience and mind of the other, never lose or transcend their own individuation. Unlike the act of empathy, there is no analogical transfer. This article defends the possibility of a restricted sense telepathy. The author argues that four conditions must be ful????illed for telepathy to occur: recognition of a social drive; a partially willed act of mind that results in the assump-tion of a certain stance, but it also comes upon us as an experience; constitution of subjects as persons marked by a “fundamental es-sence”; and I-splitting.