Paul Russell

THE SUBJECT MATTER of this essay is Locke's well-known discussion of consent in sections 116-122 of the Second Treatise of Government.' I will not be concerned to discuss the place of consent in Locke's political philosophy 2 My concerns are somewhat narrower than this. I will simply be concerned to show that in important respects several recent discussions of Locke's political philosophy have misrepresented Locke's views on the subject of express and tacit consent. At theheart of these misinterpretations lie misunderstandings about the way in which landownership and the inheritance of land are related to express and tacit consent. I will show that these misinterpretations of Locke's views are, to a certain extent, indicative of internal strains that can bediscovered in Locke's arguments. My discussion will fall into four sections. In the first I will try toclarify Locke's views on the nature of express consent. I will show that Locke's views on this matter, when examined in their historical context, are not as obscure as some critics have suggested. In the second section I will examine Locke's views on the nature of tacit consent. I will be especially concerned to examine the relationship between landownership and express and tacit consent. In the third section I will look at Locke's views on the inheritance of land and how it relates to express and tacit consent. I will show that his views on this matter are not entirely consistent. In one passage Locke suggests that inheritance of land requires only tacit consent whereas, in another passage, he suggests that inheritance of land requires full membership of society and express consent. In the fourth and final section I will summarize the salient features of my interpretation of Locke's views on the subject of express and tacit consent. I will also briefly note interpretations of Locke's views that have been rejected in the course of this essay. .

Smith's views on moral luck have attracted little attention in the relevant contemporary literature on this subject.* More surprising, perhaps, the material in the secondary literature directly concerned with Smith's moral philosophy is rather thin on this aspect of his thought. In this paper my particular concern is to provide an interpretation and critical assessment of Smith on moral luck. I begin with a description of the basic features of Smith's position; then I criticize two particularly important claims that are fundamental to his position; and I conclude with an examination of the significance of Smith's discussion in relation to the contemporary debate. * There is some change in this situation since this paper was originally published.

My principal objective in this essay will be to show that the widely held view that Hume's Treatise' is not significantly or "directly" concerned with problems of religion is seriously mistaken. I shall approach this issue by way of an examination of a major skeptical theme that runs throughout the Treatise; namely, Hume's skepticism regarding the powers of demonstrative reason. In this paper I shall be especially concerned to bring to light the full significance of this skeptical theme by placing Hume's arguments in their appropriate historical context. I shall show that both Hume and his contemporaries recognized that these important skeptical arguments were aimed primarily against the dogmatic Christian rationalism of John Locke and above all Samuel Clarke, and that they were, therefore, well aware that these arguments had considerable theological significance.

A number of commentators on Smith's philosophy have observed that the relationship between his moral theory and his theological beliefs is "exceedingly difficult to unravel". The available evidence, as generally presented, suggests that although Smith was not entirely orthodox by contemporary standards, he has no obvious or significant irreligious commitments or orientation. Contrary to this view of things, I argue that behind the veneer of orthodoxy that covers Smith's discussion in The Theory of the Moral Sentiments there are significant irreligious themes present in his work. Two irreligious themes, I maintain, are especially important. The first is that the impartial spectator, as described in Smith's moral system, serves to sustain and support moral conduct and practice without any reliance on the goodness and justice of God in a future state. By this means, Smith is able to show how moral life is grounded in human nature without collapsing into the scepticism and "licentiousness" associated with the moral systems of Hobbes and Mandeville. On the other hand, related to this first irreligious theme, Smith also points out that there is no perfect match between virtue and happiness in this life. More specifically, he notes that even the mechanism of the impartial spectator cannot protect the innocent person from the miseries associated with unjust condemnation by others in our society. The general force of Smith's observations on this matter is not to justify the credibility of the doctrine of a future state but rather to explain its deep psychological roots in our (human) moral nature. In the final section of this paper I argue that although these two irreligious themes are clearly present in The Theory of the Moral Sentiments, Smith does not manifest the kind of systematic hostility to the influence of religion on moral life that features prominently in Hume's writings. On this basis, I conclude that Smith's views on ethics should be characterized as "weakly irreligious" in contrast with Hume's "strongly irreligious" ethical views.

"In 'Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition' Professor Hampton undertakes an "extensive examination" of Hobbes's argument, primarily as stated in Leviathan, for the institutionof an absolute sovereign. Hampton, however, is concerned to accomplish more than "a description or explication" of Hobbes's political philosophy. Rather, it is her intention to develop a "rational reconstruction" of Hobbes's argument.... 'Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition' is an important and valuable contribution to the study of Hobbes's political philosophy. Throughout this work one acquires new and illuminating insights into Hobbes's argument and its contemporary significance. ... it is essential reading for all those who are seriously concerned to come to grips with Hobbes's social contract theory. Hobbes scholar and political theorist alike will learn a great deal from it."

Hume's Treatise of Human Nature was published in the form of three separate books. The first two, "Of the Understanding" and "Of the Pas- sions," were published in London in January 1739 by John Noon. The third, "Of Morals," was published independently in London by Thomas Longman in November 1740.2 The title and subtitles on all three books are the same: A Treatise of Human Nature: Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. On the title page of the first two books Hume employs an epigram from Tacitus: Rara temporumfelicitas, ubi sentire, quae velis; & quae sentias, dicere licet. ["Seldom are men blessed with times in which they may think what they like and say what they think."] On the title page of the third book this epigram is replaced by an epigram taken from the ninth book of Lucan's Pharsalia: Durae semper virtutis amator, Quaere quid est virtus, et posce exemplar honesti. ["Thou that to virtue ever wer't inclined, learn what it is, how certainly defin'd, and leave some perfect Rule to guide Mankind."] Given the context and the prominence of these epigrams, it is a curious fact that they have attracted little or no attention or comment from Hume scholars. In this paper I argue that Hume's use of the epigram from Lucan is directly relevant to his use of the epigram from Tacitus. The epigrams flag very clearly the anti-Christian nature of Hume's intentions in the Treatise and his affiliations with and allegiance to an anti-Christian tradition of thought that stretches from Hobbes and Spinoza in the late seventeenth century to a circle of anti-Newtonian radical freethinkers that appeared in Britain in the first part of the eighteenth century. In more general terms these epigrams are a notable and illuminating example of esoteric communication in this context, and they indicate that the Treatise has an important place in the literature of the radical enlightenment.

It is my concern in this paper to suggest that from the perspective of interpretation, it is not possible to justify or defend the use of the dominant colligatory concept of the idea of ‘British empiricism’ as a basis for understanding and explaining the essential features of Hume’s philosophy. That requires reference to Hume's fundamental irreligious aims and intentions. At the same time, from the perspective of providing a plausible account of his legacy throughout the past two centuries it is indeed exactly this understanding of his philosophy that has proved central to the reception and influence that his philosophical ideas have generated. We should not succumb to the temptation to emphasize or insist upon one side of this relationship at the expense of the other.

SHORTLISTED FOR THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION BOOKPRIZE (in 2000) ----- In this book, Russell examines Hume's notion of free will and moral responsibility. It is widely held that Hume presents us with a classic statement of a compatibilist position--that freedom and responsibility can be reconciled with causation and, indeed, actually require it. Russell argues that this is a distortion of Hume's view, because it overlooks the crucial role of moral sentiment in Hume's picture of human nature. Hume was concerned to describe the regular mechanisms which generate moral sentiments such as responsibility, and Russell argues that his conception of free will must be interprted within this naturalistic framework. He goes on to discuss Hume's views about the nature and character of moral sentiment; the extent to which we have control over our moral character; and the justification of punishment. Throughout, Russell argues that the naturalistic avenue of interpretation of Hume's thought, far from draining it of its contemporary interest and significance, reveals it to be of great relevance to the ongoing contemporary debate - particuarly in relation to the views of P.F. Strawson and his influential paper "Freedom and Resentment".

Hume’s Letter from a Gentleman is an important document for Hume scholarship because, among other things, it serves as a useful tool for the interpretation and analysis of Hume’s philosophical intentions in the Treatise. The Letter itself, however, raises several difficult problems of interpretation. One of the most important of these concerns the identity of Hume’s “accuser“-the author of A Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion and Morality &c., to which Hume is responding in the Letter. Clearly the interpretation of the Letter, and its relevance to the Treatise, will vary depending on who is identified as the source of the accusations against Hume, and what is made of this person’s motivation and philosophical commitments. The immediate difficulty is that the Specimen is presented anonymously, and thus conjectures must be made about the author on the basis of available evidence.

.... The strategy I have defended involves drawing a distinction between those who can and cannot legitimately hold an agent responsible in circumstances when the agent is being covertly controlled (e.g. through implantation processes). What is intuitively unacceptable, I maintain, is that an agent should be held responsible or subject to reactive attitudes that come from another agent who is covertly controlling or manipulating him. This places some limits on who is entitled to take up the participant stance in relation to agents who are rational self-controllers but nevertheless subject to covert control.26 In this way, what is compromised by conditions of covert control is not the responsibility of the agent as such. It is, rather, the participant stance of those other agents who covertly control him. Clearly it is possible to establish these specific limits on who can hold these agents responsible without denying that the agents themselves remain free and responsible. When we take this approach we will find that we are no longer faced with an unattractive choice between simply “biting the bullet” or having to “spit it out”. All we need to do is chew carefully, until there is nothing left that we find too hard to swallow.

The central thesis of this paper is that the scope and structure of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature is modelled, or planned, after that of Hobbes's The Elements of Law and that in this respect there exists an important and unique relationship between these works. This relationship is of some importance for at least two reasons. First, it is indicative of the fundamental similarity between Hobbes's and Hume's project of the study of man. Second, and what is more important, by recognizing this relationship between Hume's and Hobbes's works we can come to appreciate the unity of the project of the Treatise itself. My discussion will proceed in three stages. In section I present the evidence for my central thesis. In the second section I shall consider why Hume does not, as one might expect, acknowledge this important debt to Hobbes in the Introduction to the Treatise or in the Abstract. Finally, in the third section I shall note a few points of some importance to the understanding of Hume's philosophy which this relationship between Hobbes's and Hume's work touches upon.

Hume’s famous and influential contributions to the philosophy of religion pursue two broad themes that have deep links with his general sceptical and naturalistic commitments throughout his philosophy as a whole.1 The first is his sceptical critique of the philosophical arguments and doctrines of various (Christian) theological systems. The second is his naturalistic account of the origins and roots of religion in human nature. Taken together, these two themes serve to advance Hume’s “Lucretian mission”, which was to discredit and dislodge the role of religion in human life. In this paper I consider the criticism that Hume’s entire Lucretian mission is fundamentally misguided and misconceived as judged in terms of his own claims and hypotheses concerning religion. More specifically, it may be argued that if Hume is right about the foundations of religion in human nature and the human predicament, then his Lucretian mission is neither wise nor achievable. His project is, in other words, both theoretically self-refuting and practically self-defeating. Drawing from Hume’s writings on this subject, I will suggest a set of replies and responses to these criticisms.

Compatibilists argue, famously, that it is a simple incompatibilist confusion to suppose that determinism implies fatalism. Incompatibilists argue, on the contrary, that determinism implies fatalism, and thus cannot be consistent with the necessary conditions of moral responsibility. Despite their differences, however, both parties are agreed on one important matter: the refutation of fatalism is essential to the success of the compatibilist strategy. In this paper I argue that compatibilism requires a richer conception of fatalistic concern; one that recognizes the _legitimacy_ of (pessimistic) concerns about the origination of character and conduct. On this basis I argue that any plausible compatibilist position must concede that determinism has fatalistic implications of some significant and relevant kind, and thus must allow that agents may be legitimately held responsible in circumstances where they are subject to fate. The position generated by these compatibilist concessions to incompatibilism will be called 'compatibilist-fatalism'.

In the early eighteenth century context there was an intimate connection between problems concerning the existence of the material world and problems of natural religion. Two issues are of particular importance for understanding Hume’s irreligious intentions in the Treatise. First, if we are unable to establish that we know that the material world exists, then all arguments for the existence of God that presuppose knowledge of the material world (i.e. its beauty, order, design, etc.) are placed in doubt. Second, if we are naturally disposed to believe in the existence of body, but this belief is false, then it seems to follow that God must be a deceiver -- or does not exist. Hume’s arguments in 1.4.2, I maintain, are finely crafted to present both these (irreligious) challenges to the orthodox view.

In her influential and challenging paper “Skepticism about Practical Reason” Christine Korsgaard sets out to refute an important strand of Humean scepticism as it concerns a Kantian understanding of practical reason.1 Korsgaard distinguishes two components of scepticism about practical reason. The first, which she refers to as content scepticism, argues that reason cannot of itself provide any “substantive guidance to choice and action” (SPR, 311). In its classical formulation, as stated by Hume, it is argued that reason cannot determine our ends. Our ends are determined by our desires and reason is limited to the role of identifying the relevant means to these ends. The second component, which Korsgaard calls motivational scepticism, suggests doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. The claim here, as Korsgaard interprets Hume’s view on this matter, is that “all reasoning that has motivational influence must start from a passion, that being the only possible source of motivation” (SPR, 314).2 Korsgaard’s fundamental objective in “Skepticism about Practical Reason” is to show that motivational scepticism must always be based on content scepticism. In other words, according to Korsgaard, motivational scepticism has no independent force. In this paper I argue that Korsgaard’s attempt to discredit motivational scepticism is unsuccessful.

Review of Nicholas Capaldi, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy In Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy Professor Capaldi attempts “to construct a coherent account of Hume’s moral philosophy both with an eye to those issueswhich have persistently vexed his readers and commentators and with the intent of underscoring those novel and challenging aspects of his moral philosophy which ...remain unnoticed or unappreciated” (p.xi).Capaldi’s project falls into three distinct, but related, parts. First, he provides a “brief sketch of the intellectual milieu in which Hume was writing”. Many of the misunderstandings of Hume’s philosophy, Capaldi suggests, “are largely the result of failing to see the specific issues and opponents Hume had in mind” (p. 28 - cp. p. 93). O n this matter Capaldi’s overall view is that Hume’s moral thought may be interpreted as an effort to incorporate “Hutcheson’s moral philosophy and teachings into a more fundamental framework which can only be described as Newtonian” (p.21). Throughout this work Capaldi is particularly at pains to emphasise Hume’s (supposed) antagonism to Hobbes’s “selfish system” of morals (e.g. pp. 5-9, 13, 23, 198-99, 209-10, 292, 298, 301). Second, Capaldi cites four “major issues within moral philosophy” which structure his own interpretation of various specific aspects of Hume’s moral thought. The four issues are: (i) the existence of a “moral domain”; (ii) the nature of our “access” to this domain; (iii) the relationship between “moral apprehension” and “moral motivation”; and, finally, (iv) the relationship between “moral motivation” and “non-moral motivation” (p. 2). It is largely within this framework that Capaldi discusses the familiar issues concerning moral obligation, moral judgement, sympathy, moral sentiment, and justice. Third, Capaldi’s principal concern in this study is to present an account or description of Hume’s ‘Copernican Revolution in Philosophy’. This “revolution" is described in terms of the shift from the ‘Ithink’ to the ‘WeDo’ perspective (see esp.pp.21-7 andCh. 8).This feature of Hume’s philosophical thought has, Capaldi claims, been insufficiently understood and this has resulted in both unnecessary misunderstanding and misplaced criticism of Hume’s moral thought....

"This substantial collection of essays reflects Terence Penelhum's distinguished contribution to several related fields of philosophy. ... as a philosopher and commentator on Hume, Penelhum follows in a tradition that can be traced back to certain members of the moderate clergy in eighteenth century Britain — individuals such as Butler and Reid. This tradition also includes Hume's "philosophically minded friends in the Moderate clergy" — to whom Penelhum refers in his "Comments and Responses" (254). Suffice it to point out, therefore, that the tradition and style of criticism of which Penelhum is a distinguished representative, is one that Hume himself held in great esteem."

: In this paper I argue that Hume's famous discussion of probability and induction, as originally presented in the Treatise, is significantly motivated by irreligious objectives. A particular target of Hume's arguments is Joseph Butler's Analogy of Religion. In the Analogy Butler intends to persuade his readers of both the credibility and practical importance of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. The argument that he advances relies on probable reasoning and proceeds on the assumption that our past experience in this life serves as a reliable and effective guide for our expectations concerning a future state. In the relevant sections of the Treatise Hume aims to discredit this religious argument and the practical objectives associated with it

This article is concerned with a central strand of Strawson's well-known and highly influential essay “Freedom and Resentment” Strawson's principal objectives in this work is to refute or discredit the views of the "Pessimist." The Pessimist, as Strawson understands him/ her, claims that the truth of the thesis of determinism would render the attitudes and practices associated with moral responsibility incoherent and unjustified. Given this, the Pessimist claims that if determinism is true, then we must abandon or suspend these attitudes and practices altogether. Against the Pessimist Strawson argues that no reasoning of any sort could lead us to abandon or suspend our "reactive attitudes." That is to say, according to Strawson responsibility is a "given" of human life and society-something which we are inescapably committed to. In this article I argue that Strawson's reply to the Pessimist is seriously flawed. More specifically, I argue that Strawson fails to distinguish two very different forms or modes of naturalism and that he is constrained by the nature of his own objectives (i.e., the refutation of Pessimism) to embrace the stronger and far less plausible form of naturalism. On this basis I conclude that while there is something to be said for Strawson's general approach to these matters, we nevertheless cannot naturalize responsibility along the specific lines that he suggests.

John Danford claims that Hume's philosophy must be understood within the framework of the 'problem of reason'. The problem of reason', according to this account, concerns the general relationship between philosophy and reason, on the one hand, and experience and 'common life' on the other. Danford maintains that the nature and development of Hume's thought, considered as a response to this problem, falls, essentially, into two parts. First, we must consider Hume's Treatise and his first Enquiry (ie., his 'epistemological works' [61-cp.9]). The heart of Hume's Treatise, Danford suggests, lies with the epistemology of Book I and, in particular, with the discussions of causation and the external world. Hume's primary concern in these passages, it is argued, was to refute and discredit the rationalistic, 'scientific philosophies of Descartes and, especially, Hobbes (24-5, 40-5, 59, 74-5, 84-5, 190). These thinkers, Danford maintains, had driven a 'wedge' between philosophy and experienceor 'common life' (24-5). By emphasizing the limits and weakness of h u m a n understanding Hume exposes the vulnerability of Hobbes's and Descartes's scientific ambitions and, in this way, he seeks to return philosophy to the secure and appropriate foundations of 'common life and everyday experience.....Shortly after Hume published the Treatise there was, Danford claims, a 'shift' in his thinking on these matters (28). This shift is represented most clearly in his later works: the Essays, the History, and the Dialogues (10, 33, 7, 88, 108). Danford firmly rejects the suggestion that these works represent a turning away from philosophy. On the contrary, it is these later works, taken together, which constitute Hume's most mature philosophy. Indeed, they are, Danford says, the 'flower ofHume's philosophic career' (10). The mature philosophy of Hume, it is argued, must be interpreted as 'Political philosophy". It is political philosophy in the sense that it attempts to investigate human life in its full diversity and complexity and, on this basis, it seeks to provide us with some general guide as to how we should live (10, 7, 88-9, 183-6). From the 'teachings' of the History and the Essays Danford draws some lessons that are 'valid for all times' (112 and 114). The inspirational message concerns, roughly, the merits of capitalism (see, e.g., p. 131: The increase in personal liberty, then, was and is directly connected to the growth of commerce...' and p.137:'. the central lesson of British history [is] the superiority of liberal commercial society ...).

David Hume is widely recognized as providing the most influential statement of the “compatibilist” position in the free will debate — the view that freedom and moral responsibility can be reconciled with (causal) determinism. The arguments that Hume advances on this subject are found primarily in the sections titled “Of liberty and necessity”, as first presented in A Treatise of Human Nature (2.3.1-2) and, later, in a slightly amended form, in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (sec. 8). Although there is considerable overlap in content between these two statements of Hume's position, there are also some significant differences. This includes, for example, some substantial additions in the Enquiry discussion as it relates to problems of religion, such as predestination and divine foreknowledge. While these differences are certainly significant they should not be exaggerated. Hume's basic strategy and compatibilist commitments in both works remain the same in their essentials..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:165 CORRECTIONS REGARDING "Hume's 'Two Definitions' of Cause and the Ontology of 'Double Existence'" In my paper "Hume's 'Two Definitions' of Cause and the Ontology of 'Double Existence" (Hume Studies, Vol. X, No. 1, pp. 1-25) there were several corrections which should have appeared in the final printed version of the paper but which, unfortunately, were not inserted. In the version of my paper which has been printed in Hume Studies natural relations are misrepresented as being identical with connexions or associations of ideas whereas clearly they should be understood as those relations which produce or generate connexions or associations of ideas. While this defect in the paper does not affect the substance of my position (and is, I think, easily rectified) it may nevertheless generate some unnecessary difficulties and complications for the reader. In light of this I ask the reader to note the following specific corrections: pg. 12: lines 11-13 should read: This "connexion" is the product of a natural relation. It is an association which holds only between our perceptions and it cannot, therefore, be attributed to the objects (i.e, bodies) themselves, pg. 13: lines 23-5 should read: That is, the necessary connexion turns out to be an association between our perceptions, pg. 15: lines 5-9 should read: The gist of Hume's answer to this question seems to be that while we may attribute philosophical relations to physical objects we cannot attribute those connexions which are produced by natural relations to them (though he notes that we have a natural tendency to do this; cf. T 167). 166 pg. 15: lines 14-24 should read: But, as we have seen, he will not allow that the product of natural relations, that is, those "connexions" which hold between our perceptions of these objects, may also be "transferred" to these bodies. A natural relation is a "quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other after the manner above explained [sc. at I,i,4 — in terms of "the connexion or association of ideas"]. These effects of natural relations (viz. the generation of "connexions" among our ideas) must, obviously, be confined to our perceptions. However, we find philosophical relations wherever there are qualities "which make objects admit of comparison". (T 14 — my emphasis) pg. 16: lines 11-14 should read: Accordingly, as he is considering bodies he makes no mention of perceptions (i.e impressions and ideas), nor of the effects of natural relations (i.e. those "connexions" which relate only perceptions). pg. 17: lines 9-12 should read: They attribute those connexions which exist in their imagination, that is those associations which connect our perceptions, to the bodies themselves. I should stress again, however, that the above corrections do not in any way affect the central theses of my paper (cf. pp. 1-2 and pp. 20-1). Paul Russell Sidney Sussex College Cambridge...

Review of The New Hume Debate Revised Edition Edited By Rupert Read, Kenneth Richman: Pub: 2000 '... The editors have done an excellent job of choosing and presenting some of the more important papers on this subject. The volume contains a useful bibliography and a citation index. ... There is also a helpful introduction, written by Richman, which provides a synopsis of the individual papers in this volume. A few important contributions are not included in the collection ... Nevertheless, all the papers that are included are well worthwhile and serve the editors’ stated aim in their Preface, which is to offer “insights not only into the most difficult issues of the interpretation of some of Western philosophy’s most vital texts, but also into an absolutely central example of the relevance of the philosophical history of philosophy to contemporary philosophy, in . . . accessible form.” '

Recent work in contemporary compatibilist theory displays considerable sophistication and subtlety when compared with the earlier theories of classical compatibilism. Two distinct lines of thought have proved especially influential and illuminating. The first developed around the general hypothesis that moral sentiments or reactive attitudes are fundamental for understanding the nature and conditions of moral responsibility. The other important development is found in recent compatibilist accounts of rational self-control or reason responsiveness. Strictly speaking, these two lines of thought have developed independent of each other. However, in the past decade or so they have been fused together in several prominent statements of compatibilist theory. I will refer to theories that combine these two elements in this way as RS theories. RS theories face a number of familiar difficulties that relate to each of their two components. Beyond this, they also face a distinct set of problems concerning how these two main components relate or should be integrated. My concerns in this paper focus primarily on this set of problems. According to one version of RS compatibilism, the role of moral sentiments is limited to explaining what is required for holding an agent responsible. In contrast with this, the role of reason responsiveness is to explain what moral capacities are required for an agent to be responsible, one who is a legitimate or fair target of our moral sentiments. More specifically, according to this view, moral sense is not required for rational selfcontrol or reason responsiveness. There is, therefore, no requirement that the responsible agent has some capacity to feel moral sentiment. Contrary to this view, I argue that a responsible agent must be capable of holding herself and others responsible. Failing this, an agent’s powers of rational self-control will be both limited and impaired. In so far as holding responsible requires moral sense, it follows that being responsible also requires moral sense.

In his note 'Paul Russell on Hume's "Reconciling Project"' {Mind, 1984, pp. 587-8) Professor Flew makes two criticisms of my note 'On the Naturalism of Hume's "Reconciling Project"' {Mind, 1983, pp. 593-600). They are: (1) that 'nowhere does Russell take note of the fact that Hume left us two treatments "Of Liberty and Necessity", two treatments which are at least in emphases and tone of presentation very different'; and (2) that I must be 'prepared to offer and to defend some alternative reading' of the first three paragraphs of the first Enquiry discussion 'Of Liberty and Necessity' where Hume suggests that 'the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words' {EHU, p. 81—my emphasis: this and later page references are to the Selby-Bigge editions). This note answers both of Flew's criticisms.

The philosophical debate about free will and responsibility has been of great importance throughout the history of philosophy. In modern times this debate has received an enormous resurgence of interest and the contribution in 1962 by P.F. Strawson with the publication of his essay "Freedom and Resentment" has generated a wide range of discussion and criticism in the philosophical community and beyond. The debate is of central importance to recent developments in the free will literature and has shaped the way contemporary philosophers now approach the problem. This volume brings together a focused selection of the major contributions and reactions to the free will and responsibility debate inspired by Strawson's contribution. McKenna and Russell also provide a comprehensive overview of the debate.

The philosophy of Samuel Clarke is of central importance for an adequate understanding of Hume’s Treatise.2 Despite this, most Hume scholars have either entirely overlooked Clarke’s work, or referred to it in a casual manner that fails to do justice to the significance of the Clarke-Hume relationship. This tendency is particularly apparent in accounts of Hume’s views on space in Treatise I.ii. In this paper, I argue that one of Hume’s principal objectives in his discussion of space is to discredit Clarke’s Newtonian doctrine of absolute space and, more deeply, the ‘argument a priori’ that Clarke constructs around it. On the basis of this interpretation, I argue that Hume’s ‘system’ of space constitutes an important part of his more fundamental ‘atheistic’ or anti- Christian objectives in the Treatise.3