Fulvia De Luise

Se e in che modo il piacere abbia a che fare con il modello di vita preferibile è argomento centrale, sia nella cultura greca, sia nel dibattito filosofico antico. Questo articolo confronta le differenti soluzioni che Platone e Aristotele hanno dato alla questione del piacere, rispettivamente nel Filebo e nell’Etica Nicomachea, registrando una significativa divergenza nel metodo e nella concezione antropologica.Whether and in what way pleasure has to do with a desirable lifestyle is a main topic both in Greek culture and in ancient philosophical debate. This article compares the different solutions that Plato and Aristotle gave to the question of pleasure, in Philebus and in Nicomachean Ethics respectively, pointing out an important divergence in method and anthropological conception.

The subject I intend to discuss deals with a problem which is central in the debate of ancient greek philosophy: the quest for happiness as the final end, the highest good for a human being. Fixing in the achievement of a life worth living the strategic aim of actions, ancient philosophers tried to define as well what a man should desire for himself to fully develop all the capabilities which lie inside human nature. On the one side they proposed major normative models of wisdom, on the other side they gave an important practical indication: the “care of the self”, as a self-control discipline that aims to build a virtuous form of subjectivity, that is able to design and deserve the eudaimonia. In this context, my analysis will focus on the issue of pleasure. The hedone surely represents the critical point of all happiness models of Socratic origin, centred in different ways on the practice of the “care of the self”. While this practical proposal appears to be a complex and demanding alternative in the search for a life worth living, the hedonistic way seems to be much easier and simpler, as far as pleasure is intended as an unequivocal sign of goodness and wellness, immediately recognisable in the experience of happiness. The hedonism of the many appears to the philosophers as a serious menace to society and to the individual, because it conveys unlimited desires and interior disharmony, though, on the other hand, it not possible to deny the value of pleasure without making philosophical happiness unattractive. In the field of the important contemporary re-evaluation of bios models of ancient philosophers (Hadot, Foucault, Nussbaum, Annas) to test their strength and operative capabilities in human subject’s condition in the present days, I would like to outline a comparison between Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on the dilemmas set by pleasure in the enterprise of self-construction: their positions appear, as usual, close and at the same time opposite in the well-known “gigantomachy”.

L’articolo si propone di mostrare alcuni aspetti della strategia platonica nella Repubblica. L’analisi è condotta ricostruendo in primo luogo il modo in cui si presentava a Platone la questione della giustizia, con particolare riferimento alla tradizione relativa a Dike e alla crisi della cultura cittadina ateniese, tra V e IV secolo; in secondo luogo segnala il rapporto ambivalente che Platone intrat¬tiene con la cultura socratica della giustizia interiore; si indirizza infine a mostrare le modalità costruttive con cui Platone propone di risolvere il conflitto nell’anima e nella città, ricorrendo ad una poli¬tica delle emozioni che non necessariamente esclude la compas¬sione.This article intends to illustrate some aspects of the platonic strategy in the Republic. The analysis is carried out at first by revising the way in which Plato was faced with the question of justice, with particular emphasis on the Dike’s tradition and on the crisis of the Athenian urban culture, between the Vth and IVth centuries; secondly, it points out Plato’s ambivalent relationship with the Socratic culture of inner justice; it finally underlines the structural procedures according to which Plato intends to solve the conflict in the soul and in the city and to realize forms of social identity, resorting to a policy of emotions which does non necessarily exclude compassion.