Alan Schwerin

In September 1982 then Bishop Desmond Tutu appeared before the Eloff Commission of Inquiry. After politely explaining the activities of the South African Council of Churches to the government appointed commission, Tutu ended on a defiant note: God's purposes are certain. They [i.e. the S.A. government] may remove a Tutu; they may remove the South African Council of Churches, but God's intention to establish His Kingdom of justice, of love, of compassion, will not be thwarted. We are not scared, certainly not of the Government, or any other perpetrators of injustice and oppression, for victory is ours through Him who loves us.1 Others have also made appeals like this in time of need, and many are bound to continue the practice in the future. However, it is tragically ironic that the institutions and individuals that Tutu singles out as the "perpetrators of injustice and oppression" in his deputation invoke the very same deity in their deliberations. As I shall show in this paper, the founders of apartheid also lay claim to God in their attempts to overcome their sociological and political problems. But the Afrikaners are not alone in their appeal to faith to justify their actions. Many of the early settlers in South Africa also rest their vision of the solutions to the problems of South Africa on their understanding of "God's intention to establish His Kingdom of justice, of love, and compassion." Prominent among those with this vision for Africa are the missionaries. An assessment of the involvement of the missionaries in South Africa is clearly too vast an undertaking for this paper. What I can do here is provide only some indication of the perspective imported by some of these influential participants in the development of the country.

According to Russell, the notation in Principia Mathematica has been designed to avoid the vagueness endemic to our natural language. But what does Russell think vagueness is? My argument is an attempt to show that his views on vagueness evolved and that the final conception he adopts is not coherent. Three phases of his conception of vagueness are identified, the most significant being the view that he articulates on vagueness in his 1923 address to the Jowett Society. My central thesis is that the 1912 conception of vagueness -- what I characterize as "semantic egalitarianism" -- seriously conflicts with the later paradoxical account of vagueness.

Towards the end of 1911, Russell complains that philosophy has unfortunately not produced a set of religious beliefs that he can rely on in his personal life. Early in his career philosophy had appeared very promising. But the adoption of G.E. Moores's philosophical views put paid to the "last hope of getting any creed out of philosophy". My paper is an attempt to show that Russell ought to celebrate, and not complain about the products of his philosophical endeavours. His correspondence with Lady Ottoline Morrell contains a fascinating methodological hypothesis on the relationship between emotions and understanding: an hypothesis that can be used to produce the religion that Russell is after in 1911. This view will later form the basis of some of Russell's most obscure writings on religion - namely, his work on mysticism.