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Laurence Goldstein
(1947 - 2014)

PhD: University of St. AndrewsLast affiliation: University of Kent
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    125
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  •  News and Updates
    43

 More details
  • University of Kent
    Regular Faculty
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 1977
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
20th Century Philosophy
  • All publications (125)
  •  197
    Refuse disposal
    Analysis 62 (3): 236-241. 2002.
    Ethics
  •  287
    How to boil a live frog
    Analysis 60 (2): 170-178. 2000.
    Sorites Paradox
  •  186
    Farewell to Grelling
    Analysis 63 (1): 31-32. 2003.
    Liar Paradox
  •  50
    What does “Experiencing Meaning” Mean?
    In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (ed.), The Third Wittgenstein. Ashgate Wittgenstin Studies, Ashgate. pp. 107-123. 2004.
    Wittgenstein links the strange phenomenon of experiencing meaning to the more familiar phenomenon of seeing-as, or noticing an aspect. His interest in the subject seems to have been sparked by the work of William James, and this chapter examines both what he has to say on the matter (some of which long pre-dates the 'third' Wittgenstein stage) and its relevance to language-learning, prose, poetry and puns.
  •  97
    New Books Received (review)
    with Andrew Brennan, Max Deutsch, Joe Y. F. Lau, Gary L. Hardcastle, and George A. Reisch
    Philosophy Today 50 (3): 368-368. 2006.
  • When is a statement not a statement? when it'sa liar
    with A. Blum
    The Reasoner 2 (2): 4-6. 2008.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyTruth
  •  131
    A Unified Pyrrhonian Resolution of the Toxin Problem, The Surprise Examination and Newcomb’s Puzzle
    with Peter Cave
    American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4). 2008.
    The three puzzles here considered are shown to have a common structure. And in each, an agent is thrust into a cleverly contrived deliberatively unstable situation. The paper advocates a resolutely Pyrrhonian abandonment of the futile reasoning in which the agent is trapped and advocates an alternative strategy for escape.
    Decision-Theoretic Puzzles
  •  33
    Book Reviews (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 25 (98): 84-85. 1975.
  •  87
    Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore.Philosophical Grammar
    with Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, and Anthony Kenny
    Philosophical Quarterly 25 (100): 279. 1975.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  127
    Dying Quickly but Painfully
    Analysis 55 (3). 1995.
    Death and DyingAssisted Suicide
  •  79
    Wittgenstein, semantics and connectionism
    with Hartley Slater
    Philosophical Investigations 21 (4). 1998.
    Ludwig WittgensteinNeural Networks and Connectionism
  •  220
    Examining boxing and toxin
    Analysis 63 (3): 242-244. 2003.
    Decision-Theoretic Puzzles
  •  108
    Universals and Scientific Realism
    Philosophical Quarterly 29 (117): 360-362. 1979.
    Universals
  •  185
    Spandrels of Truth * By JC BEALL
    with B. Armour-Garb
    Analysis 70 (3): 586-589. 2010.
    No abstract is available for this citation
    Liar Paradox
  •  25
    Book Reviews (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 28 (111): 174-176. 1978.
  •  38
    Gardner-Inspired Design of Teaching Materials
    with Martin Gough
    Discourse: Learning and Teaching in Philosophical and Religious Studies 10 (1): 173-202. 2010.
  •  52
    Book Reviews (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119): 153-155. 1980.
  •  66
    Linguistic Representation
    Philosophical Quarterly 26 (103): 189-191. 1976.
  •  53
    The Imagination as Glory: The Poetry of James Dickey
    with James Dickey, Bruce Weigl, and T. R. Hummer
    Journal of Aesthetic Education 22 (2): 118. 1988.
    Aesthetics
  •  100
    Design of teaching materials informed by consideration of learning-impaired students
    with A. Martin Gough
    The general aim of this project is to fundamentally re-think the design of teaching materials in view of what is now known about cognitive deficits and about what Howard Gardner has termed ‘multiple intelligences’. The applicant has implemented this strategy in two distinct areas, the first involving the writing of an English language programme for Chinese speakers, the second involving the construction of specialized equipment for teaching elementary logic to blind students. The next phase (for…Read more
    The general aim of this project is to fundamentally re-think the design of teaching materials in view of what is now known about cognitive deficits and about what Howard Gardner has termed ‘multiple intelligences’. The applicant has implemented this strategy in two distinct areas, the first involving the writing of an English language programme for Chinese speakers, the second involving the construction of specialized equipment for teaching elementary logic to blind students. The next phase (for which funding is sought) is to test the effectiveness of the logic device, because in theory – the one to be tested – materials the design of which is informed by the above rationale will provide a richer learning experience for non-impaired users.
    Academic and Teaching Ethics
  •  14
    Reasoning without Contradiction
    The Reasoner 6 (12): 183-184. 2012.
  •  50
    Smooth and Rough Logic
    Philosophical Investigations 15 (2): 93-110. 1992.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic, General Works
  • Clear and Queer Thinking: Wittgenstein's Development and His Relevance to Modern Thought
    Mind 110 (437): 207-211. 2001.
  • Pasquale Frascolla, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics
    Philosophical Investigations 19 337-341. 1996.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  30
    Wittgenstein and Legal Theory
    Philosophical Books 34 (4): 242-244. 1993.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  80
    A Buridanian discussion of desire, murder and democracy
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4). 1992.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    MurderDemocracyJean Buridan
  •  106
    Logic and reasoning
    Erkenntnis 28 (3). 1988.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogicsLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous
  •  137
    The sorites as a lesson in semantics
    Mind 97 (387): 447-455. 1988.
    Sorites Paradox
  •  270
    How original a work is the tractatus logico-philosophicus?
    Philosophy 77 (3): 421-446. 2002.
    Wittgenstein's Tractatus is widely regarded as a masterpiece, a brilliant, if flawed attempt to achieve an ‘unassailable and definitive … final solution’ to a wide range of philosophical problems. Yet, in a 1931 notebook, Wittgenstein confesses: ‘I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking. I think I have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else’. This disarming self-assessment is, I believe accurate. Th…Read more
    Wittgenstein's Tractatus is widely regarded as a masterpiece, a brilliant, if flawed attempt to achieve an ‘unassailable and definitive … final solution’ to a wide range of philosophical problems. Yet, in a 1931 notebook, Wittgenstein confesses: ‘I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking. I think I have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else’. This disarming self-assessment is, I believe accurate. The Tractatus, despite making significant advances on the logical doctrines of Frege and Russell, is essentially a derivative work—Wittgenstein, as he elsewhere acknowledges, provided a fertile soil in which the original seeds of other peoples' thought grew in a unique way. In a play of mine, published in Philosophy (1999), Wittgenstein fails a tough viva on the Tractatus because he fails to properly support some of the weak arguments in the work and because of his inadequate acknowledgment of sources. The present paper further explores some of the antecedents of Wittgenstein's early views and answers some criticisms of the play.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  61
    To Let: Unsuccessful Stipulation, Bad Proof, and Paradox
    American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1): 93. 2013.
    Letting is a common practice in mathematics. For example, we let x be the sum of the first n integers and, after a short proof, conclude that x = n(n+1)/2; we let J be the point where the bisectors of two of the angles of a triangle intersect and prove that this coincides with H, the point at which another pair of bisectors of the angles of that triangle intersect. Karl Weierstrass's colleagues, in an attempt to solve optimization problems, stipulated that the minimum area for a triangle with a …Read more
    Letting is a common practice in mathematics. For example, we let x be the sum of the first n integers and, after a short proof, conclude that x = n(n+1)/2; we let J be the point where the bisectors of two of the angles of a triangle intersect and prove that this coincides with H, the point at which another pair of bisectors of the angles of that triangle intersect. Karl Weierstrass's colleagues, in an attempt to solve optimization problems, stipulated that the minimum area for a triangle with a given perimeter be a straight line segment conceived as a triangle with zero altitude. (Weierstrass complained that this obscured the insight that some problems have no solutions.) In mathematics applied to physics, we let x be the temperature in Fahrenheit corresponding to 30° Centigrade; we let v be the velocity of the Earth through the luminiferous ether. Before the error was spotted, the official rules for Little League Baseball made an inconsistent stipulation about the dimensions of home plate (Bradley 1996).
    Areas of Mathematics
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