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Laurence Goldstein
(1947 - 2014)

PhD: University of St. AndrewsLast affiliation: University of Kent
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    125
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    43

 More details
  • University of Kent
    Regular Faculty
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 1977
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
20th Century Philosophy
  • All publications (125)
  •  197
    Refuse disposal
    Analysis 62 (3): 236-241. 2002.
    Ethics
  •  287
    How to boil a live frog
    Analysis 60 (2): 170-178. 2000.
    Sorites Paradox
  •  186
    Farewell to Grelling
    Analysis 63 (1): 31-32. 2003.
    Liar Paradox
  •  50
    What does “Experiencing Meaning” Mean?
    In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (ed.), The Third Wittgenstein. Ashgate Wittgenstin Studies, Ashgate. pp. 107-123. 2004.
    Wittgenstein links the strange phenomenon of experiencing meaning to the more familiar phenomenon of seeing-as, or noticing an aspect. His interest in the subject seems to have been sparked by the work of William James, and this chapter examines both what he has to say on the matter (some of which long pre-dates the 'third' Wittgenstein stage) and its relevance to language-learning, prose, poetry and puns.
  •  97
    New Books Received (review)
    with Andrew Brennan, Max Deutsch, Joe Y. F. Lau, Gary L. Hardcastle, and George A. Reisch
    Philosophy Today 50 (3): 368-368. 2006.
  • When is a statement not a statement? when it'sa liar
    with A. Blum
    The Reasoner 2 (2): 4-6. 2008.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyTruth
  •  131
    A Unified Pyrrhonian Resolution of the Toxin Problem, The Surprise Examination and Newcomb’s Puzzle
    with Peter Cave
    American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4). 2008.
    The three puzzles here considered are shown to have a common structure. And in each, an agent is thrust into a cleverly contrived deliberatively unstable situation. The paper advocates a resolutely Pyrrhonian abandonment of the futile reasoning in which the agent is trapped and advocates an alternative strategy for escape.
    Decision-Theoretic Puzzles
  •  33
    Book Reviews (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 25 (98): 84-85. 1975.
  •  87
    Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore.Philosophical Grammar
    with Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, and Anthony Kenny
    Philosophical Quarterly 25 (100): 279. 1975.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  127
    Dying Quickly but Painfully
    Analysis 55 (3). 1995.
    Death and DyingAssisted Suicide
  •  79
    Wittgenstein, semantics and connectionism
    with Hartley Slater
    Philosophical Investigations 21 (4). 1998.
    Ludwig WittgensteinNeural Networks and Connectionism
  •  220
    Examining boxing and toxin
    Analysis 63 (3): 242-244. 2003.
    Decision-Theoretic Puzzles
  •  108
    Universals and Scientific Realism
    Philosophical Quarterly 29 (117): 360-362. 1979.
    Universals
  •  185
    Spandrels of Truth * By JC BEALL
    with B. Armour-Garb
    Analysis 70 (3): 586-589. 2010.
    No abstract is available for this citation
    Liar Paradox
  •  25
    Book Reviews (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 28 (111): 174-176. 1978.
  •  38
    Gardner-Inspired Design of Teaching Materials
    with Martin Gough
    Discourse: Learning and Teaching in Philosophical and Religious Studies 10 (1): 173-202. 2010.
  •  52
    Book Reviews (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119): 153-155. 1980.
  •  66
    Linguistic Representation
    Philosophical Quarterly 26 (103): 189-191. 1976.
  •  53
    The Imagination as Glory: The Poetry of James Dickey
    with James Dickey, Bruce Weigl, and T. R. Hummer
    Journal of Aesthetic Education 22 (2): 118. 1988.
    Aesthetics
  •  100
    Design of teaching materials informed by consideration of learning-impaired students
    with A. Martin Gough
    The general aim of this project is to fundamentally re-think the design of teaching materials in view of what is now known about cognitive deficits and about what Howard Gardner has termed ‘multiple intelligences’. The applicant has implemented this strategy in two distinct areas, the first involving the writing of an English language programme for Chinese speakers, the second involving the construction of specialized equipment for teaching elementary logic to blind students. The next phase (for…Read more
    The general aim of this project is to fundamentally re-think the design of teaching materials in view of what is now known about cognitive deficits and about what Howard Gardner has termed ‘multiple intelligences’. The applicant has implemented this strategy in two distinct areas, the first involving the writing of an English language programme for Chinese speakers, the second involving the construction of specialized equipment for teaching elementary logic to blind students. The next phase (for which funding is sought) is to test the effectiveness of the logic device, because in theory – the one to be tested – materials the design of which is informed by the above rationale will provide a richer learning experience for non-impaired users.
    Academic and Teaching Ethics
  •  174
    Introduction
    The Monist 88 (1): 3-10. 2005.
    According to some commentators, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is all one big joke: we plough through the text trying to extract the sense out of each spare and heroic proposition, only to be told at the end, that anyone who understands the author will realize that all of his propositions are nonsensical and so are not even propositions. The whole work is a kind of hoax; the readers are ridiculed, but, with luck, will eventually have to laugh when they come to recognize that what they had taken for de…Read more
    According to some commentators, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is all one big joke: we plough through the text trying to extract the sense out of each spare and heroic proposition, only to be told at the end, that anyone who understands the author will realize that all of his propositions are nonsensical and so are not even propositions. The whole work is a kind of hoax; the readers are ridiculed, but, with luck, will eventually have to laugh when they come to recognize that what they had taken for deep philosophy was all so much gibberish. As a result of this revelation, they will be cured for ever of the urge to philosophize.
    French PhilosophyLiar Paradox
  •  119
    Wittgenstein's Late Views on Belief, Paradox and Contradiction
    Philosophical Investigations 11 (1): 49-73. 1988.
    Moore's ParadoxLudwig Wittgenstein
  •  203
    Circular queue paradoxes - the missing link
    Analysis 59 (4): 284-290. 1999.
  •  278
    Paradoxical partners: semantical brides and set-theoretical grooms
    Analysis 73 (1): 33-37. 2013.
    Is there a key for ‘translating' some set-theoretical paradoxes into counterpart semantical paradoxes and vice-versa? There is, and this encourages the hope of a unified solution. The solution turns not on inventing new axioms that do not entail contradiction, but on imposing a completely intuitive restriction on the comprehension axiom of naive set theory in order to avoid illegitimate (circular) stipulation
    Liar Paradox
  •  165
    Wittgenstein and situation comedy
    Philosophia 37 (4): 605-627. 2009.
    Wittgenstein discusses speakers exploiting context to inject meaning into the sentences that they use. One facet of situation comedy is context-injected ambiguity, where scriptwriters artfully construct situations such that, because of conflicting contextual clues, a character, though uttering a sentence that contains neither ambiguous words nor amphibolous contruction may plausibly be interpreted in at least two distinct ways. This highlights an important distinction between the (concise) sente…Read more
    Wittgenstein discusses speakers exploiting context to inject meaning into the sentences that they use. One facet of situation comedy is context-injected ambiguity, where scriptwriters artfully construct situations such that, because of conflicting contextual clues, a character, though uttering a sentence that contains neither ambiguous words nor amphibolous contruction may plausibly be interpreted in at least two distinct ways. This highlights an important distinction between the (concise) sentence that a speaker uses and what the speaker means, the disclosure of which may require considerable spelling out. Understanding this phenomenon of nonindexical contextualism is the key to solving, inter alia , problems where, puzzlingly, exchanging a singular term in a statement with a co-referential one fails to preserve truth-value. This is a rare case where there is a huge debate in the recent literature that is decisively settled by Wittgenstein’s approach.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  209
    A non-theistic cosmology and natural history
    Analysis 66 (3): 256-260. 2006.
    The plausibility of the theory of evolution depends on abandoning the assumption of a unique 'big bang' ex nihilo marking the beginning of the universe.
  •  85
    On explaining linguistic competence
    Mind 86 (341): 104-108. 1977.
    Knowledge of Language
  •  245
    'This Statement Is Not True' Is Not True
    Analysis 52 (1): 1. 1992.
  •  67
    Inescapable Surprises and Acquirable Intentions
    Analysis 53 (2). 1993.
    Decision TheoryIntentions
  •  67
    The Micro-Computer as Logic Tutor
    Teaching Philosophy 7 (2): 109-114. 1984.
    Philosophy of Education
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