-
147Moral Responsibility InvariantismPhilosophia 39 (1): 179-200. 2011.Moral responsibility invariantism is the view that there is a single set of conditions for being morally responsible for an action (or omission or consequence of an act or omission) that applies in all cases. I defend this view against some recent arguments by Joshua Knobe and John Doris
-
53Bending the Rules: Morality in the Modern World from Relationships to Politics and WarPhilosophical Psychology 23 (1): 129-132. 2010.This Article does not have an abstract
-
1949Punishment and ForgivenessIn Jonathan Jacobs & Jonathan Jackson (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Criminal Justice Ethics, Routledge. pp. 203-216. 2016.In this paper we explore the relationship between forgiving and punishment. We set out a number of arguments for the claim that if one forgives a wrongdoer, one should not punish her. We then argue that none of these arguments is persuasive. We conclude by reflecting on the possibility of institutional forgiveness in the criminal justice setting and on the differences between forgiveness and acts of mercy.
Bowling Green, OH, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Normative Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Aesthetics |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
PhilPapers Editorships
Forgiveness |