Paul Russell

Review of Nicholas Capaldi, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy In Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy Professor Capaldi attempts “to construct a coherent account of Hume’s moral philosophy both with an eye to those issueswhich have persistently vexed his readers and commentators and with the intent of underscoring those novel and challenging aspects of his moral philosophy which ...remain unnoticed or unappreciated” (p.xi).Capaldi’s project falls into three distinct, but related, parts. First, he provides a “brief sketch of the intellectual milieu in which Hume was writing”. Many of the misunderstandings of Hume’s philosophy, Capaldi suggests, “are largely the result of failing to see the specific issues and opponents Hume had in mind” (p. 28 - cp. p. 93). O n this matter Capaldi’s overall view is that Hume’s moral thought may be interpreted as an effort to incorporate “Hutcheson’s moral philosophy and teachings into a more fundamental framework which can only be described as Newtonian” (p.21). Throughout this work Capaldi is particularly at pains to emphasise Hume’s (supposed) antagonism to Hobbes’s “selfish system” of morals (e.g. pp. 5-9, 13, 23, 198-99, 209-10, 292, 298, 301). Second, Capaldi cites four “major issues within moral philosophy” which structure his own interpretation of various specific aspects of Hume’s moral thought. The four issues are: (i) the existence of a “moral domain”; (ii) the nature of our “access” to this domain; (iii) the relationship between “moral apprehension” and “moral motivation”; and, finally, (iv) the relationship between “moral motivation” and “non-moral motivation” (p. 2). It is largely within this framework that Capaldi discusses the familiar issues concerning moral obligation, moral judgement, sympathy, moral sentiment, and justice. Third, Capaldi’s principal concern in this study is to present an account or description of Hume’s ‘Copernican Revolution in Philosophy’. This “revolution" is described in terms of the shift from the ‘Ithink’ to the ‘WeDo’ perspective (see esp.pp.21-7 andCh. 8).This feature of Hume’s philosophical thought has, Capaldi claims, been insufficiently understood and this has resulted in both unnecessary misunderstanding and misplaced criticism of Hume’s moral thought....

"This substantial collection of essays reflects Terence Penelhum's distinguished contribution to several related fields of philosophy. ... as a philosopher and commentator on Hume, Penelhum follows in a tradition that can be traced back to certain members of the moderate clergy in eighteenth century Britain — individuals such as Butler and Reid. This tradition also includes Hume's "philosophically minded friends in the Moderate clergy" — to whom Penelhum refers in his "Comments and Responses" (254). Suffice it to point out, therefore, that the tradition and style of criticism of which Penelhum is a distinguished representative, is one that Hume himself held in great esteem."

: In this paper I argue that Hume's famous discussion of probability and induction, as originally presented in the Treatise, is significantly motivated by irreligious objectives. A particular target of Hume's arguments is Joseph Butler's Analogy of Religion. In the Analogy Butler intends to persuade his readers of both the credibility and practical importance of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. The argument that he advances relies on probable reasoning and proceeds on the assumption that our past experience in this life serves as a reliable and effective guide for our expectations concerning a future state. In the relevant sections of the Treatise Hume aims to discredit this religious argument and the practical objectives associated with it

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY PRIZE for the best published book in the history of philosophy [Awarded in 2010] _______________ Although it is widely recognized that David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) belongs among the greatest works of philosophy, there is little agreement about the correct way to interpret his fundamental intentions. It is an established orthodoxy among almost all commentators that skepticism and naturalism are the two dominant themes in this work. The difficulty has been, however, that Hume's skeptical arguments and commitments appear to undermine and discredit his naturalistic ambition to contribute to "the science of man". This schism appears to leave his entire project broken-backed. The solution to this riddle depends on challenging another, closely related, point of orthodoxy: namely, that before Hume published the Treatise he removed almost all material concerned with problems of religion. Russell argues, contrary to this view, that irreligious aims and objectives are fundamental to the Treatise and account for its underlying unity and coherence. It is Hume's basic anti-Christian aims and objectives that serve to shape and direct both his skeptical and naturalistic commitments. When Hume's arguments are viewed from this perspective we can solve, not only puzzles arising from his discussion of various specific issues, we can also explain the intimate and intricate connections that hold his entire project together. This "irreligious" interpretation provides a comprehensive fresh account of the nature of Hume's fundamental aims and ambitions in the Treatise. It also presents a radically different picture of the way in which Hume's project was rooted in the debates and controversies of his own time, placing the Treatise in an irreligious or anti-Chrisitan philosophical tradition that includes Hobbes, Spinoza and freethinking followers. Considered in these terms, Hume's Treatise constitutes the crowning achievement of the Radical Enlightenment

.... The strategy I have defended involves drawing a distinction between those who can and cannot legitimately hold an agent responsible in circumstances when the agent is being covertly controlled (e.g. through implantation processes). What is intuitively unacceptable, I maintain, is that an agent should be held responsible or subject to reactive attitudes that come from another agent who is covertly controlling or manipulating him. This places some limits on who is entitled to take up the participant stance in relation to agents who are rational self-controllers but nevertheless subject to covert control.26 In this way, what is compromised by conditions of covert control is not the responsibility of the agent as such. It is, rather, the participant stance of those other agents who covertly control him. Clearly it is possible to establish these specific limits on who can hold these agents responsible without denying that the agents themselves remain free and responsible. When we take this approach we will find that we are no longer faced with an unattractive choice between simply “biting the bullet” or having to “spit it out”. All we need to do is chew carefully, until there is nothing left that we find too hard to swallow.

Throughout this paper my objective will be to establish and clarify Hume's original intentions in his discussion of causation in Book I of the Treatise. I will show that Hume's views on ontology, presented in Part IV of that book, shed light on his views on causation as presented in Part III. Further, I will argue that Hume's views on ontology account for the original motivation behind his two definitions of 2 cause. This relationship between Hume's ontology and his account of causation explains something which has baffled Hume scholars for some time,- namely, why does Hume's discussion of causation in I, iii, 14 have such a paradoxical air about it? I will show that Hume's views on causation have a paradoxical air about them because they rest on an ontology of "double existence" - an ontology which Hume describes as the monstrous offspring of two principles, which are contrary to each other, which are both at once embrac'd by the mind, and which are unable mutually to destroy each other (T 215) My interpretation will centre on the following two claims: (i) When Hume wrote Section 14, Of the idea of necessary connexion, he was primarily concerned to attack the view that the origin of our idea of necessity was to be discovered in the operations of matter or bodies. Of the suggested sources from which our idea of necessity could be thought to originate this is the source which, initially, interested Hume the most. It is, therefore, of great importance that we interpret Hume's remarks in light of this fact. (ii) Hume offers the first definition of cause as an account of causation as it exists in the material world independent of our thought and reasoning.He offers the second definition as an account of causation as we find it in our perceptions. It will also be argued, in this context, that necessity constitutes "an essential part" of both of Hume's two definitions of cause.

David Hume is widely recognized as providing the most influential statement of the “compatibilist” position in the free will debate — the view that freedom and moral responsibility can be reconciled with (causal) determinism. The arguments that Hume advances on this subject are found primarily in the sections titled “Of liberty and necessity”, as first presented in A Treatise of Human Nature (2.3.1-2) and, later, in a slightly amended form, in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (sec. 8). Although there is considerable overlap in content between these two statements of Hume's position, there are also some significant differences. This includes, for example, some substantial additions in the Enquiry discussion as it relates to problems of religion, such as predestination and divine foreknowledge. While these differences are certainly significant they should not be exaggerated. Hume's basic strategy and compatibilist commitments in both works remain the same in their essentials..