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46Adaptive Logic in Scientific Discovery: the Case of ClaudiusLogique and Analyse 143 359-389. 1993.
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156On the Acceptance of Problem Solutions Derived from Inconsistent ConstraintsLogic and Logical Philosophy 8 (n/a): 33-46. 2000.In this paper, I discuss the main difficulties one encounters whensolving problems with inconsistent constraints. I argue that in order to meetthese difficulties we need an inconsistency-adaptive logic that enables one toderive as many consequences as possible, but that at the sametime allows one to determine which consequences can be accepted. I showthat the inconsistency-adaptive logic ANA satisfies these requirements
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47A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses1In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalo, Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann & Marcel Weber (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation, Springer. pp. 93--108. 2011.
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130Inconsistencies and the dynamics of scienceLogic and Logical Philosophy 11 (n/a): 129-148. 2003.It is generally agreed upon today that scientific reasoning, like everyday reasoning, proceeds in a dynamic way: inferences derived at some stage in the reasoning process may at a later stage be rejected. This dynamics may be extrinsic or intrinsic. I shall call it extrinsic when previously derived conclusions are rejected on non-logical grounds, and intrinsic when their rejection is based on a purely logical analysis
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72Claudius' discovery of the first two laws of thermodynamics. A paradigm of reasoning from inconsistenciesPhilosophica 63 (1): 89-117. 1999.
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172An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative ConflictsJournal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2): 285-315. 2013.We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r, a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are ver…Read more
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47Paraconsistent compatibilityLogique Et Analyse 46 (184): 251-287. 2003.In this paper, I present two adaptive logics for paraconsistent compatibility. The consequence relation defined by these logics leads from a (possibly inconsistent) set of premises to all the sentences that are compatible with them. Their proof theory is dynamic, but is proven sound and complete with respect to a static semantics. For the consistent case, both logics lead to exactly the same results as the logics for classical compatibility that were presented in [11]. It is shown that paraconsi…Read more
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57Adaptive Logics and the Integration of Induction and DeductionVienna Circle Institute Yearbook 11 93-120. 2004.The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I want to argue that the distinction between induction and deduction is less clear-cut than traditionally assumed, and that, moreover, most reasoning processes in the sciences involve an integration of inductive and deductive steps. Next, I want to show how so-called adaptive logics may lead to a better understanding of this integrated use of induction and deduction
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115Deductive and ampliative adaptive logics as tools in the study of creativityFoundations of Science 4 (3): 325-336. 1999.In this paper, I argue that logic hasan important role to play in the methodological studyof creativity. I also argue, however, that onlyspecial kinds of logic enable one to understand thereasoning involved in creative processes. I show thatdeductive and ampliative adaptive logics areappropriate tools in this respect.
