Jonathan Parry

If states are permitted to create and maintain a military force, by what means are they permitted to do so? This article argues that a theory of just recruitment should incorporate a concern for moral risk. Since the military is a morally risky profession for its members, recruitment policies should be evaluated in terms of how they distribute moral risk within a community. We show how common military recruitment practices exacerbate and concentrate moral risk exposure, using the UK as a case study. We argue that the British state wrongs its citizens by subjecting them to excessively morally risky recruitment practices. Since, we argue, this risk exposure cannot be justified by appealing to the benefits of a military career for recruits, our argument calls for reform of existing practices. Our method of evaluation is generalizable and therefore can be used to assess other states' practices.

Killing and harming others are paradigmatic wrongs. And yet there is at least one intuitive exception to this prohibition—namely, killing or harming in self-defense, or in defense of others. Consider: Murder: Attacker is culpably trying to kill Victim because he is jealous of Victim’s success. Victim can save his own life only by lethally throwing a grenade at Attacker. With the exception of strict pacifists, there is broad consensus in morality and law that defensive harm can be permissible in cases like this. However, as we shall see, it is surprisingly difficult to explain the grounds and limits of this permission.

This paper focuses on Quong's account of the scope of the means principle (the range of actions over which the special constraint on using a person applies). One the key ideas underpinning Quong's approach is that the means principle is downstream from an independent and morally prior account of our rights over the world and against one another. I raise three challenges to this 'rights first' approach. First, I consider Quong's treatment of harmful omissions and argue that Quong's view generates counter-intuitive results. Second, I argue that cases of harmful omissions raise problems for Quong's claim that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility. Third, I consider Quong's extension of the means principle to include uses of persons' rightfully-owned property. I suggest that, contra Quong, questions of distributive justice are not morally prior to the ethics of defensive harm. Instead the two normative domains mutually inform one another.

This paper argues that certain common views about, respectively, the justification of harm and the moral limits of legitimate authority require revision. It defends two main claims. The first concerns agents who are commanded to inflict serious harm on others. It is argued that agents can be morally required to obey such commands, including in (at least some) cases where harming would be morally prohibited in the absence of the command. The argument thus defends a novel ‘authority-based’ justification for harm. The second claim concerns the permissibility of using defensive force against ‘authorized threateners’. It is argued that an agent’s possessing an authority-based justification does not, in itself, raise the justificatory burden on defensively harming them. In doing so, an alternative explanation is provided of why resisting authorized agents is often intuitively impermissible, which holds that authoritative commands can also impose constraints on causing harm, in addition to creating justifications.

Despite a recent explosion of interest in the ethics of armed conflict, the traditional just war criterion that war be waged by a legitimate authority has received relatively little attention. Moreover, of those theorists who have addressed the criterion, many are deeply skeptical about its moral significance. This article aims to add some clarity and precision to the authority criterion and the debates surrounding it, and to suggest that this skepticism may be too quick. The first section analyzes the authority criterion and reveals that there are at least two distinct moral claims associated with it, each requiring separate evaluation. The second section outlines an increasingly influential reductivist approach to just war theory, explaining how this approach grounds powerful objections to the authority criterion. The third section sketches the most promising strategies for providing a qualified defense of authority, while acknowledging the further questions and complications these strategies raise. Importantly, the article aims to rehabilitate the authority criterion from within a broadly reductivist view.

This paper proposes a novel reinterpretation of the familiar, if inchoate, thought that paternalism offends against an ideal of personal sovereignty. The central idea is that (competent) persons have a particular kind of normative power. Just as each of us has the right to control how others are permitted to use our bodies or property, we each have a structurally similar right to control how others are permitted to use our good. When others seek to benefit us without adequately consulting our will, they trespass into a domain that is ours to control, treating us as lacking rights that we in fact have. The paper argues that this theory of anti‐paternalism is superior to existing accounts, is independently attractive, and rests on deeper foundations.

If states are permitted to create and maintain a military force, by what means are they permitted to do so? This article argues that a theory of just recruitment should incorporate a concern for moral risk. Since the military is a morally risky profession for its members, recruitment policies should be evaluated in terms of how they distribute moral risk within a community. We show how common military recruitment practices exacerbate and concentrate moral risk exposure, using the UK as a case study. We argue that the British state wrongs its citizens by subjecting them to excessively morally risky recruitment practices. Since, we argue, this risk exposure cannot be justified by appealing to the benefits of a military career for recruits, our argument calls for reform of existing practices. Our method of evaluation is generalizable and therefore can be used to assess other states' practices.

This paper proposes a novel reinterpretation of the familiar, if inchoate, thought that paternalism offends against an ideal of personal sovereignty. The central idea is that (competent) persons have a particular kind of normative power. Just as each of us has the right to control whether others are permitted to use our bodies or property, we each have a structurally similar right to control whether others are permitted to use our good. When others seek to benefit us without adequately consulting our will, they trespass into a domain that is ours to control, treating us as lacking rights that we in fact have. The paper argues that this theory of anti-paternalism is superior to existing accounts, is independently attractive, and rests on deeper foundations.

This paper argues that certain common views about, respectively, the justification of harm and the moral limits of legitimate authority require revision. It defends two main claims. The first concerns agents who are commanded to inflict serious harm on others. It is argued that agents can be morally required to obey such commands, including in (at least some) cases where harming would be morally prohibited in the absence of the command. The argument thus defends a novel ‘authority-based’ justification for harm. The second claim concerns the permissibility of using defensive force against ‘authorized threateners’. It is argued that an agent’s possessing an authority-based justification does not, in itself, raise the justificatory burden on defensively harming them. In doing so, an alternative explanation is provided of why resisting authorized agents is often intuitively impermissible, which holds that authoritative commands can also impose constraints on causing harm, in addition to creating justifications.

If states are permitted to create and maintain a military force, by what means are they permitted to do so? This paper argues that a theory of just recruitment should incorporate a concern for moral risk. Since the military is a morally risky profession for its members, recruitment policies should be evaluated in terms of how they distribute moral risk within a community. We show how common military recruitment practices exacerbate and concentrate moral risk exposure, using the UK as a case study. We argue that the British state wrongs its citizens by subjecting them to excessively morally risky recruitment practices. Since, we argue, this risk exposure cannot be justified by appealing to the benefits of a military career for recruits, our argument calls for reform of existing practices. Our method of evaluation is generalizable and thus can be used to assess other states’ practices.

This paper focuses on Quong’s account of the scope of the means principle (the range of actions over which the special constraint on using a person applies). One the key ideas underpinning Quong’s approach is that the means principle is downstream from an independent and morally prior account of our rights over the world and against one another. I raise three challenges to this ‘rights first’ approach. First, I consider Quong’s treatment of harmful omissions and argue that Quong’s view generates counter-intuitive results. Second, I argue that cases of harmful omissions raise problems for Quong’s claim that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility. Third, I consider Quong’s extension of the means principle to include uses of persons’ rightfully-owned property. I suggest that, contra Quong, the morality of defensive harm is not based on a prior account of distributive justice. Instead the two normative domains mutually inform one another.

Despite a recent explosion of interest in the ethics of armed conflict, the traditional just war criterion that war be waged by a “legitimate authority” has received less attention than other components of the theory. Moreover, of those theorists who have addressed the criterion, many are deeply skeptical about its moral significance. This article aims to add some clarity and precision to the authority criterion and to debates surrounding it, and to suggest that this skepticism may be too quick. First, it provides an analysis of the authority criterion, and argues there are (at least) two distinct moral claims associated with the criterion, requiring separate evaluation. Second, it outlines an increasingly influential “reductivist” approach to just war theory, and explains how it grounds powerful objections to the authority criterion. Third, and in response, it sketches the most promising strategies for providing a (qualified) defense of authority, and the further questions and complications they raise. Importantly, these strategies aim to rehabilitate the authority criterion from within a broadly reductivist view.