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115Deductive and ampliative adaptive logics as tools in the study of creativityFoundations of Science 4 (3): 325-336. 1999.In this paper, I argue that logic hasan important role to play in the methodological studyof creativity. I also argue, however, that onlyspecial kinds of logic enable one to understand thereasoning involved in creative processes. I show thatdeductive and ampliative adaptive logics areappropriate tools in this respect.
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130The methodological study of creativity and discovery -- some backgroundFoundations of Science 4 (3): 231-235. 1999.
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27Empirical progress and ampliative adaptive logicsPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 193-217. 2005.In this paper, I present two ampliative adaptive logics: LA and LAk. LA is an adaptive logic for abduction that enables one to generate explanatory hypotheses from a set of observational statements and a set of background assumptions. LAk is based on LA and has the peculiar property that it selects those explanatory hypotheses that are empirically most successful. The aim of LAk is to capture the notion of empirical progress as studied by Theo Kuipers.
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58IntroductionLogic and Logical Philosophy 21 (4): 319-322. 2012.This introduction clarifies the ideas behind the Logic, Reasoningand Rationality congress from which the papers in this issue are selected.These ideas are situated in the history of 20th century philosophy. We also give an overview of the papers in this issue.
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41Model-based reasoning in creative processesIn L. Magnani, Nancy Nersessian & Paul Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Kluwer/plenum. pp. 199--217. 1999.
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102Discussive adaptive logics: Handling internal and external inconsistenciesPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1): 211-223. 2006.In this paper, I present the discussive adaptive logic DLI r . As is the case for other discussive logics, the intended application context of DLI r is the interpretation of discussions. What is new about the system is that it does not lead to explosion when some of the premises are self-contradictory. It is argued that this is important in view of the fact that human reasoners are not logically omniscient, and hence, that it may not be evident to discover the inconsistencies in one's beliefs. I…Read more
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An extremely rich paraconsistent logic and the adaptive logic based on itIn Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic, Research Studies Press. pp. 189-201. 2000.
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83The Positivists’ Approach to Scientific DiscoveryPhilosophica 64 (2). 1999.In the early eighties, philosophers of science came to the conviction that discovery and creativity form an integral part of scientific rationality. Ever since, the?positivists? have been criticised for their neglect of these topics. It is the aim of this paper to show that the positivists' approach to scientific discovery is not only much richer than is commonly recognized, but that they even defended an important thesis which some of the `friends of discovery' seem to have forgotten. Contrary …Read more
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46Adaptive Logic in Scientific Discovery: the Case of ClaudiusLogique and Analyse 143 359-389. 1993.
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156On the Acceptance of Problem Solutions Derived from Inconsistent ConstraintsLogic and Logical Philosophy 8 (n/a): 33-46. 2000.In this paper, I discuss the main difficulties one encounters whensolving problems with inconsistent constraints. I argue that in order to meetthese difficulties we need an inconsistency-adaptive logic that enables one toderive as many consequences as possible, but that at the sametime allows one to determine which consequences can be accepted. I showthat the inconsistency-adaptive logic ANA satisfies these requirements
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47A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses1In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalo, Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann & Marcel Weber (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation, Springer. pp. 93--108. 2011.
