Annemarie Kalis

In this article ethical issues are discussed which play a role in pharmacogenetics. Developments in pharmacogenetics have a large impact on many different practices such as clinical trials, the practice of medicine and society at large. In clinical trials, questions rise regarding the exclusion of genetic subgroups that may be non- or poor-responders to the experimental drug. Also, the question is asked how pharmaceutical companies should deal with their growing knowledge about the relations between genetic variation and adverse effects. Moreover, pharmacogenetics may provide disease-specific predictive information which may have a significant impact on the relations between physicians, patients and their relatives in the practice of medicine. Here, issues also arise regarding responsibility of patients and physicians for health and disease. In the society at large, the high costs of new pharmacogenetic possibilities lead to questions concerning solidarity and fair distribution on a national as well as an international level. It is concluded that in the near future, ethical research should be focused on the themes responsibility, inclusion and exclusion and global justice.

Do Heidegger-teabags give philosophy a bad name? An essay about philosophy for the general public Among many academic philosophers, philosophy for the general public has a bad reputation. In this paper I give an overview of the main points of criticism, and use these to develop a positive account of what good philosophy for the general public could be. As a first step towards such an account, I outline different views on how philosophy for the general public can relate to academic philosophy. Subsequently, I argue that what makes philosophy for the general public ‘good’, is just what makes philosophical work in general ‘good’: good philosophical work has a philosophical aim, employs philosophical methods and employs these methods in a sound way. Finally I argue that communicability of philosophical ideas should not be seen as a bonus feature but as the sine qua non of philosophical thinking: if academic philosophy paid more attention to communicability, we might not even need a distinct discipline of philosophy for the general public. I conclude with some concrete suggestions for improving such communicability.

Mental states in psychology Many of our thoughts, emotions and motivations have intentional content: they are ‘about’ something. In this paper I present my VENI research project, which starts from the observation that the everyday practice of empirical psychological research is built on the idea that mental states have content. However, empirical psychology lacks a clear view on how mental content should be understood and how mental states could be causally efficacious in virtue of their content. I focus on mental states that play a role in psychiatric symptomatology, and develop an interpretivist answer to these questions. I also offer some suggestions showing how an interpretivist notion of mental content could be used in empirical research on psychiatric symptoms.

This book explores classic philosophical questions regarding the phenomenon of weakness of will or ‘akrasia’: doing A, even though all things considered, you judge it best to do B. Does this phenomenon really exist and if so, how should it be explained? Nacht van Descartes The author provides a historical overview of some traditional answers to these questions and addresses the main question: how does the phenomenon of 'going against your own judgment' relate to the idea that we are rational beings? She elaborates on the notion of rational agency and shows how different types of behaviour express or fail to express our rational agency. This leads to the speculation of what is needed for akratic action to be free action. A novel position is developed, stating that certain widespread philosophical accounts of free action must conclude that 'going against your own judgment' is necessarily unfree. This also requires a reflection on possible implications for moral responsibility. Would it mean that people cannot be held accountable for irrational behaviour? Kalis offers insight on whether everyday irrational behaviour differs from irrational behaviour occurring in the context of psychiatric dysfunction, and develops a view on how we should understand ourselves when we do something other than what we judge best. Written for philosophers, psychologists and psychiatrists interested in issues of irrationality and philosophy of action, this is an indispensable book for both professionals and students interested in interdisciplinary endeavours in the science of mind and behaviour.

In contemporary moral psychology, an often-heard claim is that knowing how we make moral judgments can help us make better moral judgments. Discussions about moral development and improvement are often framed in terms of the question of which mental processes have a better chance of leading to good moral judgments. However, few studies elaborate on the question of what makes a moral judgment a good moral judgment. This article examines what is needed to answer questions of moral improvement and development. It distinguishes 3 types of claims that are at stake: descriptive claims, metaethical claims, and normative claims. To find out what makes certain moral judgments better than others, one needs to have insight in the psychological processes and capacities underlying moral judgment formation. However, one also needs to address the question of what makes a moral judgment justified, and this in turn requires a view on the nature of moral goodness and on the question of what makes a judgment moral at all. The author discusses possible ways in which philosophical theories in the areas of metaethics and normative ethics can contribute to the answering of such questions. Also, she provides concrete suggestions for doing interdisciplinary research that is able to address those questions in moral psychology that have both normative and descriptive aspects.