Elisa Aaltola

Animal ethics has become a valuable part of philosophy. The main elements include criticism of anthropocentric assumptions and emphasis on experientialism. The analytic approach, which has applied standard moral theories to other animals, has been accompanied by the postmodern approach, which emphasizes matters such as plurality and contextuality. This is where J. M. Coetzee becomes relevant. His novels present ethical views related to nonhuman animals, constantly underpinned by the issue of how to communicate such views to others. On a more concrete level, the novels are a form of persuasion in themselves.

With the recent sentimentalism revival, both emotion and empathy have re-emerged as prominent contenders for the throne of moral agency. Particularly the emotive argument, according to which emotions are both the necessary and sufficient criterion for moral ability, has become increasingly popular. The emotive argument is supported by neurostudies and social psychology, which have manifested that the majority of moral decision-making appears to be rested on immediate intuition, and ultimately emotion. However, not all have been willing to accept emotion as the foundation of moral agency, and particularly supporters of the rationalistic argument have presented an arsenal of criticisms against it. The paper explores this rift between Humean and Kantian ethics in the light of contemporary literature, and analyses particularly arguments offered by Jesse Prinz and Jeannette Kennett. It will be suggested that both emotion and reason fail to offer a convincing basis for moral agency, and that we should instead favour a multi-tier approach, with affective empathy as the key capacity on which core moral agency is built.

Altruism has often been thought to be the reason we treat animals with a certain moral respect. Animals are not moral agents who could reciprocally honour our well being, and because of this duties toward them are considered to be based on other-directed motivations. Altruism is a vague notion, and in the context of animals can be divided into at least three different alternatives. The first one equates altruism with benevolence or "kindness"; the second one argues altruism is based on recognising inherent value in others; and the third one emphasises identification. Out of these three the first one seems the poorest, for it ultimately falls into egoism: we treat animals with respect out of a need to cultivate our "humanity". The second option is well justified and has been defended thoroughly in the field of animal ethics. Still, it has been criticised recently for being too theory-dependent and even abstract. The third alternative seems tempting in its willingness to give room to practice instead of emphasising abstract moral notions. However, this willingness also comes with a price, for it seems unclear what the mere concentration on contexts and practice can tell us about duties and norms. The main problem is fitting together identification as a practical grounds for moral sentiment with the need for "codified" and even abstract moral principles. One way to do this, the paper suggests, is to use a three-level approach that seeks to take both sides into account.

Varieties of Empathy: Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics kartoittaa empatian eri muotoja ja niiden suhdetta moraaliseen toimijuuteen sekä eläinetiikkaan. Kirjan lähtökohtana on empatian käsitteellinen ja konkreettinen vaihtelevuus sekä tapa, jolla empatian suhde moraaliseen toimijuuteen riippuu tästä vaihtelusta. Keskeisiä kysymyksiä ovat: Mitä "empatia" tarkoittaa? Miten eri empatian muodot vaikuttavat moraaliseen kyvykkyyteen? Läpi kirjan esimerkkitapauksena toimii moraalinen toimijuus suhteessa muihin eläimiin.