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12Model-based reasoning in creative processesIn L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian & P. Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Kluwer/plenum. pp. 199--217. 1999.
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59Discussive adaptive logics: Handling internal and external inconsistenciesPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1): 211-223. 2006.In this paper, I present the discussive adaptive logic DLI r . As is the case for other discussive logics, the intended application context of DLI r is the interpretation of discussions. What is new about the system is that it does not lead to explosion when some of the premises are self-contradictory. It is argued that this is important in view of the fact that human reasoners are not logically omniscient, and hence, that it may not be evident to discover the inconsistencies in one's beliefs. I…Read more
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13A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses1In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalo, Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann & Marcel Weber (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation, Springer. pp. 93--108. 2011.
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2The Methodological Study of Creativity and Discovery -- Some BackgroundFoundations of Science 4 (3): 231-235. 1999.
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135Abduction through semantic tableaux versus abduction through goal-directed proofsTheoria 22 (3): 295-304. 2007.In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure s…Read more
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93An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative ConflictsJournal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2): 285-315. 2013.We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are ve…Read more
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58On the Acceptance of Problem Solutions Derived from Inconsistent ConstraintsLogic and Logical Philosophy 8 (n/a): 33-46. 2000.In this paper, I discuss the main difficulties one encounters whensolving problems with inconsistent constraints. I argue that in order to meetthese difficulties we need an inconsistency-adaptive logic that enables one toderive as many consequences as possible, but that at the sametime allows one to determine which consequences can be accepted. I showthat the inconsistency-adaptive logic ANA satisfies these requirements
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19Adaptive Logics and the Integration of Induction and DeductionVienna Circle Institute Yearbook 11 93-120. 2004.The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I want to argue that the distinction between induction and deduction is less clear-cut than traditionally assumed, and that, moreover, most reasoning processes in the sciences involve an integration of inductive and deductive steps. Next, I want to show how so-called adaptive logics may lead to a better understanding of this integrated use of induction and deduction
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49The Positivists’ Approach to Scientific DiscoveryPhilosophica 64 (2). 1999.In the early eighties, philosophers of science came to the conviction that discovery and creativity form an integral part of scientific rationality. Ever since, the?positivists? have been criticised for their neglect of these topics. It is the aim of this paper to show that the positivists' approach to scientific discovery is not only much richer than is commonly recognized, but that they even defended an important thesis which some of the `friends of discovery' seem to have forgotten. Contrary …Read more
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15Inconsistencies and the dynamics of scienceLogic and Logical Philosophy 11 (n/a): 129-148. 2003.It is generally agreed upon today that scientific reasoning, like everyday reasoning, proceeds in a dynamic way: inferences derived at some stage in the reasoning process may at a later stage be rejected. This dynamics may be extrinsic or intrinsic. I shall call it extrinsic when previously derived conclusions are rejected on non-logical grounds, and intrinsic when their rejection is based on a purely logical analysis
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32Claudius' discovery of the first two laws of thermodynamics. A paradigm of reasoning from inconsistenciesPhilosophica 63 (1): 89-117. 1999.