Gustavo E. Romero

I argue that spacetime singularities entail no ontological commitment to material entities. First, I show that Penrose’s singularity theorem is best understood as a theorem of incompleteness – it demonstrates the failure of specific spacetime models within General Relativity (or any theory incorporating the Raychaudhuri equation) under certain general conditions. Although this has been done before, I adopt a novel approach based on differentiating between physical and purely formal assumptions in the axiomatic formulation of general relativity. Next, I compare Penrose’s result with Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, highlighting key similarities and differences. Finally, I draw philosophical conclusions regarding the limits and prospects of our epistemic reconstructions of the physical world.

I argue that the universe is a material system. I first show that what we understand by the universe meets fairly stringent criteria for materiality. I then show that the universe has all the characteristics of a system, with composition, structure, mechanisms, and even environment. After demonstrating that the universe is the maximal material system, I consider– and reject– some possible objections to my views. My conclusion: the universe is not a set, a fiction, or an idea of our mind. I suggest that the universe is the greatest material system of all.

The concept of ideology is central to understanding the many political, economic, social, and cultural processes that have taken place over the past two centuries in our societies. Yet the very concept of ideology remains a vague, openended, and much debated question. In this chapter I try to answer the question of whether science is a form of ideology or not from a philosophical point of view, taking a materialist approach. I begin by characterizing ideology as a complex, multifaceted concept. I then briefly discuss the material systems on which ideological movements operate, that is, societies and concrete human groups. I identify at least 11 different elements that seem to be present in most ideologies, and I compare these characteristics with those of contemporary science and technology. Although some superficial similarities can be identified, there are deep differences that make ideology completely different from science. With technology, however, the similarities are stronger. Ideologies are constantly evolving with technological advances, social changes, and even mere fashions. The current fragmentation of ideologies caused by the widespread use of new technologies and social networks has given rise to new phenomena of ideological diffusion that I think is very dangerous, especially for open societies. I discuss these processes in the context of the nature versus nurture debate, along with the question of whether we can get rid of ideologies.

Mathematics is defined as the study and development of conceptual interpreted formal systems that are closed by deduction. These systems are not merely syntactic in the manner of logistic systems. They are interpreted, but their reference class is constituted by conceptual artifacts. Mathematical constructs are human-made creations that exist solely within the context of a specific formal system. Consequently, mathematics is devoid of any ontological import. The referents of mathematics cannot exist independently of the human mind. The theory is consistent with any general materialist worldview.

Non-relativistic QM for systems with many components provides a strong argument against the individuality of quantum particles. This is fully realized in quantum field theory, where the particles are interpreted as discrete excitations of quantum fields existing over spacetime. These arguments against the individuality of quanta, however, do not entail the existence of vague quantum objects. The ontology of quantum field theory is an ontology of fields. These fields are endowed with definite properties albeit some of them are frame-dependent. Quantum excitations are some of these relational properties, when curvature for spacetime is allowed. Relational features of certain entities do not imply ontic vagueness. At most, some people can talk vaguely about them.

All organisms with needs valuate some items. Values are fictions attributed by the organisms to those items. There are basic values or bio-values, and non-basic values or psychological values. In some cases the latter can be strongly influenced by the social context of the individual to the point that talk also of social values. Morals are norms imposed in a society to enforce values that are considered desirable (goods). Good and wrong do not exist by themselves. They are the result of our valuations. Ethics is meta-moral theory: the study, justification, and design of morals. Metaethics is the study and clarification of the concepts of ethics and the relations of ethics and morals. Action should be regulated by ethics within a society. Ethics, in a rational society, should be scientifically conducted to lead to the optimal rules of behavior, and hence, to establish what is good and wrong for individuals in the context of that society.

Knowledge is the result of the process of learning by some biological system. It is not related to belief and it is not necessarily true. Actually, not all knowledge is propositional: there is motor-sensitive knowledge and perceptual knowledge, in addition to conceptual. Understanding is a cognitive operation that consists in the accommodation of data about the world into our conceptual view. There are three ways of understanding: description, subsumption, and explanation. The latter is the deeper one, and consists in exposing the mechanisms that produce the activity to be explained. The conceptual representation of a mechanism is a model. Theories are hypothetical deductive systems of propositions closed under deduction that include law statements. With the help of specific conditions, theories are used to construct models, and these used to validate theories. Our network of theories is the result of science, a complex human activity designed to systematically increase our knowledge. Technology based on science allows to manipulate and control our environment and create artifacts.

The most basic assumption of science is that there is a reality to be known. Without the postulate of the independent existence of a real world the scientific effort would be in vain. I do not discuss this basic assumption here. I shall come back to this issue in the next chapter, devoted to ontology. Now I want to focus on how we represent the world in our attempts to understand it. Only some brain processes and statements can be true, false, or something in between. Propositions are constructs that inherit the truth value of the statements from which they are abstracted. A truth value cannot be assigned to a theory or to a worldview. A theory, however, can be truer than another. The same holds for worldviews. Science thrives for finding ever truer theories about the world.

Quantum mechanics refers to quantum systems and their environment. The theory does not include consciousness, human subjects, or detectors. The interaction of quantum systems with detectors is the subject of a different theory: quantum theory of measurement. Quantum systems have properties that are not classical. Sometimes they behave in a similar way to classical systems such as particles or waves, but they are neither of them. Other properties, such as spin, lepton number, or color, have no classical analogous. Entanglement is a property of quantum systems that are prepared in a certain state; this property holds as far as the system does not interact with other systems exchanging energy. Quantum mechanics is a realistic, non-local, deterministic, and probabilistic theory of microphysical objects. Its dynamical equations are lineal, and hence the state functions of quantum objects obey the Principle of Superposition. This results in a phenomenology that sometimes strongly differs from what we know from classical physics and common sense.

Science needs philosophy. Without semantics it is not possible to interpret formal systems and theories. Without ontology such basic concepts as those of law, cause, chance, space, and time remain vague. Without epistemology there is no good methodology of adequate control of observation and experiment, no understanding of knowledge nor of the difference between science and charlatanism. Without ethics there is no regulation of the scientific enterprise or values to guide the use of technology. These are just a few examples that support the general statement that without philosophy there is no science. Science is based on general philosophical assumptions, and in turn science informs philosophy, in a virtuous cycle. From this mutual support results the advancement of knowledge. If philosophy fails, science is hindered. And without science, philosophy quickly degrades to domesticated speculation based on common sense…at best.

Mathematics is the science of formal systems with a conceptual reference class. Mathematical theories are creations of the human beings. They are characterized by their exactness and formal structure. Mathematical statements refer to mathematical objects that are conceptual fictions. Hence, mathematics has no ontological import. Because of that, mathematical theories can be used to formulate exact theories about different aspects of the real world. Ontologically neutral mathematical theories are connected to the world through a set of semantic rules. It is through these rules that our theories acquire their factual content.

An axiomatization of the so-called Teleparallel Equivalent to General Relativity is presented. A set of formal and semantic postulates are elaborated from where the physical meaning of various key concepts of the theory are clarified. These concepts include those of inertia, Lorentz and diffeomorphism invariance, and reference frame. It is shown that Teleparallel Gravity admits a wider representation of space-time than General Relativity, allowing to define properties of the gravitational field such as energy and momentum that are usually considered problematic. In this sense, although the dynamical equations of both theories are equivalent, their inequivalence from a physical point of view is demonstrated. Finally, the axiomatic formulation is used to compare Teleparallel Gravity with other theories of gravity based on absolute parallelism such as non-local and f(T) gravity.

The Kalam Cosmological Argument is perhaps the most solid and widely discussed argument for a caused creation of the universe. The usual objections to the argument mainly focus on the second premise. In this paper we discuss the dependency of the first premise on the topological structure of the space-time manifold adopted for the underlying cosmological model. It is shown that in chronology-violating space-times the first premise can also be violated. The chronology-violation, in turn, requires a massive violation of the so-called energy conditions which might have observational effects that are briefly discussed here. Hence, astronomical observations could be relevant for the validity of the metaphysical argument. In this sense, it is possible to talk of “observational theology”.

La filosofía científica es filosofía informada por la ciencia, que usa herramientas exactas como la lógica y la matemática, y proporciona a la actividad científica de un marco donde dirimir las cuestiones más generales sobre la naturaleza, el lenguaje que usamos para describirla, y el conocimiento que de ella obtenemos. Muchas teorías de la filosofía científica pueden ser contrastadas y evaluadas utilizando evidencia científica. En este artículo me concentro en caracterizar a la filosofía científica y en discutir los límites de la ciencia.

Closed time-like curves (CTCs) naturally appear in a variety of chronology-violating space{times. In these space{times, the principle of self-consistency demands a harmony between local and global a airs that excludes grandfather-like paradoxes. However, selfexisting objects trapped in CTCs are not seemingly avoided by the standard interpretation of this principle, usually constrained to a dynamical framework. In this letter we discuss whether we are committed to accept an ontology with self-existing objects if CTCs actually occur in the universe. In addition, the epistemological status of the principle of self-consistency is analyzed and a discussion on the information flux through CTCs is presented.

The ontology behind quantum mechanics has been the subject of endless debate since the theory was formulated some 100 years ago. It has been suggested, at one time or another, that the objects described by the theory may be individual particles, waves, fields, ensembles of particles, observers, and minds, among many other possibilities. I maintain that these disagreements are due in part to a lack of precision in the use of the theory’s various semantic designators. In particular, there is some confusion about the role of representation, reference, and denotation in the theory. In this article, I first analyze the role of the semantic apparatus in physical theories in general and then discuss the corresponding ontological implications for quantum mechanics. Subsequently, I consider the extension of the theory to quantum fields and then analyze the semantic changes of the designators with their ontological consequences. In addition to the classical arguments to rule out a particle ontology in the case of non-relativistic quantum field theory, I show how the existence of black holes makes the proposal of a particle ontology in general spacetimes unfeasible. I conclude by proposing a provisional pluralistic ontology of fields and spacetime and discussing some prospects for possible future ontological economies.

Despite the central presence of materialism in the history of philosophy, there is no universal consensus on the meaning of the word “matter” nor of the doctrine of philosophical materialism. Dictionaries of philosophy often identify this philosophy with its most reductionist and even eliminative versions, in line with Robert Boyle’s seventeenth century coinage of the term. But when we take the concept back in time to Greek philosophers and forward onto our own times, we recognize more inclusive forms of materialism as well as complex interplays with non-materialist thought about the place of matter in reality, including Christian philosophy and German idealism. We define philosophical materialism in its most general way both positively (the identification of reality with matter understood as changeability and plurality) and negatively (the negation of disembodied living beings and hypostatized ideas). This inclusive approach to philosophical materialism offers a new light to illuminate a critical history of the concept of matter and materialism from Ancient Greece to the present that is also attentive to scientific developments. By following the most important connections and discontinuities among theoretical frameworks on the idea of matter, we present a general thread that offers a rich and plural, but highly cohesive, field of investigation. Finally, we propose building on rich non-reductionist materialist philosophies, such as Mario Bunge’s systemic materialism and Gustavo Bueno’s discontinuous materialism, to elaborate powerful theoretical alternatives to both physicalism and spiritualism.

I present a condensed exposé of systemic materialism, a synthesis of materialism and systemism originally proposed by Mario Bunge. Matter is identified with mutability of propertied particulars, and a concrete or material system is defined as an object with composition, structure, mechanism, and environment. I review different aspects of this ontology, and discuss some of its implications for epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. I also try to identify some problems of this view and offer some ways to overcome the difficulties. I conclude that systemic materialism is a promising philosophical project still in the making.

This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography.