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50What does “Experiencing Meaning” Mean?In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (ed.), The Third Wittgenstein. Ashgate Wittgenstin Studies, Ashgate. pp. 107-123. 2004.Wittgenstein links the strange phenomenon of experiencing meaning to the more familiar phenomenon of seeing-as, or noticing an aspect. His interest in the subject seems to have been sparked by the work of William James, and this chapter examines both what he has to say on the matter (some of which long pre-dates the 'third' Wittgenstein stage) and its relevance to language-learning, prose, poetry and puns.
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131A Unified Pyrrhonian Resolution of the Toxin Problem, The Surprise Examination and Newcomb’s PuzzleAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4). 2008.The three puzzles here considered are shown to have a common structure. And in each, an agent is thrust into a cleverly contrived deliberatively unstable situation. The paper advocates a resolutely Pyrrhonian abandonment of the futile reasoning in which the agent is trapped and advocates an alternative strategy for escape.
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87Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore.Philosophical GrammarPhilosophical Quarterly 25 (100): 279. 1975.
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185Spandrels of Truth * By JC BEALLAnalysis 70 (3): 586-589. 2010.No abstract is available for this citation
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38Gardner-Inspired Design of Teaching MaterialsDiscourse: Learning and Teaching in Philosophical and Religious Studies 10 (1): 173-202. 2010.
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53The Imagination as Glory: The Poetry of James DickeyJournal of Aesthetic Education 22 (2): 118. 1988.
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97The general aim of this project is to fundamentally re-think the design of teaching materials in view of what is now known about cognitive deficits and about what Howard Gardner has termed ‘multiple intelligences’. The applicant has implemented this strategy in two distinct areas, the first involving the writing of an English language programme for Chinese speakers, the second involving the construction of specialized equipment for teaching elementary logic to blind students. The next phase (for…Read more
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111Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of MathematicsPhilosophical Quarterly 27 (109): 370. 1977.
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1A Problem For The DialetheistBulletin of the Section of Logic 15 (1): 10-13. 1986.There has recently been revived logical interest, particularly in the context of attempts to solve the logico-semantical paradoxes, of the idea that there are true contracistions, and of semantics accomodating the glut value both true and false. By considering some generally accepted claims about assertion. I attempt to show that this dialetheist idea is untenable
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100Paradoxes: Their roots, range and resolutionAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4). 2004.Book Information Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution. Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution Nicholas Rescher , Chicago and La Salle : Open Court , 2001 , xxiii + 293 , US$24.95 ( paper ). By Nicholas Rescher. Open Court. Chicago and La Salle. Pp. xxiii + 293. US$24.95 (paper:).
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157III-A Unified Solution to Some ParadoxesProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1): 53-74. 2000.The Russell class does not exist because the conditions purporting to specify that class are contradictory, and hence fail to specify any class. Equally, the conditions purporting to specify the Liar statement are contradictory and hence, although the Liar sentence is grammatically in order, it fails to yield a statement. Thus the common source of these and related paradoxes is contradictory (or tautologous) specifying conditions-for such conditions fail to specify. This is the diagnosis. The cu…Read more
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1653The Barber, Russell's Paradox, Catch-22, God, Contradiction, and MoreIn Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 295--313. 2004.outrageous remarks about contradictions. Perhaps the most striking remark he makes is that they are not false. This claim first appears in his early notebooks (Wittgenstein 1960, p.108). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that contradictions (like tautologies) are not statements (Sätze) and hence are not false (or true). This is a consequence of his theory that genuine statements are pictures.
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University of KentRegular Faculty
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 1977