Paul Russell

: In this paper I argue that Hume's famous discussion of probability and induction, as originally presented in the Treatise, is significantly motivated by irreligious objectives. A particular target of Hume's arguments is Joseph Butler's Analogy of Religion. In the Analogy Butler intends to persuade his readers of both the credibility and practical importance of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. The argument that he advances relies on probable reasoning and proceeds on the assumption that our past experience in this life serves as a reliable and effective guide for our expectations concerning a future state. In the relevant sections of the Treatise Hume aims to discredit this religious argument and the practical objectives associated with it

.... The strategy I have defended involves drawing a distinction between those who can and cannot legitimately hold an agent responsible in circumstances when the agent is being covertly controlled (e.g. through implantation processes). What is intuitively unacceptable, I maintain, is that an agent should be held responsible or subject to reactive attitudes that come from another agent who is covertly controlling or manipulating him. This places some limits on who is entitled to take up the participant stance in relation to agents who are rational self-controllers but nevertheless subject to covert control.26 In this way, what is compromised by conditions of covert control is not the responsibility of the agent as such. It is, rather, the participant stance of those other agents who covertly control him. Clearly it is possible to establish these specific limits on who can hold these agents responsible without denying that the agents themselves remain free and responsible. When we take this approach we will find that we are no longer faced with an unattractive choice between simply “biting the bullet” or having to “spit it out”. All we need to do is chew carefully, until there is nothing left that we find too hard to swallow.

Throughout this paper my objective will be to establish and clarify Hume's original intentions in his discussion of causation in Book I of the Treatise. I will show that Hume's views on ontology, presented in Part IV of that book, shed light on his views on causation as presented in Part III. Further, I will argue that Hume's views on ontology account for the original motivation behind his two definitions of 2 cause. This relationship between Hume's ontology and his account of causation explains something which has baffled Hume scholars for some time,- namely, why does Hume's discussion of causation in I, iii, 14 have such a paradoxical air about it? I will show that Hume's views on causation have a paradoxical air about them because they rest on an ontology of "double existence" - an ontology which Hume describes as the monstrous offspring of two principles, which are contrary to each other, which are both at once embrac'd by the mind, and which are unable mutually to destroy each other (T 215) My interpretation will centre on the following two claims: (i) When Hume wrote Section 14, Of the idea of necessary connexion, he was primarily concerned to attack the view that the origin of our idea of necessity was to be discovered in the operations of matter or bodies. Of the suggested sources from which our idea of necessity could be thought to originate this is the source which, initially, interested Hume the most. It is, therefore, of great importance that we interpret Hume's remarks in light of this fact. (ii) Hume offers the first definition of cause as an account of causation as it exists in the material world independent of our thought and reasoning.He offers the second definition as an account of causation as we find it in our perceptions. It will also be argued, in this context, that necessity constitutes "an essential part" of both of Hume's two definitions of cause.

David Hume is widely recognized as providing the most influential statement of the “compatibilist” position in the free will debate — the view that freedom and moral responsibility can be reconciled with (causal) determinism. The arguments that Hume advances on this subject are found primarily in the sections titled “Of liberty and necessity”, as first presented in A Treatise of Human Nature (2.3.1-2) and, later, in a slightly amended form, in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (sec. 8). Although there is considerable overlap in content between these two statements of Hume's position, there are also some significant differences. This includes, for example, some substantial additions in the Enquiry discussion as it relates to problems of religion, such as predestination and divine foreknowledge. While these differences are certainly significant they should not be exaggerated. Hume's basic strategy and compatibilist commitments in both works remain the same in their essentials..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:165 CORRECTIONS REGARDING "Hume's 'Two Definitions' of Cause and the Ontology of 'Double Existence'" In my paper "Hume's 'Two Definitions' of Cause and the Ontology of 'Double Existence" (Hume Studies, Vol. X, No. 1, pp. 1-25) there were several corrections which should have appeared in the final printed version of the paper but which, unfortunately, were not inserted. In the version of my paper which has been printed in Hume Studies natural relations are misrepresented as being identical with connexions or associations of ideas whereas clearly they should be understood as those relations which produce or generate connexions or associations of ideas. While this defect in the paper does not affect the substance of my position (and is, I think, easily rectified) it may nevertheless generate some unnecessary difficulties and complications for the reader. In light of this I ask the reader to note the following specific corrections: pg. 12: lines 11-13 should read: This "connexion" is the product of a natural relation. It is an association which holds only between our perceptions and it cannot, therefore, be attributed to the objects (i.e, bodies) themselves, pg. 13: lines 23-5 should read: That is, the necessary connexion turns out to be an association between our perceptions, pg. 15: lines 5-9 should read: The gist of Hume's answer to this question seems to be that while we may attribute philosophical relations to physical objects we cannot attribute those connexions which are produced by natural relations to them (though he notes that we have a natural tendency to do this; cf. T 167). 166 pg. 15: lines 14-24 should read: But, as we have seen, he will not allow that the product of natural relations, that is, those "connexions" which hold between our perceptions of these objects, may also be "transferred" to these bodies. A natural relation is a "quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other after the manner above explained [sc. at I,i,4 — in terms of "the connexion or association of ideas"]. These effects of natural relations (viz. the generation of "connexions" among our ideas) must, obviously, be confined to our perceptions. However, we find philosophical relations wherever there are qualities "which make objects admit of comparison". (T 14 — my emphasis) pg. 16: lines 11-14 should read: Accordingly, as he is considering bodies he makes no mention of perceptions (i.e impressions and ideas), nor of the effects of natural relations (i.e. those "connexions" which relate only perceptions). pg. 17: lines 9-12 should read: They attribute those connexions which exist in their imagination, that is those associations which connect our perceptions, to the bodies themselves. I should stress again, however, that the above corrections do not in any way affect the central theses of my paper (cf. pp. 1-2 and pp. 20-1). Paul Russell Sidney Sussex College Cambridge...

In this paper I provide an irreligious interpretation of Hume’s fundamental aims and objectives in his 'Treatise of Human Nature' as regards his moral theory. According to the irreligious interpretation, there are two key claims that Hume seeks to establish in the Treatise in respect of morality. The first is that Hume defends the “autonomy of morality” in relation to religion. The foundations of moral and political life, he holds, rests with our human nature, not with the doctrines and dogmas of (Christian) religion. Closely connected with this issue, Hume also aims to show that “speculative atheism” does not imply “practical atheism” or any kind of “moral licentiousness”. Taken together, these two components of Hume’s moral system constitute a defence and interpretation of “virtuous atheism”. These issues concerning the relationship between morality and religion, I maintain, are not peripheral or incidental to Hume’s fundamental aims and objectives throughout the Treatise. On the contrary, they are central to what Hume’s entire project in the Treatise aims to establish and argue for. [The material presented in this paper is now published - in English - in a longer study titled "The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Scepticism, Naturalism and Irreligion" (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): Chp. 17 - "Morality without Religion".]

Review of The New Hume Debate Revised Edition Edited By Rupert Read, Kenneth Richman: Pub: 2000 '... The editors have done an excellent job of choosing and presenting some of the more important papers on this subject. The volume contains a useful bibliography and a citation index. ... There is also a helpful introduction, written by Richman, which provides a synopsis of the individual papers in this volume. A few important contributions are not included in the collection ... Nevertheless, all the papers that are included are well worthwhile and serve the editors’ stated aim in their Preface, which is to offer “insights not only into the most difficult issues of the interpretation of some of Western philosophy’s most vital texts, but also into an absolutely central example of the relevance of the philosophical history of philosophy to contemporary philosophy, in . . . accessible form.” '