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52Deductive and ampliative adaptive logics as tools in the study of creativityFoundations of Science 4 (3): 325-336. 1999.In this paper, I argue that logic hasan important role to play in the methodological studyof creativity. I also argue, however, that onlyspecial kinds of logic enable one to understand thereasoning involved in creative processes. I show thatdeductive and ampliative adaptive logics areappropriate tools in this respect.
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An extremely rich paraconsistent logic and the adaptive logic based on itIn Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic, Research Studies Press. pp. 189-201. 2000.
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72The methodological study of creativity and discovery -- some backgroundFoundations of Science 4 (3): 231-235. 1999.
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27Empirical progress and ampliative adaptive logicsPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 193-217. 2005.In this paper, I present two ampliative adaptive logics: LA and LAk. LA is an adaptive logic for abduction that enables one to generate explanatory hypotheses from a set of observational statements and a set of background assumptions. LAk is based on LA and has the peculiar property that it selects those explanatory hypotheses that are empirically most successful. The aim of LAk is to capture the notion of empirical progress as studied by Theo Kuipers.
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19Adaptive Logic in Scientific Discovery: the Case of ClaudiusLogique and Analyse 143 359-389. 1993.
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31Tolerating deontic conflicts by adaptively restricting inheritanceLogique Et Analyse 55 (219): 477. 2012.
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12Model-based reasoning in creative processesIn L. Magnani, Nancy Nersessian & Paul Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Kluwer/plenum. pp. 199--217. 1999.
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60Discussive adaptive logics: Handling internal and external inconsistenciesPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1): 211-223. 2006.In this paper, I present the discussive adaptive logic DLI r . As is the case for other discussive logics, the intended application context of DLI r is the interpretation of discussions. What is new about the system is that it does not lead to explosion when some of the premises are self-contradictory. It is argued that this is important in view of the fact that human reasoners are not logically omniscient, and hence, that it may not be evident to discover the inconsistencies in one's beliefs. I…Read more
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13A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses1In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalo, Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann & Marcel Weber (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation, Springer. pp. 93--108. 2011.
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2The Methodological Study of Creativity and Discovery -- Some BackgroundFoundations of Science 4 (3): 231-235. 1999.
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136Abduction through semantic tableaux versus abduction through goal-directed proofsTheoria 22 (3): 295-304. 2007.In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure s…Read more
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94An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative ConflictsJournal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2): 285-315. 2013.We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are ve…Read more