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Laurence Goldstein
(1947 - 2014)

PhD: University of St. AndrewsLast affiliation: University of Kent
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    125
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  •  News and Updates
    43

 More details
  • University of Kent
    Regular Faculty
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 1977
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
20th Century Philosophy
  • All publications (125)
  •  197
    Refuse disposal
    Analysis 62 (3): 236-241. 2002.
    Ethics
  •  286
    How to boil a live frog
    Analysis 60 (2): 170-178. 2000.
    Sorites Paradox
  •  186
    Farewell to Grelling
    Analysis 63 (1): 31-32. 2003.
    Liar Paradox
  •  50
    What does “Experiencing Meaning” Mean?
    In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (ed.), The Third Wittgenstein. Ashgate Wittgenstin Studies, Ashgate. pp. 107-123. 2004.
    Wittgenstein links the strange phenomenon of experiencing meaning to the more familiar phenomenon of seeing-as, or noticing an aspect. His interest in the subject seems to have been sparked by the work of William James, and this chapter examines both what he has to say on the matter (some of which long pre-dates the 'third' Wittgenstein stage) and its relevance to language-learning, prose, poetry and puns.
  •  96
    New Books Received (review)
    with Andrew Brennan, Max Deutsch, Joe Y. F. Lau, Gary L. Hardcastle, and George A. Reisch
    Philosophy Today 50 (3): 368-368. 2006.
  • When is a statement not a statement? when it'sa liar
    with A. Blum
    The Reasoner 2 (2): 4-6. 2008.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyTruth
  •  130
    A Unified Pyrrhonian Resolution of the Toxin Problem, The Surprise Examination and Newcomb’s Puzzle
    with Peter Cave
    American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4). 2008.
    The three puzzles here considered are shown to have a common structure. And in each, an agent is thrust into a cleverly contrived deliberatively unstable situation. The paper advocates a resolutely Pyrrhonian abandonment of the futile reasoning in which the agent is trapped and advocates an alternative strategy for escape.
    Decision-Theoretic Puzzles
  •  33
    Book Reviews (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 25 (98): 84-85. 1975.
  •  87
    Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore.Philosophical Grammar
    with Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, and Anthony Kenny
    Philosophical Quarterly 25 (100): 279. 1975.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  125
    Dying Quickly but Painfully
    Analysis 55 (3). 1995.
    Death and DyingAssisted Suicide
  •  77
    Wittgenstein, semantics and connectionism
    with Hartley Slater
    Philosophical Investigations 21 (4). 1998.
    Ludwig WittgensteinNeural Networks and Connectionism
  •  218
    Examining boxing and toxin
    Analysis 63 (3): 242-244. 2003.
    Decision-Theoretic Puzzles
  •  108
    Universals and Scientific Realism
    Philosophical Quarterly 29 (117): 360-362. 1979.
    Universals
  •  185
    Spandrels of Truth * By JC BEALL
    with B. Armour-Garb
    Analysis 70 (3): 586-589. 2010.
    No abstract is available for this citation
    Liar Paradox
  •  25
    Book Reviews (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 28 (111): 174-176. 1978.
  •  38
    Gardner-Inspired Design of Teaching Materials
    with Martin Gough
    Discourse: Learning and Teaching in Philosophical and Religious Studies 10 (1): 173-202. 2010.
  •  52
    Book Reviews (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119): 153-155. 1980.
  •  66
    Linguistic Representation
    Philosophical Quarterly 26 (103): 189-191. 1976.
  •  53
    The Imagination as Glory: The Poetry of James Dickey
    with James Dickey, Bruce Weigl, and T. R. Hummer
    Journal of Aesthetic Education 22 (2): 118. 1988.
    Aesthetics
  •  96
    Design of teaching materials informed by consideration of learning-impaired students
    with A. Martin Gough
    The general aim of this project is to fundamentally re-think the design of teaching materials in view of what is now known about cognitive deficits and about what Howard Gardner has termed ‘multiple intelligences’. The applicant has implemented this strategy in two distinct areas, the first involving the writing of an English language programme for Chinese speakers, the second involving the construction of specialized equipment for teaching elementary logic to blind students. The next phase (for…Read more
    The general aim of this project is to fundamentally re-think the design of teaching materials in view of what is now known about cognitive deficits and about what Howard Gardner has termed ‘multiple intelligences’. The applicant has implemented this strategy in two distinct areas, the first involving the writing of an English language programme for Chinese speakers, the second involving the construction of specialized equipment for teaching elementary logic to blind students. The next phase (for which funding is sought) is to test the effectiveness of the logic device, because in theory – the one to be tested – materials the design of which is informed by the above rationale will provide a richer learning experience for non-impaired users.
    Academic and Teaching Ethics
  •  187
    Epimenides and Curry
    Analysis 46 (3). 1986.
    Liar Paradox
  •  90
    Scientific scotism - the emperor's new trousers or has Armstrong made some real strides?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1). 1983.
    (1983). Scientific scotism — The emperor's new trousers or has armstrong made some real strides? Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 40-57
    Ontology
  •  166
    A yabloesque paradox in set theory
    Analysis 54 (4): 223-227. 1994.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsParadoxes
  •  134
    Quotation of Types and Other Types of Quotation
    Analysis 44 (1). 1984.
    Quotation
  •  49
    Wittgenstein’s Most Important Contribution to the Philosophy of Logic
    In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 3-20. 2015.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  44
    Only Joking?
    Philosophy Now 34 25-26. 2001.
    When is a joke morally dubious?
    Humour
  •  77
    Translating Utterances, Reporting Beliefs
    The Reasoner 2 (3): 3-4. 2008.
    Responds to Constaninescu on the Non-Substitutivity and suggests a better approach built on consideration of the way in which beliefs are (usually concisely) reported.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyBeliefPhilosophy of Linguistics
  •  101
    Kripke, Pierre and Constantinescu
    The Reasoner 1 (5): 4-5. 2007.
    Refutes Cristian Constantinescu's proposed solution of Kripke's puzzle about belief.
    MeaningSemantic Theories
  •  20
    The philosopher's habitat: an introduction to investigations in, and applications of, modern philosophy
    Routledge. 1990.
    Goldstein invites the philosophical beginner to think hard about issues ranging from patriotism and racism to artificial intelligence and the mind, from love and fidelity to free will and mortality, taking an interdisciplinary approach.
  •  262
    Fibonacci, Yablo, and the cassationist approach to paradox
    Mind 115 (460): 867-890. 2006.
    A syntactically correct number-specification may fail to specify any number due to underspecification. For similar reasons, although each sentence in the Yablo sequence is syntactically perfect, none yields a statement with any truth-value. As is true of all members of the Liar family, the sentences in the Yablo sequence are so constructed that the specification of their truth-conditions is vacuous; the Yablo sentences fail to yield statements. The ‘revenge’ problem is easily defused. The soluti…Read more
    A syntactically correct number-specification may fail to specify any number due to underspecification. For similar reasons, although each sentence in the Yablo sequence is syntactically perfect, none yields a statement with any truth-value. As is true of all members of the Liar family, the sentences in the Yablo sequence are so constructed that the specification of their truth-conditions is vacuous; the Yablo sentences fail to yield statements. The ‘revenge’ problem is easily defused. The solution to the semantical paradoxes offered here revives the mediaeval cassatio approach, one that largely disappeared due to its incomprehending rejection by influential contemporary writers such as William Shyreswood and Thomas Bradwardine. The diagnosis readily extends to the set-theoretic paradoxes
    Liar Paradox
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