David Archard

Given that in our view the child has a fundamental right to be heard in all collective deliberative processes determining his or her future, we set out, firstly, what is required of such processes to respect this right – namely that the child's authentic voice is heard and makes a difference – and, secondly, the distance between this ideal and practice exemplified in the work of child welfare and child protection workers in Norway and the UK, chiefly in their display of an instrumental attitude to children's views.

Mary Midgley asserts that my argument concerning the problem of child-abuse was inappropriately framed in the language of rights, and neglected certain pertinent natural facts. I defend the view that the use of rights-talk was both apposite and did not misrepresent the moral problem in question. I assess the status and character of the natural facts Midgley adduces in criticism of my case, concluding that they do not obviously establish the conclusions she believes they do. Finally I briefly respond to the charge that my suggestions were illiberal

Much is said about the decline of the family, often in connection with the prevalence of certain social problems. In this article I consider two kinds of fear: (i) that the traditional family is disappearing; (ii) that new forms of family emerging are, in some or other respect, not worthy of the title. In themselves, neither fear, I argue, should give rise to pressing ethical concerns as such. On fear (i): if by ?traditional family? we mean one whose adult members are heterosexuals, normally married and bringing up, in a single shared residence, their own offspring to whom they are biologically related, then indeed this is threatened by certain laws, and social and biotechnological relationships that tolerate and make possible new kinds of parental relationships. But as there are clear ethical objections to the disadvantaging of non-traditional families, there is no clear-cut case that the decline of the traditional version is a bad thing. Fear (ii) typically reflects a concern about excessive separation of the social and biological aspects of parenthood?i.e., that the definition and function of the family in social terms has become detached from a strict biological understanding of such factors. I argue that this concern is misplaced, for various reasons. As a result, there is no good reason to worry that the family?in all of its myriad forms?does not have a future

This book undertakes a systematic comparative analysis of the political philosophies of Sartre and mealeau-Ponty between 1929 and 1960. It critically explores their pre-war discovery of Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger; It records the impact of the second world war and the subsequent founding of Les Temps Modernes. It also reviews their post-war writing, both journalistic and philosophical. Their eventual divergence of views is hows as developing, against the background of world events, from their initial philosophical outlooks. The book sheds new light on the work of both writers, and sets the question of Marxism's relation to existentialism in historical context.

Consider the following examples of behavior by Smith: 1. Smith, seated at her restaurant table, gives an order to the waiter; 2. Smith gets into a cab and names a destination; 3. Smith agrees to Jones's suggestion that they go back to Jones's apartment for a few drinks; 4. Smith casts her vote in some election. In each of these instances what can Smith be understood as consenting to? Is she consenting to pay the bill for whatever meal she orders; pay the fare for the journey to her named destination; sexual intimacy with Jones; and accept the authority of whatever individual or political part is elected? The fact that Smith does not actually express her consent to each of these states of affairs or outcomes need not mean that she is not giving her consent to them. The idea that individuals can give their consent in ways other than by means of a formal verbal expression of agreement is a familiar, if controversial, one.