Michael Blake

Christopher Heath Wellman has argued that freedom of association gives legitimate states a right to close their borders to even the most needy foreigners. I believe Wellman is wrong about freedom of association and thus is wrong about immigration. I use the history of antidiscrimination law to argue that freedom of association is not a simple trump right but is part of a complex package of rights—a package whose contents are in tension and whose use requires moral judgment. This means, I argue, that a proper respect for freedom of association need not entail Wellman’s stark conclusion.

Little work has been done to explore the moral foundations of the state’s right to territory.1 In modern times, the state has mostly been assumed to be a territorial unit, and no need was perceived to reflect on precisely what justifies its territorial jurisdiction. The state’s territoriality is related to another topic that has remained under-theorized: immigration. There is, moreover, an obvious relationship between these topics: the more powerful a state’s rights over its territory, the more powerful the right to constrain access to that territory might become – or so, at any rate, we might suppose. Rights to territory and rights to immigration are usefully theorized together.2 Our starting point is a Lockean analysis of the moral foundations of territoriality offered by Simmons (2001). This is a natural starting point not only because Simmons is one of the very few contemporary writers who have taken up philosophical questions about territoriality in the first place, but also because Locke’s thought, as Simmons makes clear, actually allows for the development of a sophisticated account of territoriality. This makes Locke stand out simply because generally modern political..

1. Among the most striking features of the political arrangements on this planet is its division into sovereign states.1 To be sure, in recent times, globalization has woven together the fates of communities and individuals in distant parts of the world in complex ways. It is partly for this reason that now hardly anyone champions a notion of sovereignty that would entirely discount a state’s liability the effects that its actions would have on foreign nationals. Still, state sovereignty persists as a political fact. The number of states has increased enormously due to upheavals of the 20th century, and there is nothing in principle morally wrong with the existence of states - or so we will assume.2 What must be explored, then, are the limits of normatively plausible sovereignty. How bad does a government have to be for outsiders to be allowed to interfere? What responsibilities does a country incur because of its contribution to global warming? What obligations arise through trading? In this paper, we explore another pertinent question: to what extent is a country allowed to influence who lives on its territory by regulating immigration? The angle from which we approach this question continues to be neglected even now that questions of global justice are receiving much attention. Immigration amounts to a change in political relationships as immigrants alter their standing within one community and acquire a status elsewhere. Yet it also amounts to an alteration in physical relationship, since they acquire a relationship to a territory, making a life for themselves with the resources offered by a part of the earth.3 We base our exploration of..

The claims of those who are compelled to migrate are, in general, taken to be more urgent and pressing than the claims of those who were not forced to do so. This article does not defend the moral relevance of voluntarism to the morality of migration, but instead seeks to demonstrate two complexities that must be included in any plausible account of that moral relevance. The first is that the decision to start the migration journey is distinct from the decision to stop that journey, through resettlement; the latter may involve voluntary choice, without that voluntarism impugning the involuntary nature of the former. The second is that the migration decision of the individual might be voluntary, even while that individual's family or social network might be compelled to insist upon some particular individual member's migration. That is, the fact that any particular person might be free to refuse migration does not contradict the fact that the group in question does not have the effective freedom to avoid the migration of some group members. Once these two complexities are understood, I argue, the moral relevance of voluntarism in the ethics of migration becomes more complex and nuanced than is generally understood.

In Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration, Anna Stilz argues that legitimate political authority requires the actual—rather than hypothetical—consent of the governed. I argue, however, that her analysis of that consent is inconsistent, in the weight it ascribes to the felt desire to refrain from doing politics with some particular group of people. In the context of secession and self-determination, the lack of actual consent to shared political institutions is weighty enough to render such institutions presumptively illegitimate. In the context of migration, however, a lack of actual consent to the presence of newcomers is ascribed nearly no weight, and instead is taken as evidence of irrationality or immoral preferences. I argue that this apparent contradiction must be clarified before Stilz's overall account of self-governance can be accepted.

Rawls's Law of Peoples has not gathered a great deal of public support. The reason for this, I suggest, is that it ignores the differences between the international and domestic realms as regards the methodology of reciprocal agreement. In the domestic realm, reciprocity produces both stability and respect for individual moral agency. In the international realm, we must choose between these two values — seeking stable relations between states, or respect for individual moral agency. Rawls's Law of Peoples ignores the stark nature of this choice by insisting that the only legitimate extension of liberal toleration abroad is the toleration of different forms of political organization. It is this attempt to overcome liberalism's tragic dilemma which, I suggest, has made Rawls's international theory less attractive than his domestic theory. I also suggest that this difficulty is at the base of the further difficulties identified by Henry Shue and Martha Nussbaum in their accompanying essays. Key Words: Rawls • international • toleration • reciprocity • state • Nussbaum • Shue.

Darrel Moellendorf, David Owen, and Lea Ypi have offered some subtle and powerful criticisms of the view I defend in Debating Brain Drain. I here focus on two broad category of criticism. The first is that my use of metaphor is faulty. I try to demonstrate that the right to emigrate is similar in moral strength to the right to freely exercise one’s religion, and not morally akin to the (non-existent) right to be free from paying taxes. I defend the proposition that the taking of money from people is morally distinct from the taking of time; we have reason to regard the latter sort of taking as more difficult to justify. The second category of criticism focuses on the theoretical assumption of my view, and argues that the liberalism I endorse begs important questions: it might be at such a high level of abstraction that it cannot answer the most important questions of political ethics, or it might assume so much about the nature of liberalism that it is dogmatic and unpersuasive. I argue, in response, that a political theory need not answer all political questions in order to be of use, and that the insistence on liberal rights represents not dogma but valid moral concerns.

In my chapters in Debating Brain Drain, I offer some reasons for thinking that states may not seek to prevent the emigration of their own citizens – even when those citizens have rare and desirable skills, and might use those skills to improve the lot of their fellow citizens. These arguments are developed in response to those contrary arguments given by Gillian Brock in her own chapters. I try to establish my conclusions by arguing against the empirical and philosophical bases of arguments in favor of the right to prevent exit. I suggest, on the former front, that suppression of the right to exit might well work against the interests of the poor, rather than in their favor. On the latter front, I argue that any proposals for “compulsory service” are both unfair and illiberal. States are not entitled to perpetual allegiance; rather, they must justify their uses of coercive power with reference to the interests and rights of those over whom that power is exercised. Preventing the emigration of a citizen is, on the best understandings of liberal political philosophy, morally prohibited.