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An extremely rich paraconsistent logic and the adaptive logic based on itIn Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic, Research Studies Press. pp. 189-201. 2000.
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83The Positivists’ Approach to Scientific DiscoveryPhilosophica 64 (2). 1999.In the early eighties, philosophers of science came to the conviction that discovery and creativity form an integral part of scientific rationality. Ever since, the?positivists? have been criticised for their neglect of these topics. It is the aim of this paper to show that the positivists' approach to scientific discovery is not only much richer than is commonly recognized, but that they even defended an important thesis which some of the `friends of discovery' seem to have forgotten. Contrary …Read more
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46Adaptive Logic in Scientific Discovery: the Case of ClaudiusLogique and Analyse 143 359-389. 1993.
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156On the Acceptance of Problem Solutions Derived from Inconsistent ConstraintsLogic and Logical Philosophy 8 (n/a): 33-46. 2000.In this paper, I discuss the main difficulties one encounters whensolving problems with inconsistent constraints. I argue that in order to meetthese difficulties we need an inconsistency-adaptive logic that enables one toderive as many consequences as possible, but that at the sametime allows one to determine which consequences can be accepted. I showthat the inconsistency-adaptive logic ANA satisfies these requirements
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47A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses1In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalo, Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann & Marcel Weber (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation, Springer. pp. 93--108. 2011.
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130Inconsistencies and the dynamics of scienceLogic and Logical Philosophy 11 (n/a): 129-148. 2003.It is generally agreed upon today that scientific reasoning, like everyday reasoning, proceeds in a dynamic way: inferences derived at some stage in the reasoning process may at a later stage be rejected. This dynamics may be extrinsic or intrinsic. I shall call it extrinsic when previously derived conclusions are rejected on non-logical grounds, and intrinsic when their rejection is based on a purely logical analysis
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72Claudius' discovery of the first two laws of thermodynamics. A paradigm of reasoning from inconsistenciesPhilosophica 63 (1): 89-117. 1999.
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172An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative ConflictsJournal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2): 285-315. 2013.We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r, a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are ver…Read more
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47Paraconsistent compatibilityLogique Et Analyse 46 (184): 251-287. 2003.In this paper, I present two adaptive logics for paraconsistent compatibility. The consequence relation defined by these logics leads from a (possibly inconsistent) set of premises to all the sentences that are compatible with them. Their proof theory is dynamic, but is proven sound and complete with respect to a static semantics. For the consistent case, both logics lead to exactly the same results as the logics for classical compatibility that were presented in [11]. It is shown that paraconsi…Read more
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57Adaptive Logics and the Integration of Induction and DeductionVienna Circle Institute Yearbook 11 93-120. 2004.The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I want to argue that the distinction between induction and deduction is less clear-cut than traditionally assumed, and that, moreover, most reasoning processes in the sciences involve an integration of inductive and deductive steps. Next, I want to show how so-called adaptive logics may lead to a better understanding of this integrated use of induction and deduction
