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130Inconsistencies and the dynamics of scienceLogic and Logical Philosophy 11 (n/a): 129-148. 2003.It is generally agreed upon today that scientific reasoning, like everyday reasoning, proceeds in a dynamic way: inferences derived at some stage in the reasoning process may at a later stage be rejected. This dynamics may be extrinsic or intrinsic. I shall call it extrinsic when previously derived conclusions are rejected on non-logical grounds, and intrinsic when their rejection is based on a purely logical analysis
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72Claudius' discovery of the first two laws of thermodynamics. A paradigm of reasoning from inconsistenciesPhilosophica 63 (1): 89-117. 1999.
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172An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative ConflictsJournal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2): 285-315. 2013.We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r, a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are ver…Read more
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47Paraconsistent compatibilityLogique Et Analyse 46 (184): 251-287. 2003.In this paper, I present two adaptive logics for paraconsistent compatibility. The consequence relation defined by these logics leads from a (possibly inconsistent) set of premises to all the sentences that are compatible with them. Their proof theory is dynamic, but is proven sound and complete with respect to a static semantics. For the consistent case, both logics lead to exactly the same results as the logics for classical compatibility that were presented in [11]. It is shown that paraconsi…Read more
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57Adaptive Logics and the Integration of Induction and DeductionVienna Circle Institute Yearbook 11 93-120. 2004.The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I want to argue that the distinction between induction and deduction is less clear-cut than traditionally assumed, and that, moreover, most reasoning processes in the sciences involve an integration of inductive and deductive steps. Next, I want to show how so-called adaptive logics may lead to a better understanding of this integrated use of induction and deduction
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115Deductive and ampliative adaptive logics as tools in the study of creativityFoundations of Science 4 (3): 325-336. 1999.In this paper, I argue that logic hasan important role to play in the methodological studyof creativity. I also argue, however, that onlyspecial kinds of logic enable one to understand thereasoning involved in creative processes. I show thatdeductive and ampliative adaptive logics areappropriate tools in this respect.
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130The methodological study of creativity and discovery -- some backgroundFoundations of Science 4 (3): 231-235. 1999.
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27Empirical progress and ampliative adaptive logicsPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 193-217. 2005.In this paper, I present two ampliative adaptive logics: LA and LAk. LA is an adaptive logic for abduction that enables one to generate explanatory hypotheses from a set of observational statements and a set of background assumptions. LAk is based on LA and has the peculiar property that it selects those explanatory hypotheses that are empirically most successful. The aim of LAk is to capture the notion of empirical progress as studied by Theo Kuipers.
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58IntroductionLogic and Logical Philosophy 21 (4): 319-322. 2012.This introduction clarifies the ideas behind the Logic, Reasoningand Rationality congress from which the papers in this issue are selected.These ideas are situated in the history of 20th century philosophy. We also give an overview of the papers in this issue.
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41Model-based reasoning in creative processesIn L. Magnani, Nancy Nersessian & Paul Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Kluwer/plenum. pp. 199--217. 1999.
