Paul Russell

This article is concerned with a central strand of Strawson's well-known and highly influential essay “Freedom and Resentment” Strawson's principal objectives in this work is to refute or discredit the views of the "Pessimist." The Pessimist, as Strawson understands him/ her, claims that the truth of the thesis of determinism would render the attitudes and practices associated with moral responsibility incoherent and unjustified. Given this, the Pessimist claims that if determinism is true, then we must abandon or suspend these attitudes and practices altogether. Against the Pessimist Strawson argues that no reasoning of any sort could lead us to abandon or suspend our "reactive attitudes." That is to say, according to Strawson responsibility is a "given" of human life and society-something which we are inescapably committed to. In this article I argue that Strawson's reply to the Pessimist is seriously flawed. More specifically, I argue that Strawson fails to distinguish two very different forms or modes of naturalism and that he is constrained by the nature of his own objectives (i.e., the refutation of Pessimism) to embrace the stronger and far less plausible form of naturalism. On this basis I conclude that while there is something to be said for Strawson's general approach to these matters, we nevertheless cannot naturalize responsibility along the specific lines that he suggests.

John Danford claims that Hume's philosophy must be understood within the framework of the 'problem of reason'. The problem of reason', according to this account, concerns the general relationship between philosophy and reason, on the one hand, and experience and 'common life' on the other. Danford maintains that the nature and development of Hume's thought, considered as a response to this problem, falls, essentially, into two parts. First, we must consider Hume's Treatise and his first Enquiry (ie., his 'epistemological works' [61-cp.9]). The heart of Hume's Treatise, Danford suggests, lies with the epistemology of Book I and, in particular, with the discussions of causation and the external world. Hume's primary concern in these passages, it is argued, was to refute and discredit the rationalistic, 'scientific philosophies of Descartes and, especially, Hobbes (24-5, 40-5, 59, 74-5, 84-5, 190). These thinkers, Danford maintains, had driven a 'wedge' between philosophy and experienceor 'common life' (24-5). By emphasizing the limits and weakness of h u m a n understanding Hume exposes the vulnerability of Hobbes's and Descartes's scientific ambitions and, in this way, he seeks to return philosophy to the secure and appropriate foundations of 'common life and everyday experience.....Shortly after Hume published the Treatise there was, Danford claims, a 'shift' in his thinking on these matters (28). This shift is represented most clearly in his later works: the Essays, the History, and the Dialogues (10, 33, 7, 88, 108). Danford firmly rejects the suggestion that these works represent a turning away from philosophy. On the contrary, it is these later works, taken together, which constitute Hume's most mature philosophy. Indeed, they are, Danford says, the 'flower ofHume's philosophic career' (10). The mature philosophy of Hume, it is argued, must be interpreted as 'Political philosophy". It is political philosophy in the sense that it attempts to investigate human life in its full diversity and complexity and, on this basis, it seeks to provide us with some general guide as to how we should live (10, 7, 88-9, 183-6). From the 'teachings' of the History and the Essays Danford draws some lessons that are 'valid for all times' (112 and 114). The inspirational message concerns, roughly, the merits of capitalism (see, e.g., p. 131: The increase in personal liberty, then, was and is directly connected to the growth of commerce...' and p.137:'. the central lesson of British history [is] the superiority of liberal commercial society ...).

David Hume's various writings concerning problems of religion are among the most important and influential contributions on this topic. In these writings Hume advances a systematic, sceptical critique of the philosophical foundations of various theological systems. Whatever interpretation one takes of Hume's philosophy as a whole, it is certainly true that one of his most basic philosophical objectives is to unmask and discredit the doctrines and dogmas of orthodox religious belief. There are, however, some significant points of disagreement about the exact nature and extent of Hume’s irreligious intentions. One of the most important of these is whether Hume's sceptical position leads him to a view that can be properly characterized as “atheism”. Although this was a view that was widely accepted by many of Hume's critics during his own lifetime, contemporary accounts have generally argued that this misrepresents his final position on this subject. The primary aims of this article are: (1) to give an account of Hume's main arguments as they touch on various particular issues relating to religion; and (2) to answer to the question concerning the general character of Hume's commitments on this subject.

In recent years a number of general studies of Hume’s philosophy have appeared. It is in this rather crowded traffic that Professor Antony Flew’s David Hume must make its way.... Flew claims that “no previous study of Hume’s philosophy has made nearly enough of the fact that almost all his conclusions are, for better or for worse, conditioned and sometimes determined by an interlocking set of Cartesian assumptions”(p. 2). In this way, Flew suggests that earlier interpreters have rarely recognised the “grotesquely paradoxical” nature of Hume’s Cartesian assumptions and have, therefore, “failed to point the strangeness, the often self-frustrating perversity, of some of the positions which Hume was misled to adopt later” (p. 3).... ..... In a short introductory work it is, of course, very difficult to defend particular interpretations and criticisms in much detail. Nevertheless, I find that Flew’s discussion frequently moves at an excessive speed and that too often his claims are not given the care and attention that they require. Flew certainly does have some interesting points to make and, at his best, Flew is an insightful and stimulating commentator. On the whole, however, his claims come across as thinly defended, poorly articulated and, as a result, rather unconvincing....

In the early eighteenth century context there was an intimate connection between problems concerning the existence of the material world and problems of natural religion. Two issues are of particular importance for understanding Hume’s irreligious intentions in the Treatise. First, if we are unable to establish that we know that the material world exists, then all arguments for the existence of God that presuppose knowledge of the material world (i.e. its beauty, order, design, etc.) are placed in doubt. Second, if we are naturally disposed to believe in the existence of body, but this belief is false, then it seems to follow that God must be a deceiver -- or does not exist. Hume’s arguments in 1.4.2, I maintain, are finely crafted to present both these (irreligious) challenges to the orthodox view.

In this paper I will describe certain significant features of the title-page of Hume's Treatise which have gone largely unnoticed. My discussion will focus on two features of the titlepage. First, Hume's Treatise shares its title with a relevant and well-known work by Hobbes. Second, the epigram of the title-page, which is taken from Tacitus, also serves as the title for the final chapter of Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. In the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries Hobbes and Spinoza were infamous as the two most influential representatives of 'atheistic' or antiChristian philosophy. The significance of these features of the title-page of the Treatise, therefore, is that in this important context Hume unambiguously alludes to these philosophers and their 'atheistic' doctrines. This, I will argue, accords well with a proper understanding of the nature of

Recent work in contemporary compatibilist theory displays considerable sophistication and subtlety when compared with the earlier theories of classical compatibilism. Two distinct lines of thought have proved especially influential and illuminating. The first developed around the general hypothesis that moral sentiments or reactive attitudes are fundamental for understanding the nature and conditions of moral responsibility. The other important development is found in recent compatibilist accounts of rational self-control or reason responsiveness. Strictly speaking, these two lines of thought have developed independent of each other. However, in the past decade or so they have been fused together in several prominent statements of compatibilist theory. I will refer to theories that combine these two elements in this way as RS theories. RS theories face a number of familiar difficulties that relate to each of their two components. Beyond this, they also face a distinct set of problems concerning how these two main components relate or should be integrated. My concerns in this paper focus primarily on this set of problems. According to one version of RS compatibilism, the role of moral sentiments is limited to explaining what is required for holding an agent responsible. In contrast with this, the role of reason responsiveness is to explain what moral capacities are required for an agent to be responsible, one who is a legitimate or fair target of our moral sentiments. More specifically, according to this view, moral sense is not required for rational selfcontrol or reason responsiveness. There is, therefore, no requirement that the responsible agent has some capacity to feel moral sentiment. Contrary to this view, I argue that a responsible agent must be capable of holding herself and others responsible. Failing this, an agent’s powers of rational self-control will be both limited and impaired. In so far as holding responsible requires moral sense, it follows that being responsible also requires moral sense.

The philosophy of Samuel Clarke is of central importance to Hume’s Treatise. Hume’s overall attitude to Clarke’s philosophy may be characterized as one of systematic scepticism. The general significance of this is that it sheds considerable light on Hume’s fundamental “atheistic” or anti-Christian intentions in the Treatise. These are all claims that I have argued for elsewhere.’ In this paper I am concerned to focus on a narrower aspect of this relationship between the philosophies of Clarke and Hume. Specifically, I will consider Hume’s views on the subjects of materialism and necessity in relation to Clarke’s enormously influential debate with Anthony Collins on these topics. I begin by describing the nature and context of this controversy; I then examine how Hume‘s positions on questions of materialism and necessity stand in relation to the positions and arguments taken up by Clarke and Collins; and finally I explain the deeper significance of these specific issues for Hume’s wider “atheistic” or anti-Christian objectives in the Treatise. Hume’s views on the closely related subjects of materialism and necessity, I maintain, constitute core elements of his “atheistic” project in the Treatise, and they manifest his basic antipathy to the theistic metaphysics of the Christian religion in general,and to the Newtonian cosmology of Clarke in particular

The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that free will is required only in the sphere of morality—and that to this extent the art/morality analogy breaks down. I argue that both these incompatibilist approaches encounter significant problems and difficulties—and that incompatibilist have paid insufficient attention to these issues. However, although the analogy between art and morality may be welcomed by compatibilists, it does not pave the way for an easy or facile optimism on this subject. On the contrary, while the art/morality analogy may lend support to compatibilism it also serves to show that some worries of incompatibilism relating to the role of luck in human life cannot be easily set aside, which denies compatibilism any basis for complacent optimism on this subject

The empiricist-compatibilist strategy falls, essentially, into two distinct stages of argument. Historically speaking, the first stage was initiated by Hobbes and the second stage was initiated by Hume. The first stage, which I shall refer to as the "compulsion argument" seeks to describe the general significance of the distinction between causation and compulsion for the "free will" dispute. The second stage of the empiricist-compatibilist strategy, which I shall refer to as the "regularity argument," endeavours to reconstruct the compulsion argument on the foundation of the regularity theory of causation. My primary concern in this paper will be to examine the relation between these two stages of the empiricist-compatibilist strategy. Proponents of this strategy claim that the regularity argument strengthens the compatibilist position. I will argue, on the contrary, that the regularity argument generates serious difficulties for the compulsion argument and that it therefore weakens the compatibilist position. In this way I will be concerned to show that the traditional empiricist-compatibilist strategy suffers from significant internaltensions and that these tensions indicate that the regularity theory of causation does not serve as a particularly secure or congenial metaphysical foundation upon which to rest the compatibilist position as it is generally understood.

Andre Willis argues that although Hume is generally credited with being a “devastating critic” of religion, it is a mistake to view Hume solely in these terms or to present him as an “atheist.” This not only represents a failure to appreciate Hume’s “middle path” between “militant atheists and evangelical theists”, it denies us an opportunity to “enhance” our understanding and appreciation of the positive, constructive value of religion through a close study of Hume’s views. Willis’s study presents Hume as committed to a “bifurcated approach to religion” that rests on the fundamental distinction between “false religion” and “true religion”. False religion, which includes Christianity, is a...

The problem that I am primarily concerned with in this paper is the nature of moral capacity as it relates to virtue in Hume’s ethical system.1 In particular, I am concerned with the relationship between virtue and moral sense. Hume’s remarks about this matter are both brief and scattered. I will argue, nevertheless, that when we piece together his various claims and observations on this subject we discover some important insights that add to the overall coherence and credibility of his system. The most important of these is the suggestion that our ability to acquire and sustain the virtues depends in large measure on our capacity for moral sense. Throughout this paper I will explore this theme and show how it relates to other key components in Hume’s scheme.

In this paper I pursue two closely related objectives. First, I articulate and describe the nature and character of Hume's theory of punishment. Second, in light of this account, I offer an assessment of the contem- porary interest and value of Hume's theory. Throughout my discus- sion I emphasize the relevance and importance of Hume's views on moral responsibility to his account of punishment.1 More specifically, I argue that Hume seeks to develop an account of punishment on the foundation of a naturalistic theory of responsibility - that is, a theory which draws our attention to the role of moral sentiment in this sphere.2 Although this naturalistic aspect of Hume's theory of punishment has been largely overlooked by commentators, I maintain that it is, nevertheless, precisely this aspect of Hume's theory that is especially interesting from a contemporary pers

In this book, Russell examines Hume's notion of free will and moral responsibility. It is widely held that Hume presents us with a classic statement of a compatibilist position--that freedom and responsibility can be reconciled with causation and, indeed, actually require it. Russell argues that this is a distortion of Hume's view, because it overlooks the crucial role of moral sentiment in Hume's picture of human nature. Hume was concerned to describe the regular mechanisms which generate moral sentiments such as responsibility, and Russell argues that his conception of free will must be interprted within this naturalistic framework. He goes on to discuss Hume's views about the nature and character of moral sentiment; the extent to which we have control over our moral character; and the justification of punishment. Throughout, Russell argues that the naturalistic avenue of interpretation of Hume's thought, far from draining it of its contemporary interest and significance, reveals it to be of great relevance to the ongoing contemporary debate - particuarly in relation to the views of P.F. Strawson and his influential paper "Freedom and Resentment".

In 'Necessity, Cause and Blame' (London: Duckworth, 1980) Richard Sorabji attempts to develop a notion of moral responsibility which does not get caught on either horn of a well known dilemma. One horn is the argument that if an action was caused then it must have been necessary and therefore could not be one for which the agent is responsible. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused then it is inexplicable and random and therefore not something which the agent can be responsible for. Sorabji denies that what is caused is always necessitated. Causes are primarily explanatory rather than necessitating. This established, Sorabji hopes to show that action open to moral scrutiny may be caused without being necessitated and the dilemma collapses. I will argue that this strategy runs into serious difficulties.

The central thesis of this paper is that the scope and structure of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature is modelled, or planned, after that of Hobbes's The Elements of Law and that in this respect there exists an important and unique relationship between these works. This relationship is of some importance for at least two reasons. First, it is indicative of the fundamental similarity between Hobbes's and Hume's project of the study of man. Second, and what is more important, by recognizing this relationship between Hume's and Hobbes's works we can come to appreciate the unity of the project of the Treatise itself. My discussion will proceed in three stages. In section I present the evidence for my central thesis. In the second section I shall consider why Hume does not, as one might expect, acknowledge this important debt to Hobbes in the Introduction to the Treatise or in the Abstract. Finally, in the third section I shall note a few points of some importance to the understanding of Hume's philosophy which this relationship between Hobbes's and Hume's work touches upon.

Hume’s famous and influential contributions to the philosophy of religion pursue two broad themes that have deep links with his general sceptical and naturalistic commitments throughout his philosophy as a whole.1 The first is his sceptical critique of the philosophical arguments and doctrines of various (Christian) theological systems. The second is his naturalistic account of the origins and roots of religion in human nature. Taken together, these two themes serve to advance Hume’s “Lucretian mission”, which was to discredit and dislodge the role of religion in human life. In this paper I consider the criticism that Hume’s entire Lucretian mission is fundamentally misguided and misconceived as judged in terms of his own claims and hypotheses concerning religion. More specifically, it may be argued that if Hume is right about the foundations of religion in human nature and the human predicament, then his Lucretian mission is neither wise nor achievable. His project is, in other words, both theoretically self-refuting and practically self-defeating. Drawing from Hume’s writings on this subject, I will suggest a set of replies and responses to these criticisms.

Compatibilists argue, famously, that it is a simple incompatibilist confusion to suppose that determinism implies fatalism. Incompatibilists argue, on the contrary, that determinism implies fatalism, and thus cannot be consistent with the necessary conditions of moral responsibility. Despite their differences, however, both parties are agreed on one important matter: the refutation of fatalism is essential to the success of the compatibilist strategy. In this paper I argue that compatibilism requires a richer conception of fatalistic concern; one that recognizes the _legitimacy_ of (pessimistic) concerns about the origination of character and conduct. On this basis I argue that any plausible compatibilist position must concede that determinism has fatalistic implications of some significant and relevant kind, and thus must allow that agents may be legitimately held responsible in circumstances where they are subject to fate. The position generated by these compatibilist concessions to incompatibilism will be called 'compatibilist-fatalism'.

This article examines the free will problem as it arises within Thomas Hobbes' naturalistic science of morals in early modern Europe. It explains that during this period, the problem of moral and legal responsibility became acute as mechanical philosophy was extended to human psychology and as a result human choices were explained in terms of desires and preferences rather than being represented as acts of an autonomous faculty. It describes how Hobbes changed the face of moral philosophy, through his Leviathan, in ways that still structure and resonate within the contemporary debate.

Review of Nicholas Capaldi, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy In Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy Professor Capaldi attempts “to construct a coherent account of Hume’s moral philosophy both with an eye to those issueswhich have persistently vexed his readers and commentators and with the intent of underscoring those novel and challenging aspects of his moral philosophy which ...remain unnoticed or unappreciated” (p.xi).Capaldi’s project falls into three distinct, but related, parts. First, he provides a “brief sketch of the intellectual milieu in which Hume was writing”. Many of the misunderstandings of Hume’s philosophy, Capaldi suggests, “are largely the result of failing to see the specific issues and opponents Hume had in mind” (p. 28 - cp. p. 93). O n this matter Capaldi’s overall view is that Hume’s moral thought may be interpreted as an effort to incorporate “Hutcheson’s moral philosophy and teachings into a more fundamental framework which can only be described as Newtonian” (p.21). Throughout this work Capaldi is particularly at pains to emphasise Hume’s (supposed) antagonism to Hobbes’s “selfish system” of morals (e.g. pp. 5-9, 13, 23, 198-99, 209-10, 292, 298, 301). Second, Capaldi cites four “major issues within moral philosophy” which structure his own interpretation of various specific aspects of Hume’s moral thought. The four issues are: (i) the existence of a “moral domain”; (ii) the nature of our “access” to this domain; (iii) the relationship between “moral apprehension” and “moral motivation”; and, finally, (iv) the relationship between “moral motivation” and “non-moral motivation” (p. 2). It is largely within this framework that Capaldi discusses the familiar issues concerning moral obligation, moral judgement, sympathy, moral sentiment, and justice. Third, Capaldi’s principal concern in this study is to present an account or description of Hume’s ‘Copernican Revolution in Philosophy’. This “revolution" is described in terms of the shift from the ‘Ithink’ to the ‘WeDo’ perspective (see esp.pp.21-7 andCh. 8).This feature of Hume’s philosophical thought has, Capaldi claims, been insufficiently understood and this has resulted in both unnecessary misunderstanding and misplaced criticism of Hume’s moral thought....

"This substantial collection of essays reflects Terence Penelhum's distinguished contribution to several related fields of philosophy. ... as a philosopher and commentator on Hume, Penelhum follows in a tradition that can be traced back to certain members of the moderate clergy in eighteenth century Britain — individuals such as Butler and Reid. This tradition also includes Hume's "philosophically minded friends in the Moderate clergy" — to whom Penelhum refers in his "Comments and Responses" (254). Suffice it to point out, therefore, that the tradition and style of criticism of which Penelhum is a distinguished representative, is one that Hume himself held in great esteem."

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY PRIZE for the best published book in the history of philosophy [Awarded in 2010] _______________ Although it is widely recognized that David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) belongs among the greatest works of philosophy, there is little agreement about the correct way to interpret his fundamental intentions. It is an established orthodoxy among almost all commentators that skepticism and naturalism are the two dominant themes in this work. The difficulty has been, however, that Hume's skeptical arguments and commitments appear to undermine and discredit his naturalistic ambition to contribute to "the science of man". This schism appears to leave his entire project broken-backed. The solution to this riddle depends on challenging another, closely related, point of orthodoxy: namely, that before Hume published the Treatise he removed almost all material concerned with problems of religion. Russell argues, contrary to this view, that irreligious aims and objectives are fundamental to the Treatise and account for its underlying unity and coherence. It is Hume's basic anti-Christian aims and objectives that serve to shape and direct both his skeptical and naturalistic commitments. When Hume's arguments are viewed from this perspective we can solve, not only puzzles arising from his discussion of various specific issues, we can also explain the intimate and intricate connections that hold his entire project together. This "irreligious" interpretation provides a comprehensive fresh account of the nature of Hume's fundamental aims and ambitions in the Treatise. It also presents a radically different picture of the way in which Hume's project was rooted in the debates and controversies of his own time, placing the Treatise in an irreligious or anti-Chrisitan philosophical tradition that includes Hobbes, Spinoza and freethinking followers. Considered in these terms, Hume's Treatise constitutes the crowning achievement of the Radical Enlightenment

: In this paper I argue that Hume's famous discussion of probability and induction, as originally presented in the Treatise, is significantly motivated by irreligious objectives. A particular target of Hume's arguments is Joseph Butler's Analogy of Religion. In the Analogy Butler intends to persuade his readers of both the credibility and practical importance of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. The argument that he advances relies on probable reasoning and proceeds on the assumption that our past experience in this life serves as a reliable and effective guide for our expectations concerning a future state. In the relevant sections of the Treatise Hume aims to discredit this religious argument and the practical objectives associated with it

.... The strategy I have defended involves drawing a distinction between those who can and cannot legitimately hold an agent responsible in circumstances when the agent is being covertly controlled (e.g. through implantation processes). What is intuitively unacceptable, I maintain, is that an agent should be held responsible or subject to reactive attitudes that come from another agent who is covertly controlling or manipulating him. This places some limits on who is entitled to take up the participant stance in relation to agents who are rational self-controllers but nevertheless subject to covert control.26 In this way, what is compromised by conditions of covert control is not the responsibility of the agent as such. It is, rather, the participant stance of those other agents who covertly control him. Clearly it is possible to establish these specific limits on who can hold these agents responsible without denying that the agents themselves remain free and responsible. When we take this approach we will find that we are no longer faced with an unattractive choice between simply “biting the bullet” or having to “spit it out”. All we need to do is chew carefully, until there is nothing left that we find too hard to swallow.

Throughout this paper my objective will be to establish and clarify Hume's original intentions in his discussion of causation in Book I of the Treatise. I will show that Hume's views on ontology, presented in Part IV of that book, shed light on his views on causation as presented in Part III. Further, I will argue that Hume's views on ontology account for the original motivation behind his two definitions of 2 cause. This relationship between Hume's ontology and his account of causation explains something which has baffled Hume scholars for some time,- namely, why does Hume's discussion of causation in I, iii, 14 have such a paradoxical air about it? I will show that Hume's views on causation have a paradoxical air about them because they rest on an ontology of "double existence" - an ontology which Hume describes as the monstrous offspring of two principles, which are contrary to each other, which are both at once embrac'd by the mind, and which are unable mutually to destroy each other (T 215) My interpretation will centre on the following two claims: (i) When Hume wrote Section 14, Of the idea of necessary connexion, he was primarily concerned to attack the view that the origin of our idea of necessity was to be discovered in the operations of matter or bodies. Of the suggested sources from which our idea of necessity could be thought to originate this is the source which, initially, interested Hume the most. It is, therefore, of great importance that we interpret Hume's remarks in light of this fact. (ii) Hume offers the first definition of cause as an account of causation as it exists in the material world independent of our thought and reasoning.He offers the second definition as an account of causation as we find it in our perceptions. It will also be argued, in this context, that necessity constitutes "an essential part" of both of Hume's two definitions of cause.

David Hume is widely recognized as providing the most influential statement of the “compatibilist” position in the free will debate — the view that freedom and moral responsibility can be reconciled with (causal) determinism. The arguments that Hume advances on this subject are found primarily in the sections titled “Of liberty and necessity”, as first presented in A Treatise of Human Nature (2.3.1-2) and, later, in a slightly amended form, in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (sec. 8). Although there is considerable overlap in content between these two statements of Hume's position, there are also some significant differences. This includes, for example, some substantial additions in the Enquiry discussion as it relates to problems of religion, such as predestination and divine foreknowledge. While these differences are certainly significant they should not be exaggerated. Hume's basic strategy and compatibilist commitments in both works remain the same in their essentials..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:165 CORRECTIONS REGARDING "Hume's 'Two Definitions' of Cause and the Ontology of 'Double Existence'" In my paper "Hume's 'Two Definitions' of Cause and the Ontology of 'Double Existence" (Hume Studies, Vol. X, No. 1, pp. 1-25) there were several corrections which should have appeared in the final printed version of the paper but which, unfortunately, were not inserted. In the version of my paper which has been printed in Hume Studies natural relations are misrepresented as being identical with connexions or associations of ideas whereas clearly they should be understood as those relations which produce or generate connexions or associations of ideas. While this defect in the paper does not affect the substance of my position (and is, I think, easily rectified) it may nevertheless generate some unnecessary difficulties and complications for the reader. In light of this I ask the reader to note the following specific corrections: pg. 12: lines 11-13 should read: This "connexion" is the product of a natural relation. It is an association which holds only between our perceptions and it cannot, therefore, be attributed to the objects (i.e, bodies) themselves, pg. 13: lines 23-5 should read: That is, the necessary connexion turns out to be an association between our perceptions, pg. 15: lines 5-9 should read: The gist of Hume's answer to this question seems to be that while we may attribute philosophical relations to physical objects we cannot attribute those connexions which are produced by natural relations to them (though he notes that we have a natural tendency to do this; cf. T 167). 166 pg. 15: lines 14-24 should read: But, as we have seen, he will not allow that the product of natural relations, that is, those "connexions" which hold between our perceptions of these objects, may also be "transferred" to these bodies. A natural relation is a "quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other after the manner above explained [sc. at I,i,4 — in terms of "the connexion or association of ideas"]. These effects of natural relations (viz. the generation of "connexions" among our ideas) must, obviously, be confined to our perceptions. However, we find philosophical relations wherever there are qualities "which make objects admit of comparison". (T 14 — my emphasis) pg. 16: lines 11-14 should read: Accordingly, as he is considering bodies he makes no mention of perceptions (i.e impressions and ideas), nor of the effects of natural relations (i.e. those "connexions" which relate only perceptions). pg. 17: lines 9-12 should read: They attribute those connexions which exist in their imagination, that is those associations which connect our perceptions, to the bodies themselves. I should stress again, however, that the above corrections do not in any way affect the central theses of my paper (cf. pp. 1-2 and pp. 20-1). Paul Russell Sidney Sussex College Cambridge...