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Klaus Corcilius

University TübingenUniversity of California, Berkeley
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    98
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  •  Events
    12
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    19

 More details
  • University Tübingen
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
  • University of California, Berkeley
    Department of Philosophy
    Associate Professor
Tübingen, Baden-Württemberg, Germany
Areas of Specialization
History of Western Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Philosophy of Action
History of Western Philosophy
  • All publications (98)
  •  8
    Phantasia
    In Christof Rapp & Klaus Corcilius (eds.), Aristoteles-Handbuch: Leben-Werk-Wirkung, J.b. Metzler Verlag. pp. 346-350. 2021.
    Phantasia ist ein terminologischer Ausdruck aus Aristoteles’ philosophischer Psychologie. Er bezeichnet das Vermögen von Lebewesen, Wahrnehmungsgehalte auch in Abwesenheit externer Wahrnehmungsgegenstände mental gegenwärtig zu haben. Der Ausdruck leitet sich her von dem Verb phainomai (erscheinen, sichtbar sein, sich zeigen) und ist nicht zu verwechseln mit dem in der Wortgestalt identischem phantasia, dem aus phainomai gebildeten nomen abstractum, das kein seelisches Vermögen bezeichnet, sonder…Read more
    Phantasia ist ein terminologischer Ausdruck aus Aristoteles’ philosophischer Psychologie. Er bezeichnet das Vermögen von Lebewesen, Wahrnehmungsgehalte auch in Abwesenheit externer Wahrnehmungsgegenstände mental gegenwärtig zu haben. Der Ausdruck leitet sich her von dem Verb phainomai (erscheinen, sichtbar sein, sich zeigen) und ist nicht zu verwechseln mit dem in der Wortgestalt identischem phantasia, dem aus phainomai gebildeten nomen abstractum, das kein seelisches Vermögen bezeichnet, sondern so viel wie ›Erscheinung‹, ›geistiges Bild‹ oder ›subjektiver Eindruck‹ bedeutet.
  •  5
    De anima
    In Christof Rapp & Klaus Corcilius (eds.), Aristoteles-Handbuch: Leben-Werk-Wirkung, J.b. Metzler Verlag. pp. 99-108. 2021.
    Aristoteles’ Traktat De anima befasst sich mit der Natur der Seele. Die verhältnismäßig kurze Schrift – sie umfasst nicht mehr als 33 Seiten in der Bekker-Ausgabe – teilt sich in drei mehr oder weniger gleichlange ›Bücher‹ (s. Kap. III.10). Sie gehört neben der Metaphysik zu den besonders häufig kommentierten Schriften des Aristoteles.
  •  56
    Common Sense and Extra Powers: A Discussion of Anna Marmodoro, Aristotle on Perceiving Objects
    Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 50 289-320. 2016.
    Aristotle: MetaphysicsAristotle: Perception
  •  21
    Sean Kelsey, Mind and World in Aristotle’s De Anima, Cambridge University Press, 2022, 181pp., $99.99 (hbk), ISBN 9781108832915 (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2022 (October). 2022.
  •  33
    Eli Diamond, Mortal Imitations of Divine Life: The Nature of the Soul in Aristotle's De Anima, Northwestern University Press, 2015, 333pp., $39.95 (pbk), ISBN 9780810130692 (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017 (May). 2017.
  •  16
    Sabine Föllinger, (ed.), Was ist ‘Leben’? Aristoteles’ Anschauungen zur Entstehung und Funktionsweise von Leben. Akten der 10. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung vom 23.-26. August 2006 in Bamberg, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010. 420 pp. ISB (review)
    Scripta Classica Israelica 30 144-147. 2011.
  •  41
    Andre Laks/Marwan Rashed (Hrsg.): Aristote et le mouvement des animaux. Dix etudes sur le de Motu Animalium, 248 S., Septentrion, Villeneuve d'Ascq 2004 (review)
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59 (1): 150-151. 2005.
    Aristotle: Motion of AnimalsAristotle: Natural Science
  •  35
    Wann ist eine Übersetzung besser als die andere?
    In Hartmut Böhme, Christof Rapp & Wolfgang Rösler (eds.), Übersetzung und Transformation, De Gruyter. pp. 173-189. 2007.
    Philosophical MethodsTranslation
  • Einleitung: Handlungstheorie bei Aristoteles?
    with Christof Rapp
    In Klaus Corcilius & Christof Rapp (eds.), Beiträge zur Aristotelischen Handlungstheorie: Akten der 8. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung vom 08.-11.07.2004 in Blankensee, F. Steiner. pp. 9-27. 2008.
  •  16
    Akrasie bei Aristoteles: Die erste Aporie
    In Klaus Corcilius & Christof Rapp (eds.), Beiträge zur Aristotelischen Handlungstheorie: Akten der 8. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung vom 08.-11.07.2004 in Blankensee, F. Steiner. pp. 143-172. 2008.
  •  20
    Stellenkommentar und Essay: Thomas Hobbes
    In Dominik Perler & Johannes Haag (eds.), Ideen. Repräsentationalismus in der Frühen Neuzeit, De Gruyter. pp. 83-122. 2010.
    Hobbes: Philosophy of Mind
  •  10
    Thomas Hobbes
    In Dominik Perler & Johannes Haag (eds.), Ideen. Repräsentationalismus in der Frühen Neuzeit, De Gruyter. pp. 119-164. 2010.
    Thomas Hobbes
  •  2
    Aristotle's Definition of Non-Rational Pleasure and Pain and Desire
    In Jon Miller (ed.), Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide, Cambridge University Press. pp. 117-143. 2011.
  •  27
    Phantasia und Phantasie bei Aristoteles
    In Philipp Brüllmann, Ursula Rombach & Cornelia Wilde (eds.), Imagination, Transformation und die Entstehung des Neuen, De Gruyter. pp. 71-87. 2014.
  •  44
    Activity, Passivity, and Perceptual Discrimination in Aristotle
    In Jose Filipe Silva & Mikko Yrjönsuuri (eds.), Active Perception in the History of Philosophy: From Plato to Modern Philosophy, Springer. pp. 31-53. 2014.
    This paper offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s account of basic perceptual discrimination in On the Soul II 11. This is the discrimination of single perceptible qualities like, e.g., ‘red’, ‘sweet’, ‘hot’ of which even the simplest animals on the scala naturae are capable. It is argued that, for Aristotle, basic perceptual discrimination is largely—but not entirely—a causal process in the course of which a perceptible quality is isolated from the matter of a sensory input. That isolation …Read more
    This paper offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s account of basic perceptual discrimination in On the Soul II 11. This is the discrimination of single perceptible qualities like, e.g., ‘red’, ‘sweet’, ‘hot’ of which even the simplest animals on the scala naturae are capable. It is argued that, for Aristotle, basic perceptual discrimination is largely—but not entirely—a causal process in the course of which a perceptible quality is isolated from the matter of a sensory input. That isolation is interpreted as the result of a juxtaposition of the sensory input with a neutral perceptual value provided by the perceptual soul. The contrast resulting from that juxtaposition is basic phenomenal content like, e.g., ‘red’, ‘hot’, ’sweet’. Basic perceptual discrimination is thus interpreted as the production of phenomenal content in the animal organism. The paper ends with a discussion of the underlying notion of ‘juxtaposition’ of perceptual input with the soul and an interpretation of basic perceptual awareness as the reception of discriminated content.
    Aristotle: SoulAristotle: Perception
  •  15
    De l’'me
    In Enrico Berti & Michel Crubellier (eds.), Lire Aristote, . pp. 101-112. 2016.
  •  1
    Aristotle and Thought Experiments
    In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments, Routledge. pp. 57-76. 2018.
    Aristotle: On the SoulAristotle: Philosophy of Mind
  •  31
    Towards a Science of Life: The Cosmological Method, Teleology, and Living Things
    In Liba Taub (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek and Roman Science, Cambridge University Press. pp. 58-78. 2020.
    The phenomena of life have special significance for us. Living things impress us in ways inanimate things couldn’t. This is because livings things do things. They act for the sake of some purpose, a purpose which moreover seems to be their very own. They instil in us the impression that there is something they are ‘up to’. This certainly seems to be the case with animals and, to a lesser degree, with plants and other growing things. Their goal-directed behaviours are presumably the reasons why l…Read more
    The phenomena of life have special significance for us. Living things impress us in ways inanimate things couldn’t. This is because livings things do things. They act for the sake of some purpose, a purpose which moreover seems to be their very own. They instil in us the impression that there is something they are ‘up to’. This certainly seems to be the case with animals and, to a lesser degree, with plants and other growing things. Their goal-directed behaviours are presumably the reasons why living things are closer, more interesting – and sometimes also more repelling – to us than inanimate things: they have, one might say, certain interests they pursue. We can understand these interests and therefore interact with these pursuits in sometimes cooperative and sometimes inimical ways. This is why our attitudes towards animate things are so very different from our attitudes towards the inanimate.
  •  41
    De Anima III 7. The Actuality Principle and the Triggering of Mental Episodes
    In Gweltaz Guyomarc'H., Claire Louguet, Charlotte Murgier & Michel Crubellier (eds.), Aristote et l'âme humaine: lectures de De anima III offertes à Michel Crubellier, Peeters. pp. 185-220. 2020.
    Aristotle: Philosophy of Mind
  •  45
    Resuming Discussion of the Common Cause of Animal Self-Motion: How Does the Soul Move the Body? De Motu Animalium 6
    In Christof Rapp & Oliver Primavesi (eds.), Aristotle's De Motu Animalium: Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford University Press. 2020.
    This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 6 (MA 6). In this chapter Aristotle resumes the discussion of the common cause of animal self-motion. For this purpose the chapter introduces the technical vocabulary from De Anima III 9–11, e.g. desire, phantasia, nous, perception. The contribution argues, among other things, that MA 6 marks the beginning, not of Aristotle’s teleological explanation of animal motion, but of his common causal explanation of animal self-motion in the sen…Read more
    This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 6 (MA 6). In this chapter Aristotle resumes the discussion of the common cause of animal self-motion. For this purpose the chapter introduces the technical vocabulary from De Anima III 9–11, e.g. desire, phantasia, nous, perception. The contribution argues, among other things, that MA 6 marks the beginning, not of Aristotle’s teleological explanation of animal motion, but of his common causal explanation of animal self-motion in the sense of the efficient cause common to all sublunary living beings capable of moving themselves locally.
  •  26
    De incessu animalium 5–6: The Architecture of Locomotive Bodies
    In Andrea Falcon & Stasinos Stavrianeas (eds.), Aristotle on How Animals Move: The de Incessu Animalium: Text, Translation, and Interpretative Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 143-166. 2021.
  •  22
    Aristotle’s Theory of Animal Agency and the Problem of Self-Motion
    In Sophia M. Connell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Biology, Cambridge University Press. pp. 176-194. 2021.
  •  52
    Verantwortung zweiter Klasse. Beobachtungen zur Vorgeschichte unser Konzeption der Verantwortung
    In Reinhard Kahle & Niels Weidtmann (eds.), Verantwortung. Ein Begriff in seiner Aktualität, Brill. pp. 15-37. 2022.
    Moral ResponsibilityEthics
  •  72
    The Gate to Reality: Aristotle's Basic Account of Perception
    In Caleb M. Cohoe (ed.), Aristotle's on the Soul: A Critical Guide, Cambridge University Press. pp. 122-154. 2021.
    This chapter first argues against the widely accepted “mentalist” interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of the perception of external objects. On that view, the perception of objects results from an act of synthesis of the diverse perceptual input provided by the different sense modalities. I argue that Aristotle’s conception of perception does not require such mental “construction” of external objects. For him, we unfailingly perceive external objects by way of modally specific perception: p…Read more
    This chapter first argues against the widely accepted “mentalist” interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of the perception of external objects. On that view, the perception of objects results from an act of synthesis of the diverse perceptual input provided by the different sense modalities. I argue that Aristotle’s conception of perception does not require such mental “construction” of external objects. For him, we unfailingly perceive external objects by way of modally specific perception: perception without qualification is primarily of external 3-D objects, while modally specific perception is of perceptual qualities. As the special senses cannot operate in isolation from the perceptual system as a whole, it follows that we see colors, hear sounds, etc., and thereby perceive the objects whose colors and sounds they are. The second part offers a causal interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of perception as “reception of the form without the matter,” according to which the causal history of sensory affection fixes the content of the resulting act of perception: perception is cognitive in virtue of being the matterless presence of external things’ qualities in the perceiver.
    Aristotle: PerceptionAristotle: Soul
  •  63
    Transformation and Discontinuity, Nature, Rationality, and Self-Motion in Aristotle
    In Friedemann Buddensiek & Sebastian Odzuck (eds.), Praxis - Handeln und Handelnde in antiker Philosophie: Akten des 6. Kongresses der Gesellschaft für antike Philosophie 2019, De Gruyter. pp. 107-138. 2022.
    Aristotle: EthicsAristotle: Philosophy of Mind
  •  67
    Aristotle on Remembering and Memory. Toward an Interpretation of Mem. 1
    with Andrea Falcon
    Medicina Nei Secoli. International for the History of Philosophy 34 (1): 11-30. 2022.
    At the outset of De memoria 1 (hereafter Mem. 1) Aristotle promises a scientific definition of memory, a causal account that explains how episodes of memory occur, and a clarification as to the location of memory that identifies the main part of the soul involved in the exercise of memory. All these promises are fulfilled by the end of Mem. 1. While Aristotle has a great deal to say on human memory, his first and foremost goal is to develop an account that explains the role of memory and remembe…Read more
    At the outset of De memoria 1 (hereafter Mem. 1) Aristotle promises a scientific definition of memory, a causal account that explains how episodes of memory occur, and a clarification as to the location of memory that identifies the main part of the soul involved in the exercise of memory. All these promises are fulfilled by the end of Mem. 1. While Aristotle has a great deal to say on human memory, his first and foremost goal is to develop an account that explains the role of memory and remembering in animal life. This article discusses the explanatory and definitional strategies adopted in Aristotle’s exploration of the phenomenon of memory. It also offers an interpretation of the whole chapter from a methodological perspective.
    Aristotle: Philosophy of MindAristotle: Parva Naturalia
  •  32
    De mixtione XIII: Finally, the Truth about Mixture
    In Gweltaz Guyomarc'H. & Frans A. J. de Haas (eds.), Studies on Alexander of Aphrodisias' On mixture and growth, Brill. pp. 168-191. 2024.
    Alexander of Aphrodisias
  •  54
    Die Psychologisierung von De anima. Vermutungen über die Ursachen der Auffassung späterer Aristoteles-Kommentatoren von Aristoteles’ Wissenschaft vom Lebendigen
    In Christian Brockmann (ed.), Aristoteles-Kommentare und ihre Überlieferung, De Gruyter. pp. 131-162. 2024.
    Commentators on AristotleAristotle: On the Soul
  •  34
    Aristoteles-Handbuch: Leben-Werk-Wirkung (edited book, 2nd ed.)
    with Christof Rapp
    J.B. Metzler Verlag. 2021.
    Aristoteles, Schüler Platons und Lehrer Alexanders des Großen, gilt als einer der bedeutendsten Denker überhaupt. Er hat ein umfangreiches, aber auch anspruchsvolles und schwer zugängliches Werk hinterlassen. Seine Schriften sind nicht nur grundlegend für die weitere Entwicklung in Wissenschaften und Philosophie, sondern sie stellen nach wie vor auch eine lebendige philosophische Herausforderung dar: Aristoteles zu studieren, heißt deswegen letztlich nichts anderes als zu philosophieren. Dieses …Read more
    Aristoteles, Schüler Platons und Lehrer Alexanders des Großen, gilt als einer der bedeutendsten Denker überhaupt. Er hat ein umfangreiches, aber auch anspruchsvolles und schwer zugängliches Werk hinterlassen. Seine Schriften sind nicht nur grundlegend für die weitere Entwicklung in Wissenschaften und Philosophie, sondern sie stellen nach wie vor auch eine lebendige philosophische Herausforderung dar: Aristoteles zu studieren, heißt deswegen letztlich nichts anderes als zu philosophieren. Dieses Handbuch bietet einen Überblick über alle Werke und Werkgruppen, es informiert über Grundbegriffe, die sich durch sein Werk ziehen (wie Glück, Tugend, Form, Materie, Syllogismus, Substanz etc.), und es verfolgt die umfangreiche Rezeption vom Peripatos über die frühe Neuzeit bis in die Gegenwart. Für die 2. Auflage wurde das Handbuch umfassend durchgesehen, aktualisiert und um Stichworte zu den Themen Frauen, Mathematik, Mensch, Phronesis und Sklaverei erweitert. Ein neues Kapitel zu Existenzphilosophie und Hermeneutik schließt eine Lücke der Aristoteles-Rezeption im 20. Jahrhundert.
    Aristotle
  •  55
    Die hylemorphistische Deutung von Tod und Sterben bei Aristoteles
    In Franz-Josef Bormann (ed.), Tod und Sterben: Anthropologische Grundlagen, kulturelle Deutungsmuster und aktuelle Herausforderungen, De Gruyter. pp. 23-44. 2023.
    Defining DeathAristotle: Natural Science
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