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530Boghossian's template and transmission failureAl Mukhatabat 26 71-90. 2018.Within his overarching program aiming to defend an epistemic conception of analyticity, Boghossian (1996 and 1997) has offered a clear-cut explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical truths and logical rules through implicit definition. The explanation is based on a special template or general form of argument. Ebert (2005) has argued that an enhanced version of this template is flawed because a segment of it is unable to transmit warrant from its premises to the conclusion. …Read more
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674Tal and Comesaña on evidence of evidenceThe Reasoner 10 (5): 38-39. 2016.R. Feldman defends a general principle about evidence the slogan form of which says that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. B. Fitelson considers three renditions of this principle and contends they are all falsified by counterexamples. Against both Feldman and Fitelson, J. Comesaña and E. Tal show that the third rendition––the one actually endorsed by Feldman––isn’t affected by Fitelson’s counterexamples, but only because it is trivially true and thus uninteresting. Tal and Comesaña defend a f…Read more
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1690Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford: OUP (2009) (review)Mind 121 (484): 1069-1073. 2012.
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400Boghossian (1996) has put forward an interesting explanation of how we can acquire logical knowledge via implicit definitions that makes use of a special template. Ebert (2005) has argued that the template is unserviceable, as it doesn't transmit warrant. In this paper, we defend the template. We first suggest that Jenkins (2008)’s response to Ebert fails because it focuses on doxastic rather than propositional warrant. We then reject Ebert’s objection by showing that it depends on an implausibl…Read more
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274Transmission of Justification and WarrantThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2013.Transmission of justification across inference is a valuable and indeed ubiquitous epistemic phenomenon in everyday life and science. It is thanks to the phenomenon of epistemic transmission that inferential reasoning is a means for substantiating predictions of future events and, more generally, for expanding the sphere of our justified beliefs or reinforcing the justification of beliefs that we already entertain. However, transmission of justification is not without exceptions. As a few episte…Read more
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426Mizrahi’s argument against phenomenal conservatismThe Reasoner 7 (12): 137-139. 2013.I show that Mizrahi’s argument against Phenomenal Conservatism is fallacious.
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766Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism. BY TED POSTON (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Pp. 208. Price £ 60.) (review)Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266): 204-206. 2017.
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743Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical PossibilityErkenntnis 79 (2): 381-403. 2014.I focus on a key argument for global external world scepticism resting on the underdetermination thesis: the argument according to which we cannot know any proposition about our physical environment because sense evidence for it equally justifies some sceptical alternative (e.g. the Cartesian demon conjecture). I contend that the underdetermination argument can go through only if the controversial thesis that conceivability is per se a source of evidence for metaphysical possibility is true. I a…Read more
Luca Moretti
University of Eastern Piedmont
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University of Eastern PiedmontProfessor
APA Central Division
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Philosophy of Education |
Social Ontology |
Areas of Interest
Critical Theory |
Government and Democracy |