Gerasimos Santas

This paper argues that in Plato’s utopia the good of the ideal city-state is not identical with the good of the citizens, but it is nevertheless not independent of the good of the citizens. And similarly with the happiness of the city-state and the happiness of the citizens in it, something that can be more clearly seen once the happiness of the city and the happiness of the individual are analyzed in terms of the goods appropriate to each. Plato’s principle of social justice distributes such goods proportionately so as to promote the good of the city as a whole. Popper and others have been mostly correct in criticizing Plato for his severe restrictions of various freedoms, but not correct in claiming that Plato’s ideal city-state is an organic super-entity with a good of its own separate and independent of the good of the citizens.

The article discusses two puzzles about Plato''s account of the democratic person: (1) unlike his account of the democratic city, his characterization of a democratic person is markedly incorrect. (2) His criticism of a person so characterized is criticism of a straw man. The article argues that the first puzzle is resolved if we see it as a result of Plato''s assumption that a democratic person is a person whose soul is isomorphic to a democratic constitution. Such a person has a desire satisfaction theory of good and adopts liberty and equality of desires as a basis for action. The article then argues that Plato''s criticism brings up two problems endemic to desire satisfaction theories of good, the problem of bad desires and the problem of conflicts of desires. The criticism is that the democratic person''s way of dealing with these problems, by applying the social principles of liberty and equality to his desires, is irrational.

_Understanding Plato’s Republic_ is an accessible introduction to the concepts of justice that inform Plato’s Republic, elucidating the ancient philosopher's main argument that we would be better off leading just lives rather than unjust ones Provides a much needed up to date discussion of _The Republic_'s fundamental ideas and Plato's main argument Discusses the unity and coherence of _The Republic_ as a whole Written in a lively style, informed by over 50 years of teaching experience Reveals rich insights into a timeless classic that holds remarkable relevance to the modern world.

Plato's antidemocratic theory of social justice is instructive once we distinguish between the abstract parts of his theory and the empirical or other assumptions he uses in applying that theory. His application may have contained empirical mistakes, and it may have been burdened too much with a prolific metaphysics and a demanding epistemology. An attempt is made to look at his theory of social justice in imaginary isolation from empirical mistakes and from his metaphysics and epistemology. It is then argued that some of Plato's proposals and criticisms of democracy are well worth our attention, especially in the case of governing. His attempt to separate ruling and wealth and to establish economic floors and ceilings for his ideal city seems especially instructive in view of problems in these areas that modern democracies have experienced. Isolating his theory of social justice from his epistemology and metaphysics may be more problematic. Still, Plato's insistence that superior wisdom is the central virtue of rulers is instructive, and in this respect some modern defenders of democratic justice, such as J. S. Mill and John Rawls, have leaned some in Plato's direction. Finally, Plato's criticism of democratic free choice of occupation is less persuasive. Footnotesa I wish to thank the other contributors to this volume, and its editors, for many helpful comments.